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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ANARCHY AND ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM: REASON, FOUNDATIONALISM, 
AND THE ANARCHIST TRADITION 
by 
Joaquin A. Pedroso 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Clement Fatovic, Major Professor 
Some contemporary anarchist scholarship has rejected the Enlightenment-inspired 
reliance on reason that was supposedly central to classical anarchist thought and 
expanded the anarchist critique to address issues ignored by their classical 
predecessors.  In making reason the object of critique, some contemporary anarchists 
expanded the anarchist framework to include critiques of domination residing outside the 
traditional power centers of the state, the capitalist firm, and the church thereby shedding 
light on the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the intellect itself. 
Though contemporary anarchist scholarship has sought to apply this anti-
authoritarian ethos to the realms of epistemology and ontology (by employing Michel 
Foucault’s analysis of power and other postfoundational thinkers), their own framework 
of analysis is glaringly susceptible to what Habermas called a “performative 
contradiction.” In questioning the authority of aspects of even our own intellect (and the 
epistemological and ontological presuppositions that accompany it) we call into question 
even the authority of our own argumentation. 
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I answer this “contradiction” by interrogating two intellectual traditions. Firstly, I 
question a key postfoundational anarchist premise. Namely, I assess whether an 
understanding of classical anarchist thinkers as quintessential children of the 
Enlightenment is justified. Secondly, I offer an alternative path to reconciliation between 
the anti-authoritarian values of the anarchists and the anti-metaphysical values of the 
postfoundationalists (that I think mirrors anarchist anti-authoritarian concerns) by 
suggesting we are better served to think of an anti-authoritarianism of the intellect by 
employing three key twentieth century thinkers: Richard Rorty, Paul Feyerabend, and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. I do so while anchoring Rorty’s, Feyerabend’s, and Wittgenstein’s 
philosophies in the 19th century anti-metaphysical thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
philosophical anarchism of Max Stirner. 
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Introduction 
Anarchy, Reason, and Anti-Intellectualism 
Anarchy, first employed in its modern non-derogatory sense by Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, has been understood in anarchist circles since the 19th century as “the absence 
of a master, of a sovereign.”1 More than simply a protest against the relational dynamic 
between master and slave or sovereign and subject, anarchy was understood by Proudhon 
and other so-called classical anarchists to be fundamentally anti-authoritarian.2 They 
stood firmly against relations and structures of domination and coercion in the realm of 
the political, the social, and the economic. Anarchic anti-authoritarianism took aim at all 
social structures of domination, from the spiritual domination of organized religion, to the 
coercive governance of state systems, to the alienating and exploitative nature of 
capitalism as well as the relations of domination inherent in the inequalities bred from 
these structures.3    
Even though scholars agree that the classical anarchists forcefully challenged the 
authority of countless institutions and practices, many claim they never challenged the 
authority of Reason.4 Despite their anti-authoritarian ethos, many claim classical 
																																								 																					
1 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? ed. Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 209. 
 
2 The “classical” anarchists include William Godwin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter 
Kropotkin, as well as their immediate followers such as Rudolph Rocker, Emma Goldman et al.  
 
3 See for example, Robert M. Cutler, ed., trans. The Basic Bakunin: Writings, 1869-1871 (Buffalo, NY: 
Prometheus, 1992); Peter Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread and Other Writings. Ed. Marshall S. Shatz 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The General Idea of the 
Revolution in the Nineteenth Century. Trans. John Beverly Robinson (London: Pluto Press, 1989).  
 
4 Scholars who critique the classical anarchist reliance on Reason include Saul Newman, Lewis Call, and 
Todd May.  
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anarchists seemed oblivious to the authoritarian potential of Reason itself as well as its 
auxiliary ideological notions like scientism and human nature.5  Proudhon himself 
reflexively relied on the authoritative signaling of Reason as the unquestioned 
methodology for arriving at truth, the arrival at truth itself being a prerequisite for any 
meaningful exercise of liberty in the face of these perceived structures of domination.  In 
noting that “the opinion of no one is of any value until its truth has been proven, no one 
can put his will in the place of reason – no one is king,”6 Proudhon reinforced what many 
anarchists seemingly took for granted, namely the authority of Reason as both a liberating 
vehicle and as a prerequisite for the liberation of humanity.  These consummate anti-
authoritarians seemed to reinforce and extend the authority of Reason in both employing 
and celebrating it as the foundation for anarchic anti-authoritarianism.   
Some contemporary anarchist scholarship has rejected the reliance on Reason that 
seemed crucial to classical anarchist thought and expanded the anarchist critique to 
address issues once supposedly ignored by their classical predecessors.  In making 
Reason the object of critique, some contemporary anarchists identified structures of 
domination in realms other than the political, the economic, or the social.  Moreover, in 
expanding the anarchist framework to include critiques of domination residing outside 
the traditional power centers of the state, the capitalist firm, and the church, 
																																								 																					
5 When referring to Reason (capital R) I am referring to Reason considered both as a faculty and as an 
ideal. Otherwise, I will refer to reason (lower case r) when referring only to the faculty or to causes and 
explanations for something.   
 
6 Proudhon, Property, 209.  
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contemporary anarchist scholarship shed light on the authoritarianism inherent in even 
our own intellect.  
Recent anarchist scholarship has sought to rectify this apparent oversight of the 
classical anarchists.  Some contemporary anarchists have applied this anti-authoritarian 
ethos to the realms of epistemology and ontology (particularly to issues addressing the 
legitimacy of the authority of Reason, representation, universality, and essentialist 
categories and frameworks of analysis). This study will explore the trajectory of anarchist 
thought (from the classical anarchism of the 19th century to contemporary 
postfoundational anarchism, which, like Saul Newman, I will collectively refer to as 
postanarchism) and the feasibility and coherence of anarchist principles not only in the 
political realm but also in the realm of epistemology and ontology (especially as they 
relate to the ideal of Reason, science and scientism, and human nature).  That is, my 
purpose is to sketch what a consistent anarchism would look like in the epistemological 
and ontological spheres, which I refer to collectively as the “intellectual.”  
The danger inherent in questioning even sacrosanct bulwarks of our intellect (e.g., 
Reason) is the possibility of falling into incoherence. In questioning the authority of 
aspects of even our own intellect (and the epistemological and ontological 
presuppositions that accompany it) we call into question even the authority of our own 
argumentation.  At the very least we call into question whether such an endeavor is even 
possible.   
As I will argue, the postanarchist endeavor seems susceptible to incoherence 
when it decries the use of Reason while providing a sometimes-caricatured reading of the 
so-called classical anarchists with regard to the question of intellectualism. The question I 
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ask is whether a critique of Reason (and, according to postanarchists, the essentialist 
ideas, methodological hierarchies, and universalities that usually accompany it) that does 
not rely on those same ideas even possible. Is it even possible for postanarchists to 
coherently critique the classical anarchist reliance on Reason without having those 
critiques somehow convey notions which themselves rely on essentialist ideas, 
methodological hierarchies, or universalities apparently unavoidable in Western political 
thought?  
Ever since Plato’s attempt to establish the foundations of a just society on rational 
principles, Reason has shaped the contours of Western intellectual life and still continues 
to permeate the modern technocratic and instrumental society that critics of the 
Enlightenment have assailed, serving as the basis for most theoretical constructs of 
political order.  While the ancient ideal of Reason rests on an unchangeable archetype or 
is understood to be the source of first principles (most notably the idea of non-
contradiction in Aristotle) needed to arrive at truth, medieval thinkers like Thomas 
Aquinas argued certain religious notions exceeded the capacities of human reason yet 
some theological truths could be attained through our faculty of reason.7  
Modern thinkers like Rene Descartes and John Locke considered our individual 
exercise of reason as the vehicle to arrive at truths once promised alone by faith or 
unchanging archetypes accessible to a privileged few. Descartes considered the senses a 
																																								 																					
7 Thomas Aquinas, Of God and His Creatures: An Annotated Translation (with some abridgments) Summa 
Contra Gentiles, trans. Joseph Rickaby (Westminster, MD: The Carroll Press, 1950), 7. However, this same 
faculty of reason was understood by Aquinas as inherently limited and unable to conceive fully of the 
omniscience and omnipotence of God and would always be a less noble pursuit than the exercise of faith. 
See Aquinas, Of God and His Creatures, 228.  
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source of “uncertainty and error” and considered unmitigated reason his means of escape 
from such epistemological and ontological insecurity once alleviated by faith.8 Relatedly, 
while Locke considered faith “above reason” Locke recognized that through our faculty 
of reason we might come to know truths more certainly than by revelation and that the 
“clear evidence of reason” obviates any need of revelation.9 Nevertheless, our reason is 
necessarily insufficient and often “puzzled” because our ideas with which we reason are 
“imperfect” and “obscure” and principles often “false.”10 David Hume and Immanuel 
Kant also personalized Reason to be understood as on the one hand inherently limited (as 
in Hume’s critique of induction and Kant’s insistence of the inaccessibility of the 
noumenal) and subject to our own ends (even if derived from rational principles as in 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, yet not exclusively reliant on Reason as in Hume’s 
sentimentalism) as opposed to dependent on a transcendent Good.11   
In other words, while the ancients largely relied on Reason to determine objective 
truth about ultimate ends or the good life (these notions being otherworldly), medieval 
thinkers usually prized faith in God as both the ultimate end and inevitable outcome of 
the proper exercise of reason. Modern thinkers often thought of Reason as a means of 																																								 																					
8 Harry G. Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes’s Meditations 
(New York: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1970), 4. See also, Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method; and, 
Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).  
 
9 John Locke, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1996), 325. 
 
10 Ibid, 320.			
11 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965); Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1956).   
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determining a subjective good and considered otherworldly notions like the good life and 
God to be largely beside the personalized aims of Reason. For Moderns like Descartes, 
Locke, Hume, Kant, and others, while the exercise of our most prized faculty could 
certainly reinforce the findings of faith it also served, more importantly, as our individual 
means to “clearly” and “distinctly” assess reality (a concern independent of our faith and 
matters of “salvation”). Though the modern individualist rendering of our most prized 
faculty often highlighted its limitations it also clearly celebrated it as a guide to rendering 
our world intelligible.  
Politically, the ancient employment of Reason justified the construction of a 
“noble lie”12 which served to create meaning and value for ends that only a rational few 
could grasp and existed independently of those striving to achieve these ends.13 The 
ancient ideal focused on unchanging principles that grounded all further knowledge that 
existed independently of our own ends.  Though Aristotle recognized the role of desire 
and habit in shaping our ends they were subject to the authority and control of Reason 
that shaped the ultimate end and validated the quest for truth. Likewise, Reason would 
complement and reinforce revelation in medieval thought but would hardly stand as a 
substitute for the ultimate grounding of both meaning and knowledge, God. Though it is 
difficult to generalize, this reinforcement would often legitimize political orders based on 
subservience to existing authority and adherence to ostensible Biblical mores.  
																																								 																					
12 See Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
 
13 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991), 10. See 
also book VI of Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994).  
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The modern individualist conception of Reason on the other hand is deployed as a 
means for personal and political liberation accessible to all and couched in a seemingly 
indefatigable optimism, present especially in radical thought, in our ability to rationally 
order society to fit our ends. Rather than thinking of Reason as a faculty accessible only 
through some kind of transcendent know-how, as a gift from God to be used only for 
predetermined ends, or as the guarantor of truth, the modern employment of Reason was 
subject to the limitations and aims of the individual exercising it.   
Despite their differences, the ancient, medieval, and modern conceptions of 
Reason all consider Reason as an authoritative measure of knowledge that serves as a 
foundation for political order. The authority of Reason championed, for example, by 
Plato’s philosopher kings or Aristotle’s conception of the good life is likewise understood 
as the primary foundation of modern constructs of political order.14  In other words, 
modern critiques still rely on a privileging of Reason to both justify new political 
authority and critique existing ones.  The ancient and modern employments of Reason are 
not fundamentally different in that they both celebrate and continue to bestow a 
privileged status on Reason.  
It is claimed that the privileged position of Reason is especially evident in the 
anarchism of thinkers like William Godwin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, 																																								 																					
14 See Book III of Aristotle’s Politics where he describes the end of the state as “the good life” and admits 
that “political society exists for the sake of noble actions” to which only a few can contribute (1280b39 - 
1291a8). Likewise, modern orderings of what Aristotle called “political society” rely on Reason by 
deducing appropriate regime types from certain conceptions of human nature (as in Hobbes and Locke) or 
seeing a flourishing of (or approximation to) Reason as the ultimate end (as in deliberative models like 
Habermas’ ideal of communicative rationality. See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 1984).).  
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and Peter Kropotkin, all of whom apparently continued the Enlightenment tradition of 
harnessing the power of Reason to challenge the stifling effects of centralized state 
power, concentrations of wealth, and church dogma and are best known for 
delegitimizing the state and their rejection of institutions which justify arbitrary 
authority.15 These anarchists sometimes employed Reason in much the same way Plato 
did, exalting it in order to critique existing convention and custom and challenge what 
they perceived to be arbitrary authority.  
The general aims and conceptual pillars of the anarchist tradition have usually 
been understood in terms of the social, economic, or political.  That is, the employment 
of Reason in anarchist thought hinged on a stinging critique of organized religion, 
capitalism, and the state. Nevertheless, intellectual structures of domination (such as the 
privileging of Reason) seemingly remained unscathed by the anarchist critique according 
to some contemporary anarchist scholars.  In other words, it is argued that anarchism has 
relentlessly debunked the idea of a need for power and privilege and condemned the 
domination inherent in all forms of government, the private firm, and the church but has 
paid little attention to power and privilege in the realm of the intellect.  
Ironically, in this reading of the anarchist tradition, liberation from structures of 
domination (especially government) hinged on the unquestioned authority of Reason and 
its command over a gradual process of enlightenment.  That is, anarchism’s challenge of 
arbitrary authority and domination accepts and privileges the authority of Reason.  What 
																																								 																					
15 Self-proclaimed poststructuralist, postmodern, and postanarchist scholars like Todd May, Lewis Call, and 
Saul Newman claim the classical anarchist tradition is beholden to Enlightenment values that limit the 
radical potential of these anarchists.  
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underlies the classical anarchist tradition generally was an exaltation of Reason and belief 
in auxiliary notions such as faith in a progressive advance towards truth or enlightenment, 
universality,16 and an essentialist representational view that considered the privileged 
faculty of reason as an integral part human nature. In other words, being notably absent 
from the classical anarchist anti-authoritarian tradition, a critical appraisal of Reason did 
not challenge the authority of these auxiliary claims central to supporting the anarchist 
anti-authoritarian view.  These anarchists thought of society as “scientifically observable 
and determined by historical forces,” human beings as imbued with “essential moral and 
rational characteristics which could flourish given the right social conditions,” and a faith 
in a rationality that would overcome social and political oppression.17 
According to this narrative, since its 19th century beginnings, the privileged 
authority of Reason in anarchism remained unscathed until recent developments began to 
question its legitimacy. Godwin understood that “The true supporters of government are 
the weak and uninformed, and not the wise.  In proportion as weakness and ignorance 
shall diminish, the basis of government will also decay.”18 Godwin suggested a reliance 
on individual Reason as a means to overcome this human “weakness” and “ignorance” in 
order to be able to act with sound judgment and in liberty.  Godwin notes,  
																																								 																					
16 Where universality denotes an authoritative meaning of a certain concept or truth understood the same 
way in every context, i.e., independent of time, space, or community in which it is understood.  
 
17 Saul Newman, Unstable Universalities: Poststructuralism and radical politics (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2007), 2. 
 
18 Robert Graham, ed., Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, 14. 
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If a man be in some cases obliged to prefer his own judgment, he is in all cases 
obliged to consult that judgment, before he can determine whether the matter in 
question be of the sort provided for or no.  So that from this reasoning it 
ultimately appears that the conviction of a man’s individual understanding is the 
only legitimate principle imposing on him the duty of adopting any species of 
conduct…19  
It was only through an unquestioned privileging of and faith in our own rational 
capacities that we were able to resist existing forms of arbitrary authority. That is, in 
order to oppose “external” exercises of illegitimate authority, Godwin and others 
expected us to be subject to the “internal” authority of our own Reason.   
Similarly, Proudhon noted that the state and right of property (by which he meant 
inherited wealth, accumulated interest on capital, and other monies not earned through 
labor or occupation and the law which protected and privileged it) undermined the 
potential of Reason to liberate humankind.  He believed in the rational organization of 
society independent of the state (which enforced the right of property).  According to 
Proudhon, the natural outgrowth of property was inequality and the natural outgrowth of 
inequality was deference.  It was deference, or “the use of conventional standards of rank 
– mainly wealth, power, and prestige – to rate all members of society,” that was the target 
of Proudhon’s attack.20 These “conventional standards” were contrary to Reason for 
																																								 																					
19 Ibid.  
 
20 Alan Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre Joseph Proudhon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1969), 97. 
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Proudhon and in seeking to liberate humankind Proudhon emphasized that freedom was 
unattainable with the existence of deference stemming from property.  
He argued that wherever rank or hierarchy was present, freedom would be 
lacking.21 Indeed, Proudhon thought that “Deference engenders ‘special perquisites, 
privileges, exemptions, favors, exceptions, all the violations of justice’ – in short, 
oppression, including economic exploitation of the unprivileged.”22 All hierarchy for 
Proudhon, even certain hierarchies necessary to redistribute wealth (e.g., state 
bureaucracies) created inequality and paved the way for deference.23 That is, even 
redistribution for the sake of complete material equality is an exercise in inequality for 
Proudhon. Those in charge of the mechanisms of distribution would wield a 
preponderance of power and it was only through the abolition of the state that humankind 
would be free and Reason allowed to flourish. 
Likewise, Kropotkin based his anarchism on an animal nature (which he felt 
human beings shared) of cooperation.  This cooperation is naturally enhanced by Reason.  
Kropotkin argued that through “mutual aid” animals (and human beings) survived and 
progressed as a species.  Social conditions in the modern age, however, undermined this 
natural condition of humankind and instead encouraged competition as the way to 																																								 																					
21 Ritter notes “Choice can never be free where men view one another in graded hierarchy” in Proudhon, 
96. 
 
22 Ibid, 97. 
 
23 Ibid, 99. According to Ritter, “The existence of inequality presupposes application of a rule that tells how 
much wealth, power, and prestige each member of society should receive.  Such a rule, indicating how 
goods should be allocated among members of society, is an obvious example of a principle of distributive 
justice. Hence, if inequality is to be abolished so must its underlying distributive principle.  All rules of 
distributive justice must be eliminated.”  
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progress.  This move toward competition corrupted the individual, denying them their 
human essence.  By eliminating the social institutions that promoted competition in the 
modern age, humankind would be able to freely exercise Reason and cooperate in a 
fashion where their human essence would again flourish.24  That is, in eliminating forms 
of societal authority the authority of Reason would prevail.  
Bakunin also outlined the dangers of authority and state power, even if 
revolutionary in form. His debate with Marx over the inherent authoritarianism of state 
power led to his expulsion from the First International and highlighted his concern over 
authoritarian revolutionary means. Though he resisted authoritarian means to revolution, 
he unquestioningly accepted the authority of Reason in helping humankind discover the 
“natural laws” which held the promise of liberation. Bakunin was a staunch 
Enlightenment-inspired empiricist who rejected the idea that a human being’s essential 
nature was that of the atomized individual (as propounded by defenders of capitalism).  
Instead he advocated a view that human beings naturally inclined towards freedom in the 
form of spontaneity, that they were “naturally social and always lived in communities” 
and that they instinctively orient themselves towards justice.25 This justice, for Bakunin, 
derives from his belief in Reason and natural human sociability. In drawing the 
distinction between the natural laws of, for example, human sociability (which are not 
enforced and need only be discovered via Reason and science) and societal laws such as 
property rights (enforced through coercion and violence) he differentiated the 																																								 																					
24 Andrew M. Koch, “Poststructuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism,” Philosophy and the 
Social Sciences 23 (1993): 330.  
 
25 “The Philosophical Roots of the Marx-Bakunin Debate”, Ann Robertson, accessed 10/7/2012, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/bio/robertson-ann.htm.  
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authoritarianism inherent in state power and the authority of Reason and scientific 
thinking. It is this distinction that is crucial to the humanist, Enlightenment-inspired 
anarchist endeavor and key to differentiating it from its postanarchist successor.   
Though critics of the Enlightenment have attacked the unquestioned authority of 
Reason (and its perceived harmful technocratic effects) they have not addressed the 
possibility of anarchism as a resolution to the problem of epistemic and ontological 
authority until recently.26  The story is, by now, well known.  Beginning arguably with 
the Romantics and reaching its climax in postfoundationalist thought, the challenge to the 
hegemony of Reason in philosophy and the critique of idealism and humanism in the 
Enlightenment was manifested in an increasingly hostile reaction towards univocal or 
transcendent meaning, instrumental rationality, and scientific worldviews couched in the 
industrial and post-industrial processes of the 19th and 20th centuries.27  
Diverse thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques 
Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, among others, have argued that Western 
philosophical and especially Enlightenment considerations of Reason, including those 
prized by classical anarchists, are problematic because they both conceive of human 
																																								 																					
26 See, for example, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of the Enlightenment: Philosophical 
Fragments. Ed., Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans., Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002). Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the excesses of the Enlightenment faith in reason and its 
suspicion of anything which “does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility” led not only to 
the ambitious project of dominating nature but also the dominion of society, paving the way for the 20th 
century’s totalitarian regimes and the horrors of the Second World War (Horkheimer and Adorno, 
Dialectic, 3).  
 
27 See, for example, Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of the Enlightenment; Michel Foucault, The 
Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972); as well as 
Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1991) for an account of how these intellectual movements are situated in the increasing technocratic 
tendencies, instrumentalism, and frenetic dizziness of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
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understanding as paradigmatically Reason-based and understand human liberation as a 
uniform progress towards the flourishing of Reason.  They considered the exaltation of 
Reason as the “rationalization of coercion” (discipline in Foucault) and dismissed the 
project of truth-seeking as a misguided endeavor that endangered the independence of 
mind and autonomy central to critical inquiry.  They saw the idea of progress as a 
“strategy of repression” and while, at times, relishing the anti-establishment spirit of the 
Enlightenment, these thinkers criticized what they saw as domination in the form of 
universalizing tendencies and “meta-narratives” of modernity.28 
Like the classical anarchists generally, these thinkers were vehemently anti-
hierarchical and anti-authoritarian.  They were concerned about how power structures, 
relations of domination, and conceptual universality sustained hierarchy and arbitrary 
authority. These postfoundational philosophies aimed at a “profound destabilization” of 
authoritative “cognitive boundaries and frameworks” in challenging the hitherto lauded 
ideal of Reason.29 More generally, the postfoundational philosophies as a whole engage 
in a “fundamental questioning of the grand ideals and universal discourses that had 
defined our social, political and cultural reality since the Enlightenment.”30 
																																								 																					
28 Pierre Saint-Amand and Sophie Hawkes, “Contingency and the Enlightenment”, in SubStance, Vol.26, 
No.2, Issue 83: An Ecology of Knowledge: Michael Serres: A Special Issue (1997: 96. For a critique of the 
“meta-narratives” in modernity see Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).  
 
29 Fred Dallmayr, “The Politics of Non-Identity: Adorno, Postmodernism – And Edward Said”, Political 
Theory, Vol. 25 No. 1, (February 1997): 33. 
 
30 Saul Newman, Unstable Universalities: Poststructuralism and Radical Politics (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008).  
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For all the anti-authoritarian sentiment evident in postfoundational thought, what 
is noticeably absent is an accompanying anti-authoritarian political project that embraces 
anarchist values.31 That is, positions that characterized, among other things, the 
privileging of Reason as “politically undesirable and philosophically impossible” seemed 
to avoid the quintessentially anti-authoritarian anarchist tradition.32 This scholarship 
(especially the work of Todd May, Lewis Call, and Saul Newman) has stressed the need 
to reinterpret classical anarchist themes in light of postfoundationalism’s onto-
epistemological concerns.  This scholarship seeks to address this aspect of anarchist 
thought by interrogating issues of hierarchy, arbitrary authority, and representationalism 
in classical anarchist ontology and epistemology.   
While traditionally anarchists have challenged the idea that representative, 
ostensibly democratic, government is just, the anarchist critique is now expanded to 
include an interrogation of not only how our political interests are represented but also 
how we are categorized and characterized in ontological and epistemological terms. 
Contemporary postfoundational anarchist theory recognizes a distinction between 
perceived objects (be they modes of power and subjugation or even ourselves) and the 
ideas of those same objects occasioned by our perception of them. In the same way that 
Kropotkin in Words of a Rebel recognized that representative government is the protector 
of privilege and not the guarantor of democracy or our interests, postfoundational 
																																								 																					
31 Postfoundational political arguments like these can be found in Richard Rorty’s, Contingency, Irony, 
Solidarity and Essays on Heidegger and Others which accommodate anti-authoritarian or anti-metaphysical 
thought with liberalism, leaving the idea of the legitimate state and the capitalist firm unscathed.   
 
32 Ben Agger, “Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism,” Annual Review of Sociology 17 (1991): 
106. 
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anarchists seek to dismantle the structures of ostensible representation that govern how 
we perceive ourselves and our world.33  
These postanarchists extend the classical anarchist rejection of hierarchy, arbitrary 
authority, and representationalism to the classical anarchist reliance on Reason as a tool 
and byproduct of justice in the socio-cultural, economic, and political realms. Anarchism, 
in a sense, is turned on itself to question the legitimacy of a Reason-based and 
Enlightenment-inspired anarchist ontology and epistemology.34 In other words, in paving 
the way for a society that truly embraces classical anarchist principles and rejects 
arbitrary authority, hierarchy, and representation, Reason itself has become the object of 
critique.   
This recent anarchist scholarship takes its inspiration from Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Max Stirner, two notable anti-essentialist, anti-metaphysical thinkers as well as the 
postfoundationalist projects they inspired more generally.  Lewis Call notes that 
																																								 																					
33 In Words of a Rebel Kropotkin notes that representative government is the protector of privilege and not 
the guarantor of democracy or our interests. See Kropotkin’s commentary on representative government in 
Words of a Rebel available at “Kropotkin: Representative Government,” Peter Kropotkin, accessed July 27, 
2016, https://robertgraham.wordpress.com/2012/12/24/kropotkin-representative-government/    	
34  I make the distinction between justification of Reason-based approaches to political organization and 
legitimacy of the same as noted in A. John Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy”, Ethics 109: 4 (July 
1999): 739-771, where he argues that justification is the idea that we have reason to follow the direction or 
allow the authority of the state (say for material benefit or social cohesion) while legitimacy refers to the 
“exclusive moral right of an institution to impose on some group of persons, and to enforce those duties 
coercively” independent of any justificatory considerations (Simmons, 769). I think that the conflation of 
justificatory mechanisms and principles of legitimation obscure the implicit framework of arbitrary 
authority postfoundational philosophers seek to combat in ontology and epistemology (and should combat 
in the realm of politics).  That is, where it may be conceivable that authority would fail to be arbitrary once 
it is justified, it can still be considered illegitimate. It is, by and large, the illegitimate nature of authority 
that I will be addressing in the privileging of Reason in anarchist ontology and epistemology.  
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His [Nietzsche’s] philosophy is thus anarchistic in the strong sense of the term: it 
includes important elements of an anarchistic politics, but (more importantly) it 
also contains an anarchy of thought.  Nietzsche’s writing attacks hierarchy not 
only at the political level but at the philosophical level as well, undermining the 
very foundations of the deeply entrenched metaphysics of domination upon which 
the West as come to rely.35 
Likewise,  
All our beliefs are dismissed by Stirner as so many ideological abstractions, 
‘spooks’, ‘fixed ideas’: our faith in rationality is shown to be no less superstitious 
than faith in the most obfuscating of religions; Man is simply God reinvented; 
secular institutions and discourses are alive with spectres of Christianity; 
universalism is spoken from a particular position of power.36 
According to postanarchists, it is this thinking about hierarchy in every realm–including 
the intellectual—which distinguishes these recent anarchist thinkers from the classical 
anarchists. According to Newman and other postanarchists, classical anarchists still 
prized hierarchy in the realm of the intellect, a hierarchy that undermines the anarchist 
project.  According to Call, “classical anarchism is haunted by a rationalist semiotics 
which seriously limits its radical potential.”37 The postanarchist project employs key 
themes in Stirner and Nietzsche, as well as prominent postmodern and poststructuralist 
																																								 																					
35  Lewis Call, Postmodern Anarchism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 2.  
 
36 Saul Newman, ed., Max Stirner (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1.    
 
37 Call, Postmodern Anarchism, 16.  
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thinkers, to address issues of hierarchy and arbitrary authority in questions of 
epistemological and ontological import. Call, Newman, May and others interpret the role 
of postfoundationalist thought as dissecting and debunking the privileged position of 
Reason and other essentialist Enlightenment inspired notions in anarchist political 
philosophy.   
This approach, to some anarchist thinkers, is an ethical call.  Todd May notes that 
the “first ethical principle to which poststructuralism is committed is that practices of 
representing others to themselves – either in who they are or in what they want – ought, 
as much as possible, to be avoided.”38 In identifying the inherent authoritarianism of an 
accompanying representational essentialist view of the individual, anarchists like May 
note the dangers in acting or resisting based on authoritarian structures even in the realm 
of the intellect. Newman notes “…resistance must not refer to essentialist foundations if 
it is to avoid reaffirming domination.”39 He concludes that  
…anarchism’s pure place of resistance against power, its uncontaminated point of 
departure – the essential human subject and its related discourses of morality and 
rationality – was found to be somewhat impure, and contaminated by power.  The 
place of resistance was, on the contrary, a place of power and domination.  The 
only trouble with this was that, while it exposed the authoritarian potential within 
anarchism and indeed any revolutionary philosophy which was based on 
																																								 																					
38 Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 130.  
 
39 Saul Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 10.  
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essentialist ideas, it deprived the anti-authoritarian project of its own point of 
resistance.40   
Indeed, postfoundationalism carries an anti-authoritarian ethos that complements 
anarchist political, economic, and socio-cultural commitments.  Recognizing the 
relationship between the anti-authoritarian spirit in postfoundationalism, Nietzsche’s and 
Stirner’s epistemology and ontology, and classical anarchist concerns is central to tracing 
the “logical” extent of anarchist thought.  In other words, in striving to remain consistent, 
applying classical anarchist principles to all realms of life (specifically the realm of the 
intellect), we are forced to interrogate the epistemological and ontological foundations of 
classical anarchism in ways the classical anarchists supposedly did not consider.  Indeed, 
as Newman notes “Anarchism is animated by a living, breathing ‘spirit’ of anarchy that 
disturbs its static foundations and fixed identities.  Postanarchism reveals this joyous 
moment of anarchy within anarchism…”41  
In presuming to carry the mantle of classical anarchist values, postanarchists 
move towards a pluralistic anarchism by attempting to embrace an anti-authoritarianism 
of the intellect without falling into any rigid ideological or philosophical contours.  Such 
contours would limit the radical potential of this contemporary strand of anarchist 
thought while undermining the liberating ethos of anarchism itself.  In other words, 
according to postanarchists, there is no single Archimedean point from which anarchist 
thought and practice hinges but rather a confluence of opportunities to resist and 
innumerable points at which to apply anarchist critiques. In resisting classical anarchist 																																								 																					
40 Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan, 159.  
 
41 Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 182.  
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authoritarianism in the realm of the intellect, postanarchists seek to attune classical 
anarchist thought with what they see as anarchist values.  
While accepting that this recent anarchist literature embraces the spirit of classical 
anarchist ideas I will question the viability of such postanarchist interpretations of 
classical anarchist themes and assess its implications for anarchist political thought more 
generally. The postanarchist endeavor is susceptible to the accusation that it becomes an 
exercise in incoherence when it decries the use of Reason in the construction of any 
radical (or otherwise political) project yet engages in ostensibly Reason-based analysis 
when examining the pitfalls of essentialist vocabularies, arbitrary methodological 
hierarchies, and unwarranted conceptual limitations.  The question becomes: How can 
postanarchists coherently critique the classical anarchist reliance on Reason without 
relying on Reason itself in articulating that critique?  
The postanarchist argument is reminiscent of Adorno’s endeavor in Negative 
Dialectics that Habermas critiques, where  
Philosophical critique…is unrelentingly negative and refuses to reconcile itself to 
the positive for that would merely produce a new delusion. To do so is actually to 
miscarry the thought-process since the dynamic aspect of thought lies in its power 
to explode the illusion of identity: ‘Nonidentity is the secret telos of identification, 
that which is to be rescued in it; the mistake of traditional theory is that it holds 
identity as its goal.’ 42 
																																								 																					
42 Morris, “Performative Contradiction,” 756. See also, Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. 
E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1973).   
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Habermas accuses Adorno of relying on the “tools” of Reason in denouncing the 
“delusion” of the same.  Critique here is “purposive–rational because it uses concepts 
(since one cannot think without concepts), but is also more than this because it is aware 
that the very instrumental nature of concepts is false – they do not measure up to their 
own concept. Yet the critic nevertheless ‘thinks’ and ‘criticizes’.”43  
 This inescapable feature of philosophical critique is, according to Habermas, 
central to modernity in that in creating its “normativity out of itself” it “sees itself cast 
back upon itself without any possibility of escape.”44 A Reason-based critique is both the 
result of and the impetus for this normativity. Though Adorno clearly distinguishes 
between the dangers of Reason (especially instrumental reason)  and reasons in 
argumentation that underlie philosophical critique, Habermas argues such a distinction is 
nonsensical in that philosophical critique is inherently limited to the horizon of this 
understanding of Modernity and that Reason itself is redeemed even if engaged in a 
critique of itself.45   
The compulsion to “avoid” or “resolve” the aporia of Reason in anti-authoritarian 
thought (that is, either to invent a new understanding of the aporia independent of Reason 
or to seek to overcome it with novel intellectual tools that exclude Reason) is absent in 
the postanarchists.  The postanarchists do not argue for a need to overcome the aporia of 																																								 																					
43 Morris, “Performative Contradiction,” 756.  
 
44 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2000), 7. 
 
45 For a stinging critique of instrumental reason and the Enlightenment that inspired it see Adorno and 
Horkheimer, Dialectic of the Enlightenment. For his understanding of modernity see Habermas, The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Ch. 1.  
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Reason sketched by Habermas but rather critique it and dismiss their own supposedly 
aporetic endeavor.  Taking the Habermasian critique into consideration, I will echo 
Martin Morris and pay particular attention to the distinction between the postanarchist 
argument (and postfoundationalist endeavor, generally) being performatively 
contradictory precisely in making a point (namely rejecting the hopeless or aporetic 
nature of the postanarchist critique) and the argument remaining intelligible in its 
reasoning, therefore remaining consistent and coherent.46 Moreover, I will point to how 
these approaches contribute to an understanding of anarchist anti-intellectualism and 
sketch alternative ways of approaching the question of freedom in the anarchist tradition.  
 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter one will critically consider the so-called classical anarchist tradition as 
quintessential children of the Enlightenment. I will endeavor to unpack the veracity of 
this reading of the so-called classical anarchists and highlight a nuanced understanding of 
Reason, the celebration of science, and “foundationalisms” of all sorts in these same 
thinkers. My hope is that such a critical interrogation of the classical anarchists will make 
us re-think the popular characterization of anarchist ontology, epistemology, and reliance 
on Reason.  This chapter will briefly highlight the importance of an idealized Reason in 
																																								 																					
46 See, Morris, “Performative Contradiction,” 735-760.  
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the history of modern philosophy as well as survey its trajectory in the quintessentially 
anti-authoritarian anarchist political project.  I will also interrogate the necessity for a 
consistent anti-authoritarianism in anarchist thought and will review challenges to the 
Enlightenment faith in Reason in epistemology and ontology as well as suggest ways of 
proceeding coherently with an anti-authoritarian onto-epistemological anarchist project. 
 Chapter two will explore, in more detail, the attitudes of William Godwin and 
Pierre Joseph Proudhon towards Enlightenment values, Modernity more generally, and 
consider how their thought contributes to anarchist anti-intellectualism. Godwin and 
Proudhon generally deferred to the authority of Reason yet were ambiguous in their 
treatment of foundational ideals like human nature and transcendent truth. While they 
both celebrated Reason they recognized its limitations and even dangers. While they both 
believed in the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment they also challenged the 
framework that grounded it. Unlike their anarchist counterparts, Bakunin and Kropotkin, 
they both gradually shifted towards more critical stances on authoritative accounts of 
Reason and auxiliary notions like human nature and science.  
Chapter three will consider how Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin celebrated 
the scientific method’s ability to decipher reality in such a way that would expedite 
anarchist revolutions. Yet, while praising the liberating aspects of science (and the 
usually accompanying ideal of Reason) they diagnosed an overreliance on these same 
ideals and recognized the hierarchically institutionalized forms of scientific discovery, 
the univocity of rational thought, and the pernicious division of intellectual from manual 
labor that usually accompanied such an uncritical lauding on Reason and science. Instead, 
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they emphasized spontaneity and improvisation. They promoted a healthy skepticism of 
“intellectual authority” as urgently as they challenged the legitimacy of the state and 
other forms of institutionalized hierarchy.  
Chapter four will examine Max Stirner’s and Friedrich Nietzsche’s challenges to 
metaphysics and epistemology and their connection to anti-authoritarian thought 
(especially the anarchist tradition and recent developments in postfoundational anarchist 
theory). In part, my purpose is to stress the importance of both Stirner and Nietzsche in 
thinking through what anarchist anti-intellectualism looks like. Moreover, in doing so, I 
hope to facilitate new ways in thinking about domination and authority in the realm of the 
intellect and interrogate how such an anti-intellectualism can point towards what 
anarchists like Stirner considered thinking “freely.” 
In my concluding chapter, I frame my reading of anarchist anti-intellectualism in 
terms of contemporary philosophical attempts to, as anarchists have termed it, be 
“without adjectives.” I do so by assessing three main approaches (Wittgensteinian, 
Feyerabendian, and Rortyean) in order to, as Svetlana Boym put it, think “without 
bannisters.” In doing so, I attempt to “redescribe” anarchist anti-intellectualism as a kind 
of ironism made public and hope to further what anarchists would consider thinking 
“freely.” 
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Chapter 1 
Contextualizing and Theorizing Anarchist Anti-Intellectualism 
In the usual reading of the classical anarchists we encounter two equally forceful 
tendencies in their exaltation of Reason.47  On the one hand, we see an indefatigable faith 
in the idea that Reason propels progress (and itself is progressively realized).  On the 
other hand, we see the idea that Reason should be unimpeded in its exercise.  The latter 
tendency is possible only with the progress of Reason itself. In other words, it is only 
through the unimpeded exercise of Reason (that is, an exercise unencumbered by 
arbitrary exercises of authority by government, private concentrations of wealth, or the 
church) that we are able to eliminate those very same arbitrary exercises of authority.  
 Such a reading presents the reader with a problem.  It seems impossible to grasp 
the aspirations of the classical anarchists without admitting to their circular reasoning.  
We see a considerable logical obstacle to their lauding of Reason, namely, in that its 
unquestioned authority lies in demolishing all other forms of authority (in the social, 
economic, and political realms) which itself requires an idealized Reason only possible 
when this very same authority is absent.  
In overcoming this apparently circular reasoning, a glaring inconsistency comes 
to the fore. We see a consistent anti-authoritarianism in the social, economic, and 																																								 																					
47 Among the classical anarchists I include William Godwin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, 
Peter Kropotkin and their immediate followers, among them Emma Goldman, Rudolph Rocker, et al.  
According to some critics of the classical anarchist tradition (Todd May, Lewis Call, Saul Newman, et al.), 
what is notable about these thinkers is that they idealize Reason (which I capitalize to distinguish it from 
the more commonplace notion of the faculty of reason or the employment of reasons in argumentation) in a 
way that is consistent with the thrust of the Enlightenment tradition and ignores the authority inherent in 
prizing Reason itself as an emancipatory means and end.  
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political realms subdued by the unquestioned authority of Reason itself.  Indeed, this 
allows the classical anarchists to, on the one hand, consistently decry the exercise of 
arbitrary authority by the state, concentrations of private power, and the church, and, on 
the other hand, blame the faulty realization of Reason as an ideal. 
In this chapter, I will challenge this reading of the classical anarchists and 
highlight a nuanced understanding of Reason in these same thinkers. This critical 
interrogation of the classical anarchists will make us re-think the popular characterization 
of anarchist ontology, epistemology, and their reliance on Reason.  This chapter will 
briefly highlight the importance of an idealized Reason in the history of modern 
philosophy as well as survey its trajectory in the quintessentially anti-authoritarian 
classical anarchist political project.  I will also interrogate the necessity for a consistent 
anti-authoritarianism in anarchist thought and will review challenges to the 
Enlightenment faith in Reason in epistemology and ontology as well as suggest ways of 
proceeding coherently with a consistent anti-authoritarian onto-epistemological anarchist 
project.  
Classical Anarchists as Children of the Enlightenment 
Contemporary postfoundationalist critics of the anarchist tradition see the 
emergence of classical anarchist anti-authoritarianism as couched in the heritage of the 
Enlightenment that lauded, above all else, Reason’s potential.  They claim that, in 
understanding the Enlightenment as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred 
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immaturity”48 or as an escape from “a certain state or will that makes us accept someone 
else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for,”49 the classical 
anarchists echoed Enlightenment thinkers in relying on an unquestioned authority of 
Reason to guide societal progress. Indeed, the classical anarchists sought to harness the 
power of Reason to overcome the stifling effects of concentrated state power, wealth, and 
industrialization during the 18th and 19th centuries.50   
Nevertheless, there are mixed interpretations of the nature of Enlightenment 
thinking and the classical anarchists who garnered inspiration from it.  The 
Enlightenment is not considered a monolithic tradition nor is it understood as wholly 
liberating. Some see the Enlightenment as a liberating intellectual movement, while 
others see it flirting with dangerous totalitarian tendencies.51 The positive aspects 
attributed to it as a liberating intellectual movement tend to echo the ideals of a perpetual 
questioning of faith, tradition, and authority as well as a lauding of Reason.  However, 
accompanying these views are recent backlashes that point to dangerous totalitarian 
																																								 																					
48 H.S. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54.   
 
49 Paul Ranibow, ed., The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 34.  
 
50 See Saul Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power.  
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001); Saul Newman, Unstable Universalities: Poststructuralism and 
radical politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Saul Newman, The Politics of 
Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Saul Newman, ed., Max Stirner (United 
Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Lewis Call, Postmodern Anarchism. 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003). 
 
51 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Dialectic of the Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
 
		
	 28 
tendencies sustained by a uniform conception of human nature and a “rational 
absolutism” that seems to promise the “secret of the philosopher’s stone.”52  
This faith in the epistemological, ontological, and social authority of Reason 
seemed to mutually reinforce the political ideal of equality shared by many 
Enlightenment thinkers. Political equality was rooted in a philosophical and political 
anthropology that encouraged us to exercise a common faculty of reason to overcome the 
traditional hierarchical political and social orders of the middle ages.  Overcoming this 
hierarchy required an enthusiasm for both an idealized conception of Reason and the idea 
of progress.   
The great enthusiasm for Reason that emerged during the Enlightenment 
encompassed fervor for both the deductive rationalism of the continental tradition53 as 
well as a newfound faith in sense experience via the philosophical systems of British 
empiricists.54 Crowning the Enlightenment was Kant’s critique of Reason that 
categorized and clearly delineated the limits of our most esteemed faculty.55 Indeed, 
beginning in the late 17th and early 18th century we saw a “general process of 
rationalization and secularization” that “eradicated magic and belief in the supernatural 
from Europe’s intellectual culture” that supplanted theology’s hegemony in the world of 
																																								 																					
52 David Collings, “The Romance of the Impossible: William Godwin and the Empty Place of Reason”, 
English Literary History (Volume 70, Number 3 Fall 2003): 849.  
 
53 Among the Continental Rationalists are Rene Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Baruch Spinoza.  
 
54 Among the British empiricists are John Locke and David Hume.  
 
55 Most notably, Kant recognized our inability to access or conceive things-in-themselves, or the noumenal.  
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study.56  In Western Europe, theology itself became increasingly self-critical and through 
a process of reformation and counter-reformation that appeased the growing thirst for 
critical attitudes in every realm of life.  
Intellectual life became increasingly de-centered, local knowledge was prioritized 
over absolutist epistemologies, traditions of political authority were transformed, and 
modes of economic life began to be questioned along libertarian lines.57 These all 
converged with a plethora of radical ideas that were “nurtured within an urban milieu 
characterized by exceptional fluidity of social relations and movement between social 
strata, features which correspond directly to the freer, more flexible intellectual 
framework which emerged.”58 
The reverberations of the intellectual crises of the Enlightenment were felt just as 
forcefully in the politics and sociology of class.  This new intellectual culture both 
fostered and was cultivated by the “advent of new associations and locations with no 
fixed rules of access, which … provided a social space not specific to any one class.”59  
The Enlightenment inspired and was generated by a sort of intellectual 
meritocracy, as envisioned by some of its key participants such as Lord Shaftsbury, 
where society would be ruled not by the traditional landed elite but rather a “new kind of 																																								 																					
56 Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 4. 
 
57 For a good history see Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (Oakland: PM 
Press, 2010). See also, George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements 
(Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1962).  
 
58 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 59. 
 
59 Ibid, 60. 
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élite of affairs and ideas – an élite of the cultured, well-meaning, and gentlemanly.” 
Moreover, the movement would claim liberty as a “political and social condition” and not 
just a narrow constitutional affair as defined by the ‘Glorious Revolution’. Instead, it was 
envisioned as a liberty “defined by debate, criticism, and cultural exchange.”60  
Though there were innumerable debates among these schools (as well as various 
schools of skeptics, subjectivists, and deists of all sorts), the underlying and edifying 
theme of the Enlightenment was a reliance on private judgment guided by ones reason. 
The emerging intellectuals of Enlightenment Europe hoped that private judgment would 
stand hegemonic over intellectual pursuits.  This intellectual hegemony would encompass 
a belief that all modes of inquiry should rely, as little as possible, on traditional sources of 
both knowledge and power.  The church and the state were seen as sources of arbitrary 
authority that impeded the pure analytical and investigatory potential of our cognitive 
faculties.   
In addition to a lauding of Reason, the idea of progress is also omnipresent in 
Enlightenment thought as well as the classical anarchists who point to the expanding 
quality of our intellectual endeavors.  Indeed, the classical anarchists believed and hoped 
for progress in both our moral capacities as well as our rational and scientific pursuits. 
This notion of progress in the classical anarchists reflects the firm basis of their thought 
in the Enlightenment tradition.  But, like the classical anarchists, the Enlightenment 
tradition is itself nuanced when it comes to the idea of progress. There are strong 
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elements of a belief in progress as well as a healthy skepticism (often contradictory) 
towards the ideal of Reason and the notion of inevitable progress.  
There are many instances of a notion of progress accompanying our increasing 
ability to, as Descartes put it, master and possess nature by harnessing the power of 
Reason. Nevertheless, advances in science and technology seemed to point to a historic-
intellectual end-point thinkers in the Hegelian tradition recognized as the “end of 
history.”61  In any case, this spirit of progress in the post-Enlightenment frenzy over the 
limitless potential of Reason marched intellectual and social life towards a vague sense of 
completion.   
However, it would be unfair to characterize Enlightenment thinkers as wholly 
worshipping at the altar of Reason. While Hume questioned the value of induction and 
stressed the non-rational aspects of cognition, like sentimentalism, and Kant highlighted 
the inaccessibility of the noumenal62, Giambattista Vico, Johann Georg Hamann, and 
Johann Gottfried Herder stressed the historical nuance of “rival values within systems” 
and “different value systems with divergent backgrounds” that posses “their own 
independent validity and authenticity.”63   
Even quintessential children of the Enlightenment like Proudhon had their doubts 
about the hegemony of Reason in promoting progress.  In a letter to Marx, Proudhon 																																								 																					
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warned of the need to “…not become the leaders of a new intolerance.” He continued, 
“…let us not pose as apostles of a new religion, be it the religion of logic, the religion of 
reason. We should welcome, encourage all protests; denounce all exclusions, all 
mysticisms; let us never see a question as exhausted, and when we will have made our 
final argument, let us, if needed, begin again with eloquence and irony.”64  
Proudhon’s message of tolerance resonates with contemporary critics of the 
Enlightenment tradition.  It echoes the concern over the possibility of domination even in 
the sphere of the intellect.  Predating postfoundationalist critiques of essentialism, 
representation, and universalism, Proudhon appealed to a fundamental anarchist anti-
authoritarian sentiment.  Indeed, the classical anarchist tradition is not so easily 
interpreted as simply “essentialist.” According to Cohn,  
The notion that classical anarchist theory presupposes an “essentialist foundation” 
outside of the flux of history is also open to challenge. Rather, in refusing 
dualisms of matter and thought, bodies and souls, nineteenth century anarchists 
locate their theory within a process of development that is at once natural and 
historical. The visible universe does not ask for a transcendental supplement, but 
is the source of its own autopoietic and self-transformative creativity.65  
Indeed, his fellow anarchists eventually accompanied Proudhon in his wariness of the 
totalitarian potential of Reason.  However, their critical embrace of Reason and critique 
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of intellectualism was often sporadic and inconsistent. Often times, Proudhon himself 
seemingly contradicted this concern by celebrating the emancipatory potential of Reason 
and reiterating accompanying “essentialist” and “universalizing” concepts like truth, 
progress, and human nature.  He, along with his fellow classical anarchists, continued the 
long tradition of privileging our uniquely human faculty of reason albeit not 
unquestioningly.   
On the Need for Consistent Anti-Authoritarianism 
 Anarchism, like any set of values, prizes some ideas more than others.  Above all, 
we can say the classical anarchists prized a society that cherished individual liberty.  
While differences abound as to how to achieve such a society (e.g., whether to have 
communal ownership of the means of production – as in Kropotkin and Bakunin – or 
ensure access to private property – as in Godwin, Proudhon, and Max Stirner was a key 
question) a thorough regard for individual aims and individuality remains constant 
throughout all classical anarchist thinkers.   
  It can be argued that the main impetus behind the classical anarchist faith in 
Reason and private judgment, when present, is an undeniable embrace of individuality 
and a rejection of representation (which is premised on a denial of our uniqueness that 
cannot be represented).66 It is the drive towards exercising individuality through 
autonomy that forges the anarchist individualist perspective that relies on the ideal of 
Reason.  The tension arises when such a privileging of Reason hampers rather than 
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facilitates this individual freedom.  It is such an obstacle to individual freedom that 
postanarchists claim is at the heart of their postfoundationalist critique of classical 
anarchism.   
According to L. Susan Brown, this individualism is an offshoot of the 
individualism of classical liberalism.  Responding to Macpherson’s interpretation of the 
liberal tradition, in which he posits its underpinning in “possessive individualism,” she 
identifies two competing strains of individuality in this understanding: on the one hand an 
instrumental individualism that entails a right to both real property and property in your 
person, and existential individualism which seeks freedom independently of any 
ownership of property.  She notes that these two strains conflict.  It is in seeking a 
resolution to these two competing strains, identified by Brown, that the postanarchists 
largely base their endeavor. Postanarchists recognize the “radical commitment to 
individual freedom while rejecting liberalism’s competitive property relations” as well as 
embrace the need to overcome the “totalizing” nature of privileged Reason.  
However, as we have seen, the premise of the “totalizing” onto-epistemological 
foundation of the classical anarchists can be easily doubted.  There is plenty of textual 
evidence to indicate that the classical anarchists were more nuanced than the 
postanarchists make them out to be.  The question then becomes whether a more explicit 
framework (as the classical anarchists are often unclear, vague, and even contradictory 
when it comes to their analysis of Reason) is needed to sketch what anti-authoritarianism 
in ontology and epistemology would look like for an anarchist.  
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Classical Anarchism and Postfoundationalist Anti-Authoritarianism 
According to Brown, the ontological framework characteristic of anarchists is 
shared by another philosophical tradition usually not associated with essentialist 
renderings of the human condition.  She notes,  
Human individuals, for the anarchist, are best suited to decide for themselves how 
to run the affairs of their own lives; they are best served when left unrestrained by 
authority and unhampered by relationships of domination. The ontological basis 
for these beliefs is an understanding that individuals are free and responsible 
agents who are fit to determine their own development.  This ontology is shared at 
least in part by a number of philosophies; however, it has been most fully 
developed by the existentialists.67  
The existentialists, like the anarchists, perhaps best considered as fellow travelers and not 
disciples of any specific thinker or creed, represent, for Brown, an ontological lineage 
that spurns essentialist renderings of human nature and other familiar “foundationalisms.” 
As we have seen, many of the classical anarchists approached the question of 
human nature and the authority of Reason with both conviction and skepticism.  
However, key postanarchist thinkers endeavor to highlight the foundationalist (and in 
their view authoritarian) tendencies underlying the classical anarchist project. 
Contemporary anarchist scholars like Saul Newman question the classical anarchist’s 
“ontological and epistemological foundations.” The onto-epistemological character of 
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classical anarchist thought is conceived as centering on an essentialist view of human 
nature that expounds the idea of a rational and generally progressive being as well as 
lauds the ideal of Reason.  
Newman notes that consistent anarchist anti-authoritarians should embrace the 
postfoundationalist critique of epistemology and ontology and apply it to the social and 
political realms. To do this we “should adopt, with Lyotard, a degree of skepticism 
towards metanarratives.” That is, “subject to closer critical scrutiny the idea that there are 
universal moral and rational perspectives, or that there is a certain dialectical movement 
of historical forces that determines social relations.” We should also, “abandon the notion 
of essential identities” and “place a certain emphasis on the role of language and 
discourse in constituting social relations, practices, and identities.” And, lastly, 
postanarchists should “accept the Foucauldian insight that power is constitutive (rather 
than simply repressive) and that it is more pervasive than we had perhaps imagined.”68 
Newman and other postfoundationalist anarchists insist that such skepticism towards 
metanarratives, essentialism, and a strictly repressive view of power limit the anarchist 
imaginary in ways that neglect examples of illegitimate epistemological and ontological 
authority.  
 However, generally absent from the postanarchist critique is an acknowledgement 
that the classical anarchists took care to recognize the authoritarian potential of an 
unquestioned Reason and, for the most part, rejected monolithic understandings of human 
nature.  The seeds of a critical reflection on a “rational absolutism” are already present in 																																								 																					
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Godwin’s literary works in which he exposes the “conceptual violence” implicit in such 
an adulation of Reason.69 According to David Collins, in Things as they Are; or, The 
Adventures of Caleb Williams and St. Leon: A Tale of the Sixteenth Century, Godwin (of 
the classical anarchists, perhaps the most unapologetic champion of Reason) takes care to 
warn his audience of the dangers of an aspiration to omniscience or perfectibility. Indeed, 
in St. Leon Godwin challenges the notion of perfectibility and detached objectivity while 
couching his critique in a thorough undercutting of progressive modernity. Godwin’s 
novels extoll the virtues of, what he called, private judgment, all the while 
acknowledging the impossibility of having that private judgment grasp reality in its 
entirety.70 
Nevertheless, scholars like Brown acknowledge that classical anarchism would 
benefit from a postfoundationalist understanding of human nature.  She notes, “The 
political philosophy of existentialism, with its rejection of a fixed human nature and its 
affirmation of humanity as freedom itself, offers anarchism a fluid conceptualization of 
human nature more in keeping with its individualist imperative.”71  
 The classical anarchists, though acknowledging the inherent diversity in 
individuals, still seemingly relied on an Enlightenment framework that, at least in part, 
limited freedom-seeking to the social, political, and economic realms, leaving musings of 
freedom in the realm of the intellect largely untouched.  While Godwin and others hinted 
a the futility of sketching an ideal of Reason or the hope for a perfect private judgment, 																																								 																					
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the key to a free society remained rational individuals acting out their natures (social or 
otherwise).   
The Postanarchist Critique and Anarchist Anti-Intellectualism 
The postanarchist fusion of classical anarchist and postfoundationalist thought is 
an avenue that embraces the spirit of classical anarchist anti-authoritarianism in ontology 
and epistemology. Nevertheless, like other postfoundational philosophies it is susceptible 
to incoherence. The challenge that faces postanarchist criticism is the question of 
authority in that very critique.  That is, can the postanarchist critique be contained within 
a coherent programmatic challenge to the authority of Reason and the conceptually 
limiting auxiliary notions that usually accompany it?  
The postanarchist endeavor is susceptible to the accusation that it becomes an 
exercise in incoherence when it decries the use of Reason in the construction of any 
radical (or otherwise political) project yet engages in ostensibly Reason-based analysis 
when examining the pitfalls of an adulation of Reason, essentialist vocabularies, arbitrary 
methodological hierarchies, and unwarranted conceptual limitations.  The question 
becomes, how can postanarchists coherently critique the classical anarchist reliance on 
Reason without relying on Reason itself in articulating that critique? 
The story is by now familiar. While the postfoundationalists (Foucault, Lyotard, 
Derrida, et al.) often brazenly critiqued the onto-epistemological assumptions of 
modernity as authoritarian and limiting, others (especially Habermas) claimed that the 
possibilities for critique were already built into modernity itself and that attempting to 
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circumvent such foundational assumptions was an exercise in incoherence. Feyerabend 
problematizes the Habermasian critique well.  He notes,  
Now- how can we possibly examine something we are using all the time? How 
can we analyse the terms in which we habitually express our most simple and 
straightforward observations, and reveal their pre-suppositions? How can we 
discover the kind of world we presuppose when proceeding as we do?72  
The Habermasian idea of “performative contradiction” claims that the 
postfoundational literature is unable to decry the lauding of Reason and the 
accompanying epistemological and ontological assumptions because they are 
nevertheless present in the critique itself. That is, Habermas claims that movements like 
postanarchism necessarily employ the very same devices they claim are unjustifiable or 
illegitimate in the application of anarchist values to epistemology and ontology.   
According to Habermas there is no need to avoid the trappings of an authoritarian 
Reason or the accompanying onto-epistemological assumptions because they already 
reflect the auto-critical character of modernity. This inescapable feature of philosophical 
critique is, according to Habermas, central to modernity in that in creating its 
“normativity out of itself” it “sees itself cast back upon itself without any possibility of 
escape.”73 A Reason-based critique is both the result of and the impetus for this 
normativity. According to Habermas, philosophical critique is inherently limited to the 																																								 																					
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horizon of this understanding of Modernity and that Reason itself is redeemed even if 
engaged in a critique of itself.74   
The compulsion to “avoid” or “resolve” the aporia of an authoritative Reason in 
anti-authoritarian thought (that is, to either invent a new understanding of the aporia 
independent of Reason or seeking to overcome it with novel intellectual tools that 
exclude Reason) is absent in the postanarchists.  The postanarchists do not argue for a 
need to overcome the aporia of Reason sketched by Habermas but rather critique it and 
dismiss their own supposedly aporetic endeavor.  In other words, postanarchists largely 
talk past this Habermasian critique. So, how can we question the postanarchist endeavor 
along Habermasian lines while sketching a way to overcome the seemingly arbitrary 
authority of Reason pointed to by postanarchists?  
Perhaps a better way to approach the problem of Reason and consistent anti-
authoritarianism would be to interrogate an alternative framework by which to 
understand the critique.  We could do so by incorporating Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy.75 Wittgenstein moves us away from a representationalist, interpretational, or 
correspondence-based epistemological paradigm to a view focused on “obeying rules” or 
simply a “deed-based” approach to understanding. Admitting to the force of the 
postanarchist critique we can still hope to overcome its “performative contradiction” by 
bridging the critique with a procedural logic by employing key ideas in Wittgenstein, 
such as “knowing how to go on” and “rule following.”  																																								 																					
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“Knowing how to go on” is understood here as the idea that language has a 
multiplicity of applications which vary according to community and where understanding 
is largely based on practice.  It is actually applying how one conceives of rules, attitudes, 
principles, and orientations and, in a way, internalizing them so as to not figure it 
necessary to hold some external marker as your guide.76 That is, rather than point to a 
fixed meaning, Wittgenstein notes the plurality of meanings and the need for practice as 
the ultimate measure of meaning. In this sense, understanding is always part of an 
activity. Indeed, it is “the activity of clearing up the confusions caused by the 
bewitchments cast by language.”77 
In fact, we should see language and the principles and meaning derived from it as 
“living forms” rather than logical ones.78 Moreover, we should resist the temptation to 
transform our thoughts and desires into “things.” That is, we should resist the idea that 
every meaningful word must correspond with some object and this very idea must be 
undercut by means other than argumentation or doctrine.79 Rather, it should be undercut 
by “magnanimity towards idiolects.”80 In the Wittgensteinian framework, a 
transcendental idea of Reason would not serve as a roadmap to anarchist or anti-																																								 																					76	See chapter 2, “The Wittgensteinian Paradox,” in Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
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authoritarian theory and action but rather would inform the context-dependent and, more 
importantly, action-oriented understanding of such theory and action.  
Such an incorporation of Wittgensteinian ideas into the postfoundational anarchist 
project would overcome the “aporia” of Reason in anti-authoritarian thought while still 
remaining faithful to the postfoundational endeavor.  In this case, a context-dependent 
and action-oriented understanding of Reason and the postanarchist non-rational or anti-
rational program would stand opposed to the universalized authoritative account of the 
same.  In this context, localized “reasons” would be embraced over any ideal of Reason.  
Indeed, classical anarchists like Kropotkin also claimed that universalizing 
schemes (like overarching moral concepts – e.g., thou shall not steal) are illegitimate for 
similar reasons. Kropotkin thought that these overarching principles served as tools of the 
ruling classes that protected their power and privilege.  Instead, he noted we should act 
how we should expect others to act in similar situations. Kropotkin thought we should 
“Do to others as you would have others do to you in the same circumstances.” In this 
way, Kropotkin understood the dynamism of anarchist principles and reasoning.81 What 
Kropotkin advocated in the realm of morality, Wittgenstein explored in the realm of 
epistemology.  It is Wittgenstein’s epistemological ideas of “knowing how to go on” an 
“rule-following” that mirror the context-based approach to action that Kropotkin’s 
variation of the Golden Rule implored in the realm of morality.   
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In order to advance with the postanarchist critique a Wittgensteinian procedural 
logic is convenient so as to not fall into incoherence. Moreover, in order to avoid falling 
into universalized renderings of Reason a Wittgensteinian “knowing how to go on” is 
required to make intelligible a non-contradictory postanarchism. With this incorporation 
of Wittgenstein, “meaning” would correspond with “doing” and not with any object of 
our understanding.  How we describe or understand a state of affairs or a conceptual 
rendering of values is embedded in human ways of acting and living. While concepts are 
inherently ossifying and limiting to the postfoundationalist, actions are both fleeting and 
liberating to the anarchist and the postfoundationalist. In this framework, concepts are 
understood as uses of words.82 “Knowing how to go on” denotes an act rather than simply 
conceptual comprehension.  Since language enables a multiplicity of uses, meanings, and 
particularities that vary across time, space, and communities, repeated action (i.e., 
custom) comes to define meaning and guide continued action while acknowledging the 
ever-changing context in which these actions are embedded.  It is this action that will in 
turn outline the contours of postanarchism’s theoretical substance and avoid the trappings 
of an unwarranted authoritarian Reason in anarchist theory.  
 In other words, anarchist practices and customs may redeem localized anti-
authoritarian reasons for opposing Reason as a transcendental marker or guide without 
falling into a privileging of Reason.  Recognizing and combating the dangers of a 
privileged Reason in a non-contradictory anti-authoritarian anarchism is only possible 
when Reason itself is considered as a context-dependent “lived” concept rather than a 
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universalized noumenal Reason in-itself.  The universalizing of meaning and the 
authoritative rendering of Reason derivative of that universality is challenged by the 
plurality secured by the Wittgenstinian framework.  In this case, no “local” meaning is 
authoritative over any other rendering or critique of Reason and allows understandings of 
“lived” concepts as opposed to transcendental ideas.   
In thesis 146, in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein reminds us that 
only when we can properly understand the rules underlying correct use can we be able to 
sketch a picture of comprehension that reflects our doing and not merely our indefinite 
replication of a process.  In the same way as one can mimic the brush strokes of a master 
painter, this alone does not make us a master painter for when our guide runs out we also 
come to a halt.  Underlying our mastery of painting is instead a “state which [sic] is the 
source of correct use.”83 That is correct use, instead of mimicry or perceived adherence to 
certain ossified conceptual renderings, allows for a non-authoritarian embrace and 
exercise of Reason.  
Moreover, Wittgenstein’s idea that to follow a rule is to act in accordance with a 
communal practice, which is established through continued employment of the rule, 
informs our “knowing how to go on” and is crucial, I argue, to the postanarchist endeavor 
and to a consistent anti-authoritarianism.  Likewise, “rule-following” in Wittgenstein has 
no necessary relation with a correct interpretation of meaning or with defined contours of 
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philosophical reasoning; rather it is simply oriented towards how we act on the rule.84 
While explanations for rules eventually run out (as Wittgenstein puts it our “spade” is 
“turned”), in the end all that matters is what we do. I consider these Wittgensteinian 
ideas, as action-oriented understandings of meaning where “knowing how to go on” and 
“rule-following” are considered “performative” abilities and not “rationally articulable” 
understandings that complement and likely underlie the possibility of a consistent, 
coherent, and non-contradictory postanarchism and a guide to sketching what a 
postfoundationalist understanding of anarchism would look like when considering 
matters of authority in the realm of the intellect.85 
 This is just one possible avenue to overcome Habermasian objections to the 
postfoundational endeavor. The spirit of anti-authoritarianism in epistemology and 
ontology generally embraces a healthy skepticism towards many bulwarks of the intellect 
– most notably the authority of Reason and the essentialisms that usually accompany it as 
axiomatic truths – while acknowledging that the standards of scientific knowledge are 
quite arbitrary.  
 Indeed,  
It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, 
rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings.  To those who look 
at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent on impoverishing 																																								 																					
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it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in 
the form of clarity, precision, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, it will become clear that there 
is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all 
stages of human development.  It is the principle: anything goes.86  
Moreover, what should unite consistent anti-authoritarians is not a faith in the auto-
critical character of Reason or Modernity, or exclusively a rejection of “totalizing” 
epistemological and metaphysical notions, but rather an acknowledgment of the dangers 
of “thought” becoming the “source and soul guide of life.” In Bakunin’s words, 
consistent anti-authoritarianism requires a recognition that  
Life develops out of its own inexhaustible depths by means of a succession of 
diverse facts, not a succession of abstract reflections; the latter, always produced 
by life but never producing it, like milestones merely indicate its direction and the 
different phases of its spontaneous and self-generated development.87 
Indeed, in the final analysis it seems “allegiance to new ideas will have to be brought 
about by means other than arguments.”88  
 It is clear that the so-called classical anarchists both celebrated and admonished 
the excesses of our most cherished faculty. They understood Reason as a vehicle for 
achieving liberty as well as a potential idol that would stymie our ability to exercise it. 
The popular characterization of anarchist ontology, epistemology, and their reliance on 																																								 																					
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Reason is caricatured. Moreover, the tools for a consistent anti-authoritarianism that 
challenges not only authority of the state, the church, and forms of economic domination 
but also modes of intellectual hierarchy and domination have always been present in 
these same anarchists despite the insistence of some contemporary scholars. Moreover, 
contemporary postfoundational efforts to circumvent the forceful Habermasian critique 
have provided new avenues to challenge the Enlightenment-inspired narrative of classical 
anarchist thought that some contemporary anarchist scholars have pursued and afforded 
new ways of thinking about anarchism in the realm of the intellect.  
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Chapter 2 
Reason, Anti-Intellectualism, and the Reluctant Modernism 
of William Godwin and Pierre Joseph Proudhon 
The authority of Reason usually exists alongside notions that facilitate its exercise 
as a faculty and give purpose to its celebration as an ideal. These notions include a stable 
and univocal concept of the being to which the faculty belongs (i.e., human nature) as 
well as a faith in the existence of transcendent truth.  Absent these notions, the authority 
of Reason seems to collapse and any consideration of it tends to drift towards a critical 
deference at best and outright hostility at worst. In other words, without a stable 
conception of human nature and a transcendent notion of truth underlying any 
consideration of the authority of Reason that authority is undermined. However, this was 
not the case with so-called classical anarchist thought.  
 Generally, anarchists have not found it problematic to celebrate Reason where 
they thought it appropriate while critiquing notions like human nature, transcendent truth, 
and similar foundational concepts. While contemporary postfoundational anarchism 
highlights the poststructural and postmodern onto-epistemological framework (or lack 
thereof) of a consistent anti-authoritarian anarchism, such a critical attitude towards the 
ontological and epistemological foundations of anarchist thought was already present in 
the so-called classical anarchists.89 While the so-called classical anarchists are often 
characterized as firm believers in progress and as staunch individualists who reject the 																																								 																					
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state because of their adherence to Enlightenment values, a closer reading reveals that 
they were quite nuanced in their appreciation of Reason, the scientific method, 
foundationalisms of all kinds, and the accompanying intellectualism it usually breeds.90 
By and large, the so-called classical anarchists realized that Reason could be employed 
for good but it could also represent a danger to the same liberty they sought.91  
All of the better-known eighteenth and nineteenth century anarchists, including 
Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, struggled between notions of immanence 
and transcendence.  They navigated the seemingly transcendent ideals they vociferously 
defended (e.g. equality, liberty, truth) while celebrating the ephemeral nature of life itself 
(a life they thought was reflected in anarchy).92 While they admitted to the otherworldly 
ideals that should underwrite anarchist values, these same ideals only existed as part of 
our everyday life. They were only manifested in living. It was this tension between what 
could simply be termed theory and individual practice that itself served as the prime 
philosophical impetus of anarchist thought.93  Such a struggle continues to this day in 
																																								 																					
90 For a thorough intellectual history of anarchism see George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of 
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91 Anarchism is perhaps the most intellectually varied and, by its nature, pluralistic mode of political 
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postfoundational anarchist literature.94 However, novel ways of tackling these issues in 
contemporary anarchist thought have largely reflected the debates among 19th century 
anarchist thinkers and their interlocutors.  
More specifically, two such anarchist thinkers, Godwin and Proudhon, exhibited 
general deference to the authority of Reason and yet did not subscribe to purely 
transcendental ideas about auxiliary notions like human nature and transcendent truth.  
While they both privileged Reason they acknowledged its limitations and dangers. In 
doing so, they illuminated the interrelation of human nature, transcendent truth, and 
Reason. They both couched their calculated embrace of Reason and its supporting 
concepts in a thorough grappling with the defining features of modernity.  While they 
both believed in the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment, they also challenged 
the framework that grounded this enterprise.  Moreover, they illuminated ways in which 
the Enlightenment itself undermined static understandings of human nature as well as an 
unthinking deference to Reason and intellectualism. Unlike their classical anarchist 
counterparts, Bakunin and Kropotkin, they both gradually shifted towards a more critical 
and hesitant embrace of Reason and authoritative accounts of auxiliary notions of human 
nature and science.95  
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William Godwin as Repentant Intellectualist 
Beginning in the early 1700’s, the politically radical intelligentsia of England and 
Europe, of which William Godwin96 was a primary figure, were consumed by the 
ideational force of private judgment and Reason as a propeller of progress.97 What most 
concerned and inspired Godwin, as well as other classical anarchists and radical thinkers, 
was a faith in deduction, empiricism, the scientific method, and similar exercises of 
individual private judgment seemingly independent of the social forces that may have 
constrained and conditioned them.  According to Godwin and others, it was this 
independence from hierarchical social forces (e.g., the church, the state) and the arbitrary 
authority they exercised that made progress possible.   
If given a chance to flourish, Reason would propel human progress and hold to 
account these arbitrary exercises of authority.  Indeed, as Francis Bacon put it in his 1620 
book Novum Organum, the “formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt 
the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols.”98 A 
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century later Enlightenment figures would continue to champion the ideal of “true 
induction” to overcome superstition, parochialism, and the power and authority that were 
often empowered by and dependent on them. From the “perfectionism” of man in the 
thought of Joseph Priestly and Marquis de Condorcet to notions of historical and 
sociological progress in Giambattista Vico and Adam Smith, the idea that history (which 
reflects this progress) is a “change from darkness to light, from superstition to sound 
knowledge and from a most debasing servitude to a state of the most exalted freedom” is 
central to many of Godwin’s contemporaries who were themselves inspired by Bacon’s 
prescription.99  
As Godwin put it, our “modes of social existence, are susceptible of perpetual 
improvement” and “It is to the improvement of reason therefore that we are to look for 
the improvement of our social condition.”100 According to the anarchists everyone 
possesses this faculty of reason and it is through its exercise that the ideal of Reason 
would trump existing hierarchical social forces.  It is important to note that it was 
precisely reason’s egalitarian nature (i.e., the fact that anyone could exercise the faculty 
of reason) that gave it revolutionary potential. If only we were all able to access and be 
inspired by Reason we would recognize injustices and be empowered to correct them. 
While the ability to access the faculty of reason was sometimes hampered by social 
conditions, we had an innate ability to access it given the right environment. Moreover, it 																																								 																					
99 This part of the concluding chapter to Joseph Priestley’s Letters to the Honorable Edmund Burke are 
included in Kramnick, The Enlightenment Reader, 382-382. Excerpts of Condorcet’s introduction to his 
Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Human Mind (pp. 387-395), Vico’s introduction to Principles of a 
New Science Concerning the Common Nature of the Nations (pp. 351-356), and excerpts of Smith’s 
Lectures on Jurisprudence are all included in Kramnick, The Enlightenment Reader. 
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was Reason itself that would usher in the conditions for its own flourishing. Indeed, the 
seed to social progress was in Reason’s eventual triumph over the forces of hierarchy, 
arbitrary authority, and inequality.   
According to Godwin’s Political Justice, our very equality lay in the underlying 
faculty of reason and its attunement to truth.  Every person could recognize the authority 
of Reason given the right social conditions. Such recognition, however, was a solitary 
affair. In many cases, social and political relations interfered with an attunement to 
Reason. Propaganda, the Church, and social customs all made it increasingly difficult to 
attune ourselves to Reason and ultimately truth. While the reasons for our occasional 
inability to recognize Reason and truth lay in our intercourse with others, we escaped this 
challenge by relying on our own unimpeded private judgment. Nevertheless, the 
existence of an independent marker, existing outside the everyday lives of all who share 
the faculty of reason, is a necessary and guiding end of our own individual efforts.   
He notes, “There is no satisfactory criterion marking out any man, or set of men, 
to preside over the rest…all men are partakers of the common faculty, reason; and may 
be supposed to have some communication with the common instructor, truth.”101 It is the 
access to truth via the faculty of reason that made us equal.  Such equality begat, 
according to Godwin, a rejection of all authority other than Reason itself.  Even the 
authority of law was meaningless unless it agreed with our private judgment. It was 
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necessary that “every man should stand by himself, and rest upon his own 
understanding.”102 
According to Godwin, the only laws of any significance and worthy of deference 
or respect are the laws of Reason. This importance stemmed from the fact that they were 
prior to the man-made laws that often stymied the flourishing of Reason.103 Indeed, the 
coercive nature of prescriptive law itself damaged the march towards “perfectibility” for 
Godwin.  “ ‘All coercion’, as Godwin affirms, ‘sours the mind’. In time, the ‘simple’ 
exercise of omnipotent reason will replace the tyranny of positive laws. In the meantime, 
whilst also enduring its coercive penalties, humanity must dedicate itself to the ultimate 
destruction of this tyranny.”104  
As Collings notes, Godwin  
Attacked any attempt to reduce reason to a legal code, arguing that no code could 
ever anticipate the contingencies of any specific case, that rather than resolving 
legal disputes it would only give rise to the need for more codification ad 
infinitum. The only possible standard of justice was uncodified [sic] justice itself, 
whose dictates must be determined case by case in light of reason alone.105 
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That is, according to Godwin’s reasoning, the only ideal standard of justice worthy of the 
name are the dictates of Reason that are always capable of adapting to specific 
circumstances. The flexibility and contingent character of these dictates preserve the need 
to adapt to specific circumstances while still reflecting some otherworldly or eternal 
standard that Godwin does not make clear.  
Moreover, Reason, in Godwin, frames and underlies social relations.  It is the 
basis for any conception of natural law. He notes,   
Legislation, as it has been usually understood, is not an affair of human 
competence.  Immutable reason is the true legislator, and her decrees it behooves 
us to investigate.  The functions of society extend, not to the making but the 
interpreting of law; it cannot decree, it can only declare that which the nature of 
things has already decreed, and the propriety of which irresistibly flows from the 
circumstances of the case.106 
In other words, the “nature of things” is already in line with Reason; we just have to be 
able to recognize it.  This may seem paradoxical to any understanding of anarchist 
thought given its traditional emphasis on revolution and social change.  However, there is 
a strong determinist streak in Godwin’s thought and Godwin considers this already 
determined social reality as undeniably anarchistic in nature.  Recognition of such a 
reality is contingent on Reason’s ability to decipher it, and that ability is itself 
paradoxically dependent on the kind of social change (ridding society of authoritarian 
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structures) that would enable Reason to flourish. It is in this way that the immutable laws 
of Reason both inform and recognize the ideal social organization.   
 According to Godwin, human beings, having equal access to the laws of Reason, 
should therefore rely on their private judgment to evaluate both personal and political 
disagreements or questions. It is especially pertinent that an attunement to Reason 
underlies all justification of political relationships (if any).  Godwin believed that in 
appealing to Reason any raison d’état necessarily fades into oblivion. That is to say, the 
special logic of state that informs matters of governance and that justifies everything 
from the quelling of a domestic rebellion to war with other countries is rendered both 
incoherent and utterly meaningless when faced with the dictates of Reason. The logic that 
operates in the sphere of politics or statesmanship is always voided by “immutable 
reason.” Indeed, no social organization or political authority reflected the immutable laws 
of Reason better than our own private judgment. Godwin notes, “The conduct of an 
enlightened and virtuous man can only be conformable to the regulations of government 
so far as those regulations are accidentally coincident with his private judgment…”107 
Moreover, he emphasized that, “The true supporters of government are the weak and 
uninformed, and not the wise.  In proportion as weakness and ignorance shall diminish, 
the basis of government will also decay.”108 In other words, the more we are empowered 
to exercise Reason the more we will recognize the needlessness of government.  The 
enabling of individuals to rely on their private judgment and access Reason’s immutable 
truths is dependent on the abolition of the authoritarian structures (the Church and the 																																								 																					
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State) and this same abolition requires access to Reason. The argument seems circular but 
is not contradictory to Godwin’s own determinist beliefs.  
According to Godwin, Reason regulated everything from the lust for power and 
wealth, liberty and equality, to moral as well as intellectual progress.109 Private judgment, 
guided by Reason, stood as both the intellectual bulwark of informed opinion (i.e. a 
rejection of traditional sources of knowledge, especially the church) and the source of 
inspiration for the radical upheaval of traditional social and political hierarchies. Indeed, 
Godwin saw the workings of Reason as responsible for the civilizing effects of limited 
government and other social and political liberties.  
In addition to Reason and a transcendent notion of truth, another main idea at 
work in Godwin’s Political Justice is a utilitarianism also grounded in faith in Reason. 
While making reference to abstract or immutable truth he often couched it in the 
language of utility. He often understood truth as inevitably and undeniably consistent 
with the greatest good for the greatest number. The truths of right and wrong as with 
every guide to action are recognized by a thorough consideration of their utility. Godwin 
assumes such utility reflects these truths. However, the “calculation of consequences” 
does not necessarily constitute “right and wrong” but our “private judgment” and “public 
deliberation” are a means to discover these in Godwin. According to F.E.L. Priestly, 																																								 																					
109 For example, Godwin notes, “When the laws of morality shall be clearly understood, their excellence 
universally apprehended, and themselves seen to be coincident with each man’s private advantage, the idea 
of property in this sense will remain, but no man will have the least desire, for purposes of ostentation or 
luxury, to possess more than his neighbor” (Godwin, Political Justice, 199). See also Godwin as a 
conservative on the gradual progress of the intellect and other matters on pp. 251-2 in Political Justice.  
Also, Godwin returns repeatedly to the idea that progress is self-regulating through Reason.  He notes that 
“everything may be trusted to the tranquil and wholesome progress of knowledge, and that the office of the 
enlightened friend of political justice, for the most part, consists in this only, a vigilant and perpetual 
endeavor to assist the progress” (Godwin, Political Justice, 335).   
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Godwin already supposes that our considered judgment of utility will reveal immutable 
truths.110 For Godwin,  
The unchanging truths of the universe, if known, must dictate actions which will 
produce the greatest good, but since human judgments are fallible, no judgment or 
multiplicity of judgments as to the utility of an action will necessarily reveal its 
relation to universal truth; still less will multiplicity or even universality of 
judgment constitute universal truth. Utility may be permitted to be the criterion of 
virtue, as for all practical purposes it must be; but it is not its essence.111  
Nevertheless, we should be careful not to attribute a wholly independent and external 
existence of Reason to Godwin (though at times he clearly seems to imply it). Godwin 
claims that our powers of abstraction that accompany and in fact necessitate the faculty of 
reason are inseparable from mind itself, that is our inner and abstract conception of our 
thinking faculty and ourselves.112 Curiously, it is only the human mind that can conceive 
Reason (an abstract yet apparently truly existing notion) and it can only do so because it, 
partly, brings it into existence. Despite this seemingly idealist or subjectivist point of 
view, Godwin recognized that we all have equal access to an idealized Reason and should 
endeavor to attune ourselves to it for the sake of progress.  In attuning ourselves to 
Reason and assuming that its laws are equally accessible, Godwin presupposes both the 
existence of an external marker of Reason and that we are all endowed with an equal 
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capacity to exercise this ideal (as a faculty) in us.  He claims this all the while 
occasionally referring metaphorically to Reason as a personified legislator whose decrees 
we should follow.113 While the metaphysical status of Reason is sometimes unclear in 
Godwin the basic thrust of its role in social justice is clear.  
Reminiscent of an intellectual “invisible hand,” the belief that Reason propels 
progress on social, economic, political, and intellectual fronts reflects Godwin’s 
insistence that unimpeded private judgment is the key to any semblance of justice. No 
institution could hope to mediate between people and reason, or between people 
themselves.114 Godwin, like most anarchists, understood human relations to exist outside 
any political understanding of social organization. In other words, he understood human 
relations as independent of any political framework. Human relations are both best 
understood as existing outside political relations and usually do exist outside or 
independent a political framework.  Godwin and anarchists generally recognize that our 
everyday lives mostly revolve around personal, inter-personal, social, economic and 
cultural concerns.  While these may have a relationship with political organization the 
everyday experience of these spheres of life exist independent of politics, government, 
and the logic of state.  
Included in these human relations are understandings of justice.  For Godwin 
especially, it is a justice rooted in the primacy of private judgment. Usually taken to be a 
political idea par excellence, justice is understood among the classical anarchists to lie in 
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the realm of interpersonal relations not mediated by the state.  Godwin proposed that we 
examine justice “as it exists among individuals” and avoid in its search a “political 
view.”115 In this way, government is largely considered superfluous.  When most of our 
waking lives involve no thought of “political” justice it makes little sense to understand 
justice as exclusively (or even primarily) a governmental matter.116 
In Godwin, our concern for justice should be mediated by Reason itself 
(independent of institutions that claim to channel it).  There is no idea of justice 
independent of the dictates of Reason.  According to Godwin, Reason is both the ideal we 
should aspire to and the means to reach that ideal.  The thrust of Godwin’s argument, and 
of the classical anarchists that followed, advocated thinking of justice as necessitating 
both an appeal to Reason and an exercise of the same.  Reason was the ultimate end and 
perpetual means by which justice is both conceived and employed. Godwin and the 
classical anarchists embraced a faith in Reason as both leading to truth and accordingly 
realizing justice.   
Curiously, Godwin also relied heavily on a deterministic view of nature to justify 
action.  Far from considering determinism as discouraging action (since it would seem 
pointless given the inevitability of results) Godwin thinks it imperative to desire the very 
end he considers inevitable.  According to Godwin, determinism actually encourages our 
search for truth and reinforces the idea that Reason reflects reality, constitutes it, and is 
only through it that we are able to discover the same.   																																								 																					
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Indeed, Godwin notes,  
The more I resign myself to the influence of truth, the clearer will be my 
perception of it.  The less I am interrupted by questions of liberty and caprice, of 
attention and indolence, the more uniform will be my constancy.  Nothing would 
be more unreasonable than that the sentiment of necessity should produce in me a 
spirit of neutrality and indifference.  The more certain is the conjunction between 
antecedents and consequents, the more cheerfulness should I feel in yielding to 
painful and laborious employments.117 
This deterministic view allows for a “tendency to make us survey all events with a 
tranquil and placid temper, and approve and disapprove without impeachment to our self-
possession.”118  
 However, there seems to be some circular logic at work here.  This determinism 
seems to rely on an established Reason that both constitutes reality as well as helps us 
understand it.  According to Godwin we are naturally attuned to truth.  However, as 
Weston explains, “this automatic perception of truth and the moral action it engenders is 
conditional upon our attaining that ‘perfectly voluntary state’ of consciousness which 
evidences ‘the perfection of the human character.’”119 Such a “perfectly voluntary state” 
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is dependent on overcoming the social and political obstacles to a flourishing of Reason. 
But, such flourishing is only possible when we achieve this state.   
Nevertheless, Godwin’s view of Reason in Political Justice was not entirely 
grounded strictly on this view.  Sometimes, he seemed to anticipate romanticist thought 
in giving primacy to our sentiments.  Godwin notes, “Reason is not an independent 
principle, and has no tendency to excite us to action; in a practical view, it is merely a 
comparison and balancing of different feelings.”120 The reader can also infer from 
Godwin the dangers of basing social and political life on an ideal of Reason that claims to 
access immutable truths. He claims that ossifying certain social practices via institutions 
(privileging, say, private judgment concerning market transactions or a “rational” 
education based on “critical thinking” at universities) is dangerous. He notes, 
“institutions calculated to give perpetuity to any particular mode of thinking, or condition 
of existence, are pernicious.”121 Godwin is of course making reference to the damaging 
role of theological dogmatism or the often unquestioned justificatory frameworks of state 
authority, but we can imagine how a hardened faith in Reason and our supposed abilities 
to access the truths it reveals (e.g., about the workings of the market, our human nature, 
knowledge of “things as they are”122) could be just as “pernicious.”  
In any case, the thrust of Godwin’s philosophy in Political Justice is recognition 
of the innumerable obstacles to the proper exercise of reason (and subsequent recognition 
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of utility). Such a proper exercise would give us access to its “instructor,” truth. While we 
often rely on custom and habit rather the faculty of reason, Godwin would urge the kind 
of social environment conducive to creating customs and habits already attuned to 
Reason.   
Interestingly, Godwin forcefully shifts to a more complex view of Reason in his 
literary works. Godwin exchanges “universalism” and “essentialism” in Political Justice 
for a “skeptical romanticism” that highlights the contingency in our natures.123  That is he 
shifts to a more holistic understanding of human beings and what it means to be human. 
Godwin realizes the ratiocination so critical to the detached objectivity of Political 
Justice is actually incapable of generating the attunement to Reason necessary to 
justice.124 
The tension between an immutable reason and humility (and the necessity of 
gaining insight with the help of others) permeates Godwin’s novels. As Collings explains, 
while the “aggression implicit in absolute reason dominates in the relatively unself-
conscious” Political Justice, his novels “expose the cost of such conceptual violence in 
acute, implicitly self-critical, and progressively more sweeping terms. Total conceptual 
revolution modulates into a searching critique of the irrational component of rational 
absolutism.”125  
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Probably his most popular novel, Things as They Are, or The Adventures of Caleb 
Williams best embodied Godwin’s changing attitudes. While still thoroughly steeped in a 
rationalistic ethos it also opens a space for critical reappraisal of our most cherished 
faculty.126  The story centers on Caleb Williams and his employer Ferdinando Falkland 
who has committed a murder and is noticeably unnerved by his act. While Falkland felt 
compelled to commit the crime (the victim of his crime, Barnabas Tyrrel, was a cruel 
man and apparently deserving of such punishment) he is nevertheless racked with guilt. 
Williams insists on finding out the truth and once he does is subject to Falkland’s ire.  
The story concludes with Falkland being emotionally moved to confess the murder by the 
example of Williams’ integrity.  
In Caleb Williams the miscarriages of justice (in this case the failure to initially 
convict Falkland of murder) are considered in concert with the injustices of the world 
(which arguably caused Falkland to commit the crime).  This interplay and vagueness in 
assigning moral blame for events make up the heart of “things as they are.” While the 
novel obviously highlights the horrors of the justice system and the hypocritical mores of 
England’s aristocratic class it also makes a philosophical statement about the 
indeterminable reality that permits them. It is this indeterminacy that points to the gulf 
between our ability to decipher reality and our pretension in assuming we can control it.  
In considering the injustice of Falkland’s actions and his persecution of Caleb, Godwin 
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navigates our inability to fix certain wrongs even if we can rationally contemplate how to 
bring about justice.127  
 More directly than does Caleb Williams, Godwin’s novel St. Leon critiques our 
modern faith in Enlightenment values. St. Leon introduces the reader to the hubris 
inseparable from claims to unlimited resources and eternal youth and vigor.  Godwin 
shows how even what can seemingly make us free ensnares us in other modes of 
subjection.  The gradual fall of the protagonist, Reginald de St. Leon, reflects our 
intractable yearning for control over nature and society.  The protagonist, endowed with  
“exhaustless wealth and eternal youth”128 seeks to better the circumstance of his family 
and countrymen. However, such efforts only invite suspicion and produce calamity. 
Despite his grandiose schemes to improve the human condition and help his fellows (e.g., 
attempting to revitalize the economy of a Hungarian village and giving charity to the 
poor), all his efforts end in catastrophe. He is alienated from his family and persecuted by 
governmental authorities thanks to suspicions of witchcraft and other intrigues. His 
actions, though well intentioned, force him into exile and bring dishonor to his family. 
Despite his “divine abilities” Reginald becomes increasingly isolated.129 His fumbling 
attempts to help his family and neighbors are handicapped by his embrace of the 
philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life that proves the fault in our Enlightenment-
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inspired attempts to command and control.  St. Leon radically “undercuts the fantasy of 
inhuman knowledge – the secret of the philosophers stone – even as it enables readers to 
share the experience of possessing such knowledge.”130 
According to Rowland Weston, St. Leon represents Godwin’s “rejection of the 
sufficiency of modern, scientific rationalism as a guide to, and guarantee of, the radically 
renewed social and political order he and other progressives of the late eighteenth century 
pursued.”131 Indeed, Reginald quickly realizes that although he has access to unlimited 
wealth and eternal youth, he is unable to communicate this knowledge to anyone.  This 
robs the possession of such insight of any value or meaning. Moreover, this very 
knowledge serves as an obstacle to his relations with his family (a prominent theme 
throughout) and conveys Godwin’s increasing stress on “domestic affections” all the 
while highlighting the futility of grand schemes of social engineering. In this way, he 
highlights classic anarchist themes while also emphasizing the role our sentiments play in 
both personal and public success.   
Perhaps even more than St. Leon, Godwin’s novel Fleetwood communicates the 
centrality of affections and emotions to our development and “private judgment.”132 
Despite his early celebration of Reason in Political Justice, Godwin is considered to have 
shown increasing appreciation for the impact of feelings and our relationships with others 
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on our “determined” life choices. In Fleetwood Godwin does so by tackling several 
Rousseauian themes.   
In this coming-of-age story, Casimir Fleetwood’s upbringing and tutelage leave 
him ill-suited for the real world (specifically for relationships with others). His 
interpersonal relations leave much to be desired (they usually end in tragedy) and reflect 
his descent into lunacy as a consequence of his unsociable and lonely upbringing.  While 
he eventually recovers some of what he has lost (his marriage, his child, the respect and 
love of others) he is led to reflect on the dangers of solitary life (which tends towards 
delusion and disappointment).  
In many of his works, Godwin largely responded to Rousseau’s arguments 
concerning education and its role in fostering communal sensibilities. Godwin is 
responding mostly to Rousseau’s insistence that isolation from the harmful effects of 
others is a positive influence on a child’s rearing and education. While Rousseau would 
claim learning with others would corrupt our natural abilities, Godwin would insist that 
learning in isolation would lead to the same. 133 Fleetwood continued this response in 
literary form (sometimes quite explicitly).134 As the plot develops, it becomes obvious 																																								 																					
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showed how the mind could use its sensibility for nature and for everyday life to rise above the petty 
rivalries of social existence.”  
		
	 68 
how Casimir’s education becomes an impediment to his ability to confront the 
vicissitudes of life. Egoism and a sense of grandiosity born of his “natural education” 
removed from the corruption of society lead to his intractable contempt for humanity 
(and his inability to relate to others and fully share in the delights of companionship and 
fellow feeling). The lesson here concerns what goes wrong when we reject the 
contingencies of life with others and instead misguidedly celebrate an idealized solitary 
reflection that ostensibly favors the unimpeded exercise of reason.  
 Indeed, Godwin’s literary works show the futility of the pronounced ratiocination 
of Political Justice. Though Godwin makes sure to indicate the direction of “progressive 
modernity” to the reader (e.g., ideas of perfectibility, indefinite improvement, a 
celebration of Reason), he also makes sure to refuse it.135 Godwin interrogated one of the 
defining debates of the Enlightenment: the reconciliation between “sense and sensibility, 
reason and romance.”136 Godwin concluded that society could not be understood simply 
in terms of natural law or the dictates of Reason.  He embraced the idea that a progressive 
and tolerant society could only be an expression of fellow feeling and it could not be 
manifest in institutions of government.137  
Godwin’s faith in Reason’s liberating yet deterministic role in Political Justice 
offers a simplistic understanding of classical anarchist sentiments. It is a point of view 
that would evolve in Godwin. He would eventually convey an appreciation for the limits 																																								 																					
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of Reason in his literary works that also reflect the general thrust of classical anarchist 
thought. Other classical anarchist thinkers shared Godwin’s devotion to our most 
esteemed faculty but likewise did not translate such faith into axiomatic understandings 
of human nature, the nature of political society, or intellectual life more generally.   
The Hesitant Rationalism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
Proudhon is sometimes described as a child of the Enlightenment who shares the 
excitement of the philosophes over the seemingly boundless increase in human 
knowledge and our ability to transmit such knowledge through education. He shares with 
others in both the anarchist and Enlightenment traditions a belief in our individual 
abilities to decipher reality and collectively foster meaningful progress and juxtaposes 
such belief to religious faith and divine guidance or any other external authority.138 
While Proudhon certainly shared with his Enlightenment kin a thorough 
celebration of Reason and auxiliary notions such as a clear conception of human nature 
(in Proudhon’s case an asocial and egoistic character that could be overcome by creating 
the right social conditions), as his thought evolved he came increasingly to oppose an 
unadulterated reverence of Reason and a faith in the accompanying scientific 
methodology that Enlightenment thinkers often praised. Despite the evolution in 
Proudhon’s attitude towards our most esteemed faculty and the supporting scientific and 
anthropological worldviews that sustain it, he was remarkably consistent in his views on 
political economy as the starting point of all inquiry.  It is this consistency that structured 																																								 																					
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his theory of justice and, like his radical comrade, Marx, sought to understand reality in 
terms of economics so as to revolutionize the same. In other words, despite his evolving 
views on the importance of Reason he retained an axiomatic understanding of political 
economy that reflected the kind of intellectualism of which many anarchists are wary.  
Interestingly, despite this common point of departure and their revolutionary 
ideals, Proudhon and Marx disagreed substantially over the notion of authority within the 
revolutionary process.139 This disagreement neatly highlights Proudhon’s sometimes 
skeptical attitude towards Reason.  In a letter to Marx, Proudhon was clear he did not 
want to substitute capitalist oppression and exploitation with the tyranny of a “new 
intolerance.” In this case, he was referring to the intolerance of the “religion of reason.” 
Despite Proudhon’s desire to overcome all a priori dogmatisms and perpetually question 
our philosophical assumptions with “eloquence and irony” he also held fast to a 
foundational place for political economy within his philosophy.140  
In fact, as Proudhon jostled with Marx on issues of authority and vanguardism he 
was also engaging in productive dialogue over the authority of Reason.  Marx is well 
known for his claims that knowledge should be rooted in the material conditions of  
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“concrete existence” and Proudhon echoed Marx in his repudiation of absolutism, both 
ecclesiastical and intellectual. Proudhon was intent on highlighting that there is no final 
destination but rather “indefinite progress and metamorphosis” by which we are 
characterized as a species and as a society.141 Nevertheless his axiomatic understanding 
of political economy agreed with Marx’s view of the importance of material conditions 
and also reflected his belief in objective truth.  
This rootedness in the material conditions of concrete existence is crucial for 
Proudhon. This existence is manifested in the truths of political economy. The objectivity 
of political economy served as a linchpin for solidarity with the oppressed and exploited 
people of the world as well as the guiding truth and metaphysical grounding of 
Proudhon’s theory of justice. Proudhon was clear in the objective character of political 
economy.  He notes that  
It is indeed with political economy as with other sciences: it is inevitably the same 
throughout the world: it does not depend upon the fancies of men or nations: it 
yields to the caprice of none. There is not a Russian, English, Austrian, Tartar, or 
Hindoo [sic] political economy, any more than there is a Hungarian, German or 
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American physics or geometry. Truth alone is equal everywhere: science is the 
unity of mankind.142  
It is this truth that should guide the efforts of humankind in improving their lot. The 
“science” of political economy (considered by Proudhon the ultimate and grounding 
science underlying the study of all other subject matter) was seen as voiding the necessity 
of government and being the “sovereign arbiter of interests.”143  
 Indeed, Proudhon shared a thoroughly materialist metaphysical outlook with 
Marx.  Proudhon notes, “In other words, economic science is to me the objective form 
and realization of metaphysics; it is metaphysics in action, metaphysics projected on the 
vanishing plane of time; and whoever studies the laws of labor and exchange is truly and 
specially a metaphysician.”144 And, in a further allusion to the grounding philosophical 
framework of political economy, he equates what he considers the main driver of political 
economy (i.e. labor) with the universality of God’s creation. Proudhon notes, “The labor 
of man continues the work of God, who, in creating all beings, did but externally realize 
the eternal laws of reason.”145  
Nevertheless, there is a curious tension between the objectivity of political 
economy and the arbitrariness of property in Proudhon. While political economy reflects 
																																								 																					
142 P.J. Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Gordon Press, 
1972 [1851]), 283. 
143 Ibid.  
144 Pierre Joseph Proudhon, System of Economic Contradictions or, The Philosophy of Misery (New York: 
Arno Press, 1972 [1888]), 43. 
145 Ibid, 44. 
 
		
	 73 
underlying metaphysical truths, property, a seemingly integral feature of political 
economy, is contingent on power, chance, and a host of other factors completely opposed 
to metaphysical truth. Property, after all, is theft!146  
Interestingly, Proudhon is able to simultaneously praise the objectivity of political 
economy, celebrate Reason as the guide to deciphering reality and as an ideal to be 
aspired to, as well as acknowledge the contingent and often-arbitrary nature of human 
relations. While the basic truths of political economy were objective, they had no bearing 
on the current state of exploitation and injustice in human relations but were nevertheless 
the key to understanding how to overcome them. This seemingly convoluted 
epistemological roadmap to human liberation is based on a faith in the just reign of 
Reason. Indeed, the government of man (based on our arbitrary wills, passions, and 
desires) instead of reason will never be just. The government of man invites “domination 
by the arbitrary and willful” while the government of reason invites justice.147 Proudhon 
clearly distinguishes between our human will (under the unjust relations of capitalism and 
state rule) and Reason. In contrasting the arbitrary will of men and reason, Proudhon 
invokes anarchy as substituting our “habit of taking man for our rule and his will for our 
law.” He cautions against the “height of disorder” and the “expression of chaos” that 
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reigns in a society governed by men and celebrates the “absence of a master, of a 
sovereign” where the “sovereignty of will” gives way to the “sovereignty of reason.”148  
 It is an unfailing Reason that protects us from arbitrary injustices. According to 
Proudhon, “Reason, aided by Experience, shows man the laws of nature and of society, 
and says to him: These are the laws of necessity itself. No man has made them: nobody 
forces them upon you.”149 It is the interplay between an abstract Reason and everyday 
experience that guides us to liberation and justice.  
Proudhon’s theory is thoroughly grounded in everyday living. He considered 
knowledge to derive from experience. But, there was more to this Proudhonian insistence 
on experience than simply induction. His consideration of experience always highlighted 
the idea of process, becoming, and contingency. Proudhon found life to resist fixed and 
absolute schematization.  
“Reality,” writes Proudhon, “is inherently complex; the simple never leaves the 
realm of the ideal, never arrives at the concrete.”…In the face of a universe whose 
“infinities” are “inexhaustible,” Proudhon asks us to attend to the “fecundity of 
the unexpected,” which “outstrips any foresight” – the “fecundity of the creative 
power” of “Nature,” whose works are “always new and always unforeseen…a 
text which cannot be exhausted of conjectures.”150  
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Proudhon thought knowledge of this “text” was not “prior to phenomena,” but 
“discovered in them.” By discovering the regular relations and laws in nature we discover 
the essential rationality of the universe. We can only discover such laws by regular 
intercourse with the fleeting and contingent experiences of everyday life. However 
arbitrary or even artificially orderly this kind of knowledge may seem, Proudhon 
(especially in his later work) scorned those who divorced their theories from daily human 
experience.151 
This “rational structure” in Proudhon’s theory is not static.  “Rational 
determination is always modifiable and modifying.” This “notion of reason and of 
rationality of existence incorporates an assumption that process is essential to reality, and 
fixity alien to it.”152 This attitude has political implications. If “process” is essential to 
reality then a rejection of any fixed status quo becomes logical.  So, Proudhon’s emphasis 
on experience reflects the critical importance of flux and ephemerality rather than 
principled consistency in both politics and epistemology.  
This attitude towards change and becoming also implies progress and enthusiasm 
towards the prospect of enlightenment although Proudhon usually avoids the “naïve 
optimism common to both his contemporaries and their Enlightenment forebears.” 
Indeed, Proudhon recognized there were many obstacles to progress.153 Nevertheless, he 
never wavered in his rejection of stasis and our urge to freeze the gains of one generation 																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
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for the sake of avoiding an unknown (a progressive unknown for Proudhon) “to come.” 
154 
According to Hoffman, though Proudhon engaged in some of the systematization 
so popular in nineteenth-century social and political theory he maintained that his 
philosophy was “not absolute, but insistently non-dogmatic.” At times, Proudhon seems 
to combine an unapologetic rationalism with a suspicion of systemic thought and what he 
calls “absolutism.” Proudhon rejects the absolutism of inflexible conceptual frameworks 
and systematization of philosophy (positivist thinking in social science was a favorite 
enemy) just as vociferously as he does the absolutism of the State and the Church.155 
Nevertheless, Proudhon occasionally lends his voice to a celebration of Reason that 
overcomes the arbitrary will of others (especially those impositions that are channeled 
through unjust institutions).  
In any case, Proudhon does not entirely dismiss system building. It can serve 
practical purposes when trying to improve understanding or working towards some goal. 
However, such utility should not be confused with the nature of reality itself. Though a 
conceptualized pattern of regularity can improve our rational understanding such 
“patterns are imposed on reality and not a part of it.”156 Moreover, he recognized “no 																																								 																					
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certainties except moral obligation” and assumed “that no knowledge or concept is final.” 
In Proudhon’s philosophy there is a “rejection of the dogmatism and fatalism” of 
“traditional thought” and of the “positivism born of modern science” yet a thorough 
appreciation for the utility of generalization and conceptualization to fuel the important 
liberating effects of an adherence to Reason.157  
 This insistence on non-dogmatism tends to sit uncomfortably with Proudhon’s 
occasional flurries of celebration concerning Reason as well as his accompanying notion 
of human nature. Proudhon’s rebellion against the established order was not a “rejection 
of the rule of law, but adherence to the higher law of reason” and integral to Proudhon’s 
idea of freedom is the idea of the unimpeded exercise of reason.  Proudhon notes, “To be 
free: the man who is in possession of his reason and of his faculties, who is neither 
blinded by passion, nor constrained by or impeded by fear, nor deceived by false 
opinion.”158 In this sense, Proudhon echoes Plato, Kant, and many other seminal figures 
in Western thought. However, while the unimpeded exercise of reason does yield the 
only genuine possibility of freedom Proudhon thinks such an exercise will not reveal 
immutable truths about the proper ordering of society but rather progressively pave the 
way to justice.  
Much of Proudhonian political theory rests on this idea of freedom. Justly 
engaging in market transactions, political relationships, and working towards the public 
interest are all contingent on our ability to be free in the Proudhonian sense.  Having no 																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
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alternative but to enter disadvantageous transactions because of unequal conditions is 
bred of those same structures of inequality that impede the exercise of reason. Proudhon 
sees Reason as the vehicle through which liberation occurs as well as conceives of it as 
the ultimate end-point (as liberty and equality are always in accord with Reason and vice 
versa). This is rooted in a principled faith in our ability to autonomously make our own 
decisions and, given the requisite freedom, have those decisions attuned to Reason.  
Like Kant, Proudhon “recognizes no external authority as source of any norm. 
The rules a man lives by must be entirely internal in origin, stemming from his rational 
faculties.” This is the only way we are able to act morally. This idea of the internal origin 
of morality also reflects rationality as inherent to human identity precisely in the 
essentialist vein that much of Proudhon’s own thought about justice would reject. Within 
this frame, equality reflects the fact that we can all reason regardless of how effectively 
we do so. In other words, justice does not necessarily imply a perfect outcome for 
Proudhon but rather the possibility of striving for an outcome freely.159  
In addition to considering the exercise of reason as central to our identity, and 
despite his weariness over a “new intolerance” of logic and reason, Proudhon did not 
hesitate to celebrate Reason and to promote the axiom of our “constant, unchangeable 
nature.”160 This “essentialist” conception of humankind points to an unashamed embrace 
of Enlightenment philosophical anthropology.  He notes, “…man is moved by an internal 
attraction towards his fellow, by a secret sympathy which causes him to love, interact, 																																								 																					
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and sympathise [sic], so that, to resist this attraction, he must pit his will against his 
nature.”161  
 In addition to sympathy, Proudhon also thought we are endowed with other 
uniquely human capacities. Both evil (error, for Proudhon) and good (truth, for 
Proudhon) are the products of two human faculties, instinct and reflection. As Proudhon 
puts it “evil is the product of incest between two opposing forces, and good will sooner or 
later be the legitimate child of their holy and mysterious union.”162 Proudhon, like most 
anarchists, believed in an adaptable nature that varied as circumstances changed. We are 
capable of great good and great evil and both are products of human instincts and our 
capacity for reasonable reflection. Proudhon recognized we have egoistic and base 
instincts and an ability to use reasoning in disheartening ways for horrific ends as well as 
the capacity for sympathy and an ability to employ reason for great good. However, these 
instincts and our propensity for reflection were themselves fixed and unchanging while 
they served us in flexible ways depending on our circumstance.  
Among our fixed mental traits Proudhon claims our psychological egoism or, as 
Alan Ritter describes it, the “propensity of a man to aim for nothing but his own 
satisfaction.”163 Proudhon claims even apparent instances of altruism can be dismissed as 
expressions of an incurable egoism.164  Likewise, Proudhon sees egoistic hedonism as 
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another inherent human trait. That is, the idea that we get more pleasure from satisfying 
ourselves rather than others (thereby limiting the potential pleasure derived from 
altruism). But our nature is also mixed for Proudhon; while undeniably pugnacious we 
are also “the most sociable of animals.”165 
It is in accordance with our mixed (yet seemingly unchanging) natures that 
Proudhon envisions anarchist society.  It is a society where personal property is respected 
but the means of production should be owned communally, where societal dominion is 
unacceptable but authority in the home is tolerated, and where we can be just as easily 
dominated by the ambition of others as by our own cognitive and moral limitations and 
excesses.  Indeed, Proudhon notes the dangers of both “internal” and “external” restraint.  
Not only does he challenge the restrictions posed by “duly enacted laws, social pressures, 
religious codes, economic, and even physical forces, as by the arbitrary wills of other 
people,” but he also presupposes the “divided self” by pointing to the “internal restraint” 
that includes “not just the tyranny of the passion, but control by conscience.”166 
 Despite admitting the authoritarian potential of, at least, parts of our selves, 
Proudhon has no qualms about accepting the potential for domination in our most 
privileged faculty.  In fact, he privileges reason to the point where he considers it an 
antidote to the caprice of injustice in the social, economic, and political realms. In 
challenging the age-old notion of property he notes,  
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Finally, as to the time required for prescription, it would be superfluous to show 
that the property in general cannot be acquired by simple possession for ten, 
twenty, a hundred, or a hundred thousand years, and that, so long as there exists a 
human head capable of understanding and contesting the right to property, this 
right will never be prescribed.  For it is not a principle of jurisprudence or an 
axiom of reason but only an accidental and contingent fact.  One man’s 
possession may prescribe against that of another man, but just as the possessor 
cannot prescribe against himself, so reason has always the capacity to reform and 
revise itself, for the past is not binding on the future. Reason is external and 
always the same. The institution of property, the work of uninformed reason, may 
be abrogated by a more informed reason.  Thus, property cannot be established by 
prescription.  This is so certain and so true, that it is the basis of the maxim that in 
matters of prescription a legal error may not profit anyone.167  
Likewise, it is this external marker of Reason that should guide the proper administration 
of public affairs.  Proudhon notes,  
Every question of domestic politics must be decided by departmental statistics; 
every question of foreign politics is an affair of international statistics. The 
science of government rightly belongs to one of the sections of the Academy of 
Sciences, whose permanent secretary is necessarily prime minister; and since 
every citizen may address a memoir to the Academy, every citizen is a legislator.  
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But as the opinion of no one is of any value until its truth has been proven, no one 
can put his will in the place of reason-no one is king.168  
In other words, Proudhon considers governing a science. He appeals to the eternal laws of 
Reason as guides to the proper mode of governmental administration.  This sits uneasily 
with his rejection of government and his overall anti-authoritarianism. The fact is that 
Proudhon celebrated Reason in ways that often seemed to contradict his general suspicion 
of arbitrary authority.  
In any case, while celebrating Reason as both an ideal and a faculty, Proudhon 
also makes an “essentialist,” albeit ambivalent, case for a human nature (based on our 
incurable egoism and inherent sociability) that both anchors and attunes itself to Reason.  
Likewise, this same varied human nature informs our understanding of moral authority. 
While Proudhon conveys that we are both egoistic and sociable he does not think history 
really began this way. “‘It is only abstractly’” that man “‘can be considered in a state of 
isolation and with no law but egoism.’”169 However, scholars like Ritter contend, 
Perhaps his claims to the contrary are best interpreted as experimental hypotheses.  
Proudhon may assume that if he can show the possibility of liberation for men 
who start without social ties and with a selfish morality, he will also have proved 
liberation possible under more conducive initial conditions.170 
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The idea is that these assumptions would avoid common utopian criticisms by not relying 
on an “enlightened self-interest” to argue for reform or revolution.171 Nevertheless, 
Proudhon himself also recognizes our sympathy for others and that to resist this fellow 
feeling is unnatural.  
In light of our egoism and sociability, Proudhon found anarchist social 
organization to harmoniously overcome as well as cohere with our nature. In this view, 
blaming societal “antinomies” on either human nature (as in Christianity) or on the 
depravity of society (as in Rousseau or the utopian socialists - Saint-Simon, Owen, 
Fourier, and their disciples) is seen as simplistic and misguided to Proudhon.172  
Moreover, in addition to highlighting our varied natures, Proudhon’s stance on 
moral authority is ambivalent. On the one hand he has a deontological ethical stance. 
According to Ritter, “An action is right, he [Proudhon] maintains, only if it conforms to 
the specifications of an ultimate norm, and regardless of the actual or expectable results 
that follow from adhering to it.” For Proudhon, there are such things as intrinsically good 
actions which are “‘indispensable, imperative, often onerous, indifferent to self-interest, 
concerned only with what is right and binding, however unprofitable circumstances make 
the former, however disastrous they make the latter.’”173  
 Yet, Proudhon also seems to embrace a kind of moral constructivism by insisting 
that “the last word in ethical disputes belongs to the adversaries themselves” while 																																								 																					
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holding to a subjectivist position, which again appeals to the authority of Reason. As 
Proudhon puts it,  
Every man should decide for himself, at least about the specific obligations 
entailed by first principles. ‘In the last analysis, each individual is the judge of 
right and wrong and is empowered to act as an authority over himself and all 
others.  If I decide for myself that something is unjust, it is futile for the prince or 
the priest to call it just and order me to do it: it remains unjust and immoral…And 
conversely, if I decide inwardly that something is just, it is futile for the prince or 
the priest to claim to forbid me to do it: it remains just and moral.174 
Both beliefs, while seemingly at odds, point to a respect for freedom of choice, free 
agreement, and autonomy. For Proudhon, it is only with others that we can decide for 
ourselves. This is not a kind of moral relativism, rather it is a recognition that morality is 
only recognized and normative belief only justified when in accordance with Reason and 
Reason is itself always a reflection of our freely made choices and agreements. Whether a 
construction by the agents involved, socio-economic context, or physical reality, we are 
obliged to choose for ourselves and Proudhon takes it that we can.   
 In claiming that all “questions of legislation and politics are matters of science, 
not of opinion” Proudhon recognizes that a simple recognition of truth via Reason is 
enough to compel justice and legality.175 Nevertheless, he firmly believes that all systems 
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are equally opposed to progress.176 How then can we reconcile these two points of view if 
we take a strict adherence to Reason as a system of thought?  
 Proudhon thought of an adherence to Reason as self-legitimating. Much like 
Habermas, who believes in the self-validating role of reason,177 Proudhon sees our most 
prized faculty, and the ideals derivative of it, as grounded in an ecosystem of self-
reverence, self-reference, and auto-critique while authority, in any manifestation, is 
anathema to Reason for Proudhon. The generational authority of parents, the authority 
patriarchy and physical force in what Proudhon calls barbarous people, faith among 
sacerdotal peoples, primogeniture or caste in aristocracies, by lot or number as in 
Rousseau’s political thought – none of it can stand the scrutiny of reason. Unthinking 
submission is the only option for these traditional modes of authority; if any of these 
types of authority is met by reason their principles crumble. “Authority, like Liberty, 
recognizes only itself as a principle” but is, curiously, still imposed through “the 
investiture of Power.”178  
 However nuanced Proudhon’s conception of the authority of Reason might be 
(especially in his What is Property? and General Idea of Revolution in the Nineteenth 
Century), it is clear that his thought becomes more sophisticated and less unthinkingly 																																								 																					
176 Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution, 80. 
 
177 Habermas couches the self-validating role of reason plays in Modernity’s ability to create normativity 
out of itself. He also distinguishes between what he considers the impoverished view of instrumental 
rationality in Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of the Enlightenment and a more holistic 
understanding of reason as integral to the discourse of modernity. See Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). See especially lectures 1, 2, 5, 
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reverential to our most prized faculty (and the auxiliary notions that usually sustain it) as 
he matures. This is tied to his evolving understandings of static philosophizing in an ever-
changing world. Proudhon’s denial of stasis and embrace of the dynamic is more evident 
in his later work (especially The Philosophy of Poverty and De la Justice dans la 
revolution et dans l’Eglise). In these works he is keen to not only defend anarchism as a 
response to rigid social organization but also to attack absolutism in all its forms - 
including intellectualism and other dogmatisms.  
The Anarchist Embrace of Anti-Intellectualism and Modernism 
Many have echoed the heart of the anarchist attitude towards Reason. From 
Hegel’s politics of “inclusivity” to Habermas’ communicative rationality, the idea that we 
could non-coercively attune ourselves to truth and a politics grounded in freedom (of 
course how this freedom would materialize is the subject of continued debate) is central 
to not only anarchism but to modernity itself.179  This attitude is, first and foremost, a 
self-critical and anti-authoritarian appreciation for the importance of knowledge and its 
centrality to freedom and justice.  
 The means by which this “knowledge” is deployed informs both what constitutes 
knowledge and the means of arriving at it.  Anarchists of all stripes would agree that our 																																								 																					
179 William Connolly describes Hegel’s “politics of inclusivity” as follows: “It is part of the essence of 
humanity to seek truth by pressing onward to agreement, and the highest form of politics, to be realized 
finally in the modern period, is one where the sphere of fundamental agreement is all-inclusive, virtue is 
highly developed, rationality flourishes and freedom reigns. Put another way, the implicit purpose of 
human history is to eliminate otherness – all that escapes knowledge, reason, and normality – by pressing 
onward to agreements which assimilate it to higher forms of knowledge, reason and normality. The politics 
of inclusivity engenders the assimilation of otherness.” See William Connolly, Political Theory and 
Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 87.  Communicative rationality is detailed in Jürgen Habermas, The 
Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984).  
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modern world is governed by our hubristic drive to command and control nature. The 
idea that “knowledge is power” is reflective of this modern understanding of knowledge 
oriented towards mastery and away from wonder.180 This shift in emphasis attempts to 
harness the seemingly limitless power of Reason, and reinforces the “iron cage” 
described by Weber as a consequence, and leads to domination in several spheres of life, 
including the intellectual.  
This ironically positions us to fail more intensely in the pursuit of freedom such a 
drive promises. Any “absence of control is experienced as unfreedom and imposition: the 
experiences of alienation, estrangement, repression, authoritarianism, depression, 
underdevelopment, intolerance, powerlessness and discrimination thereby become 
extended and intensified in modern life.”181 Both Godwin and Proudhon recognized this 
danger. In an attempt to circumvent its effects, Godwin and Proudhon gradually came to 
embrace a “soft” rationalism that admitted Reason’s place as our guiding faculty but 
recognized the dangers of celebrating it and therefore rejected the predictable 
intellectualism that would follow.  
Thinking otherwise than Reason remained a difficult endeavor for both Godwin 
and Proudhon as many of their supporting concepts and ideals rested on a firm 
appreciation for the same. Our ability to freely engage one another and construct a mode 
of social organization free from coercion required Reason as the primary means and 
guiding principle. According to Godwin and Proudhon, Reason had the ability to justify 																																								 																					
180 In the Western tradition, the dictum “knowledge is power” is attributed to Francis Bacon in his 
Meditationes Sacrae (1597).  
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itself and embodied the kind of “self-critical reassurance” so typical of modernity and 
critical to anarchist practice.182  
 Nevertheless, Reason and the auxiliary notions usually employed to support it 
themselves became objects of critical consideration for both Godwin and Proudhon. They 
both came to rely less heavily on Reason as the exclusive framework from which 
freedom and justice would derive and instead embraced a multi-faceted appreciation for 
uniquely human faculties (like reason) and the romanticist impulses and counter-
Enlightenment thinking (e.g., an appreciation of our “domestic affections” and 
“sympathy”) which they considered central to both freedom, justice, and truth.  
 Later anarchist thinkers shared this critical view of intellectualism but came to 
embrace it from the start. In other words, intellectually, while Godwin and Proudhon 
progressively became less like hedgehogs and more like foxes,183 other classical anarchist 
thinkers, most notably Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, were always more diverse 
in their philosophical inspirations and less dogmatic in their appreciation of Reason. In 
the next chapter I will interrogate how Bakunin and Kropotkin came to their critical 
embrace of Reason and how they always kept the ideal (and the accompanying 
intellectualism) at arms length.  
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Chapter 3 
Reason, Science, and Anti-Intellectualism in Mikhail Bakunin and Peter 
Kropotkin  
The pursuit of scientific knowledge is as central to the anarchist endeavor as is the 
fight against the state. The so-called classical anarchists of the 19th century, especially 
Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin celebrated the scientific method and its ability to 
accurately and consistently facilitate an understanding of reality and contribute 
knowledge that would expedite anarchist revolution. While celebrating the liberating 
aspects of science (and the usually accompanying ideal of Reason), both Bakunin and 
Kropotkin diagnosed a kind of intellectual monomania that relied exclusively on Reason 
and science (and the auxiliary notions that usually sanctify them) to bring about 
revolution. They were wary of hierarchically institutionalized forms of scientific 
discovery, the dogmatic insistence on the univocity of rational thought, and the 
intellectualism and estrangement from quotidian tasks bred of a firm division of 
intellectual from manual labor incited by such monomania.   
Mikhail Bakunin was not a doctrinaire, systematic thinker. As Bakunin declared, 
“I cleave to no system, I am a true seeker.”184 Bakunin thought systematicity 
impoverished the value of lived experience and education itself.185  While systematic 
thought may serve utilitarian ends, these ends are not inherently valuable. In a rejection 
of “scientism” and “instrumental rationality,” Bakunin forcefully scorned the runaway 																																								 																					
184 Bakunin quoted in E.H. Carr, Michael Bakunin (New York: Vintage Books, 1937), 175.  
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self-legitimating character of scientific “progress” and technological advances that later 
scholars would identify as the genesis of horrors on a vast scale.186 Indeed, as Paul 
Avrich put it, Bakunin disdained intellectuals who sacrificed “real life on the alter of 
scholastic abstractions.”187  
 Peter Kropotkin equally disdained this kind of scientism and the intellectualism 
that predictably followed. While it is clear that Kropotkin accepts the epistemic authority 
of science, he does not embrace the accompanying scientism and intellectualism that is 
central to the ideological frameworks of many systems of domination. According to 
Kropotkin, anarchism itself is anathema to any institutionalized, scientific, or 
philosophical rendering of social relations. While Kropotkin did rely on evidence from 
nature (e.g., the behavior of animals) to inform his brand of anarchism, especially his 
theory of mutual aid, he clearly delineated the limits of such intellectual endeavors as 
divorced from our lived experience. Once our lived experiences are filtered through the 
lens of ideology, science, and philosophy, or are academically catalogued or 
institutionally itemized, they lose their immediacy.  According to Kropotkin, it is this 
immediacy that is steeped in the everyday experience of working class and poor people 
that reflects anarchism.188 In this sense, Kropotkin was a thorough anti-authoritarian and 
anti-intellectual.  Nevertheless, like his Enlightenment predecessors, Kropotkin saw the 																																								 																					
186 Perhaps the most theoretically forceful account of how “instrumental rationality” paved the way for 
atrocities is Max Horkeimer and Theodore Adorno, The Dialectic of The Enlightenment, ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott  (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).  
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liberating potential of science and our faculty of reason while recognizing the dangers of 
its institutionalized forms and an obsession with their purity and preeminence.  
Both Bakunin and Kropotkin shared a suspicion of concentrations of political, 
economic, and cultural power.  Prominent among these concentrations and something 
that intersects all these spheres are centers of ostensible “intellectual authority.” They 
were both wary of scientific associations and universities not because their ostensible 
goals were contrary to anarchist ideals but rather because their increasingly hierarchical 
structure sometimes facilitated the authoritarian tendencies contrary to these ideals and 
encouraged a worship of their guiding mantra of science and Reason.  
Bakunin and Kropotkin reflected the Russian anarchist movement of the 19th 
century that “manifested a deep seated distrust of rational systems and of the intellectuals 
who constructed them.”189 Anarchist historian Paul Avrich notes, “While inheriting the 
Enlightenment’s belief in the inherent goodness of man, the Russian anarchists generally 
did not share the faith of the philosophes in the power of abstract reason.”190 Both 
Bakunin and Kropotkin rejected the supposed “scientific” theories of history and society 
(reacting mainly to the Marxists) as “…artificial contrivances of the human brain which 
served only to impede the natural and spontaneous impulses of mankind.”191  
This emphasis on spontaneity, fluidity, and contingency does not pin Bakunin and 
Kropotkin against all systematic scientific and rational thought.  They promoted a healthy 																																								 																					
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suspicion of all “intellectual authority” in the same way they challenged authority vested 
in the state or other forms of institutionalized hierarchy. What this emphasis on flexibility 
does do is recognize our ability to employ these rational and scientific methods for our 
own ends. For anarchists like Bakunin and Kropotkin, these ends were the liberation of 
humankind. Insofar as the scientific method and the ideal of Reason contributed to such 
ends they were employed readily. However, whenever these means stifled or contradicted 
the march towards liberation they were combated at every turn.  
Mikhail Bakunin as Anti-Authoritarian Anti-Intellectualist 
Most of Bakunin’s writings exhibit a clear contempt for what he considered the 
authoritarian machinations of Karl Marx.192 The “dictatorship of the proletariat” and the 
accompanying social, cultural, and political institutions needed to govern such a 
revolutionary state struck Bakunin as contrary to his ideals of liberty. While the Marxists 
may have discovered the laws of political economy, their scientific pretension in 
translating those laws into revolutionary action struck Bakunin as elitist and totalitarian. 
According to Bakunin, it was not the role of an enlightened revolutionary vanguard but 
rather the people as a whole (perhaps with the input of philosophers, intellectuals, and 
political theorists) to make revolution.  
Intellectuals were to have an auxiliary role in the revolution. The revolution 
needed to be made by the people themselves. Bakunin thought it would be messy and that 
this was a good thing. The freedom to mature the revolution in fits and starts, to 																																								 																					
192 Despite Bakunin’s supposed authorship of the pamphlet, I have excluded an analysis of Catechism of a 
Revolutionary since it is usually attributed to Russian nihilist revolutionary Sergei Nechaev. See Mark 
Leier, Bakunin: The Creative Passion (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006), 201-224.  
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equivocate and correct, to quibble and overcome, was all a necessary part of a 
revolutionary process that would never quite culminate in some final stage of history or 
complete overcoming of injustice. For Bakunin, this freedom stood in contradistinction to 
the determinist and teleological worldview of the Marxists. Bakunin and the anarchists 
did not share Marx’s theory of history that crowned the successful dictatorship of the 
proletariat and eventually dissolved all class distinctions because it seems to overlook the 
importance of individual agency and creativity in a revolutionary process seemingly 
drowned in historical necessity. Rather, they considered history a reflection of the 
constantly negotiated roles and resistance integral to not only class conflict but also 
individual flourishing and the free association of persons and groups.  
Bakunin rejected the intellectualism of ossified centers of social, cultural, and 
political thinking. Academia, scientific associations, and governmental agencies 
dedicated to the dissemination of culture or knowledge were all potentially dangerous 
according to Bakunin. While they ostensibly furthered the aims of science (i.e., the search 
for truth) they also embodied structures of domination that threatened free association 
and the individual liberty Bakunin cherished. While the goal of science is certainly noble, 
a government by science or in the service of science posed a threat to liberty because the 
hierarchy inherent in government necessarily excluded full participation. Moreover, such 
a government would substitute reasons of state with reasons of science. In this case, for 
Bakunin, the arbitrarily authoritative and unaccountable idol remains only under a 
different guise. He argued such a government and the associations that could potentially 
comprise it are divorced from the true ends of revolutionary anarchism. Most 
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importantly, though perhaps facilitating access to truth, such a government would 
obstruct our liberty to recognize this truth.  
 It is worth quoting Bakunin at length. He notes, “The liberty of man consists 
solely in this: that he obeys natural laws because he has himself recognized them as such, 
and not because they have been externally imposed upon him by any extrinsic will 
whatever, divine or human, collective or individual.” He continues,  
Suppose a learned academy, composed of the most illustrious representatives of 
science; suppose this academy charged with legislation for and the organization of 
society, and that, inspired only by the purest love of truth, it frames none but the 
laws in absolute harmony with the latest discoveries of science. Well, I maintain, 
for my part, that such legislation and such organization would be a monstrosity, 
and that for two reasons: first, that human science is always and necessarily 
imperfect, and that, comparing what it has discovered with what remains to be 
discovered, we may say that it is still in its cradle. So that were we to force the 
practical life of men, collective as well as individual, into strict and exclusive 
conformity with the latest data of science, we should condemn society as well as 
individuals to suffer martyrdom on a bed of Procrustes, which would soon end by 
dislocating and stifling them, life ever remaining an infinitely greater thing than 
science.  
The second reason is this: a society which should obey legislation 
emanating from a scientific academy, not because it understood itself the rational 
character of this legislation (in which case the existence of the academy would 
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become useless), but because this legislation, emanating from the academy, was 
imposed in the name of a science which it venerated without comprehending – 
such a society would be a society, not of men, but of brutes…It would surely and 
rapidly descend into the lowest stage of idiocy.193 
Indeed, Bakunin considered the institutions that serve the perpetuation and safeguard the 
rigor of science to tend towards intellectual authoritarianism or at the very least to 
discourage the independent exercise of reason.  
It was not only the institutionalized forms of science that bore Bakunin’s 
criticism. Science itself was not free of criticism. While he saw himself laboring for truth 
and considered Reason the key to unlocking the truths of nature and society, he also saw 
a danger in limiting emancipation to our limited capacity to grasp truth in its entirety. Our 
limitations as finite thinking beings are aided by the scientific endeavor in that we can 
accumulate knowledge in the aggregate and “stand on the shoulders of giants” but by the 
same token we run the risk of being made prisoners of an all-encompassing ideology that 
promises to expedite thinking.194 In the face of our limited individual potential science 
becomes a useful tool for collective liberation but it should not be turned into just another 
belief system. Bakunin is clear in considering science a method to discover particular 
facts and not a comprehensive worldview. Bakunin notes,  
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Vast as the world itself, it [science] exceeds the capacities of the individual man, 
even though he may be the most intelligent of all humans. No one is capable of 
encompassing science in all its universality, and in all its infinite details. He who 
clings to the general and neglects the particular lapses therewith into metaphysics 
and theology – for the scientific generalization differs from the generalization in 
theology and metaphysics in that the former is built not upon an abstraction from 
all particulars, as is the case with metaphysics and theology, but, on the contrary, 
solely by relating the particulars into an ordered whole.195 
Bakunin is clear in his admiration of the ability of science to further progress in our quest 
for truth and knowledge. It facilitates the aggregate accumulation of knowledge while 
avoiding the grandiose metaphysical oversimplifications that ostensibly facilitate access 
to comprehensive belief systems. While it may be easy to hold beliefs through theology, 
ideologies, or sweeping philosophical systems that explain the world in ostensibly 
accessible ways, these methods necessarily avoid the kind of particularities that actually 
constitute knowledge.  
While the scientific method effectively allows us to discover truths, the 
metaphysical systems employed by philosophers and theologians hinder our access to 
knowledge. It is impossible to grasp the ordered whole of the universe in any 
intellectually rigorous way and this is what makes science so useful. According to 
Bakunin, sweeping intellectual explanations and rationalizations of reality, that are 
readily available in theology and metaphysical thinking, do an injustice to the complexity 																																								 																					
195 Mikhail Bakunin, ed. G.P. Maximoff, The Political Philosophy of Mikhail Bakunin: Scientific 
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of our world. Science on the other hand is able to demystify reality in all its concrete 
particularities by avoiding overarching and necessarily oversimplified intellectual 
systematizations. Science deals with particular questions, problems, and puzzles and for 
this very reason is ill-suited to answer the overarching questions that metaphysics, 
ideology, and philosophy easily tackle.  
While Bakunin is clear regarding the advantages and usefulness of science he is 
also wary of its idolization. There is also a clear disdain for the fetishizing of science in 
Bakunin’s work. Once the idea of science is elevated to the position of ideology, 
metaphysics, or philosophy its explanatory power is weakened and its institutional 
manifestations become authoritarian. For Bakunin, the worship of science becomes just 
as dangerous as the worship of God once it is celebrated as the answer to all of our ills. 
Bakunin thought once science itself was considered a belief system that promised to 
eventually solve all our problems human beings would easily be sacrificed at the “alter of 
abstractions” for the sake of an imagined progress in its name.  
 This is consistent with Bakunin’s insistence that authentic revolutionary action 
must sprout from the people themselves and not their so-called leaders. It is the 
particular, local, and contingent desires and wisdom of the people that fuels revolutionary 
action. Sweeping solutions to public problems (in Bakunin’s day a critique of Marx’s 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” was especially pronounced), however democratic they 
may seem, did not allow for the free organization of people from the bottom up without 
“interference, tutelage, or coercion from above.”  Instead, these solutions, no matter how 
republican or supposedly democratic, organized the masses from the top down and were 
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headed by “an educated and thereby privileged minority which supposedly understands 
the real interests of the people better than the people themselves.”196  
Bakunin’s unshakable faith in our ability to perceive our own interests and our 
rational capacity to discern the truth given access to adequate information is central to his 
anarchism and anti-intellectualism. He, like Godwin, Proudhon, and many Enlightenment 
thinkers before them, trusted our “private judgment” to adequately arrive at truth. That is, 
they believed we were essentially capable of exercising our most esteemed faculty in the 
service of truth so long as the obstacles to its free exercise were overcome. However, 
such faith in our most prized faculty did not translate into subservience to Reason itself.  
Nor did it translate into an absolute deference to those who claim mastery, specialization, 
or expertise in any endeavor where intellectual authority or expertise is called for.  
Bakunin clearly distinguished between hostility towards intellectual pursuits and 
hostility towards intellectuals, between a derision of education or science and distaste for 
a privileged education and scientism, as well as between an aspiration to intellectual rigor 
and an appeal to intellectual authority. Bakunin sums it up best in God and the State 
when he notes,  
In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning 
houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or engineer. For such or 
such special knowledge I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow neither the 
bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his authority upon me. I 
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listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their 
character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism 
and censure. I do not content myself with consulting a single authority in any 
special branch; I consult several; I compare their opinions, and choose that which 
seems to me the soundest. But I recognize no infallible authority, even in special 
questions; consequently, whatever respect I may have for the honesty and the 
sincerity of such or such an individual, I have no absolute faith in any person. 
Such a faith would be fatal to my reason, to my liberty, and even to the success of 
my undertakings; it would immediately transform me into a stupid slave, an 
instrument of the will and interests of others.197 
 Bakunin makes clear that were he to follow another’s guidance on intellectual or 
political matters it would be because it was “imposed” by his own “reason.” Moreover, 
he would give such guidance as much as he received it. Such, he says, “is human life.” 
He continues, “Each directs and is directed in his turn. Therefore there is no fixed and 
constant authority, but a continual exchange of mutual, temporary, and, above all, 
voluntary authority and subordination.”198 The idea of intellectual authority itself is 
always being negotiated and should not stand outside the relations of “voluntary authority 
and subordination” that comprise the anarchist ideal. Bakunin notes,  
This same reason forbids me, then, to recognize a fixed, constant, and universal 
authority, because there is no universal man, no man capable of grasping in that 																																								 																					
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wealth of detail, without which the application of science to life is impossible, all 
the sciences, all the branches of social life. And if such universality could ever be 
realized in a single man, and if he wished to take advantage thereof to impose his 
authority upon us, it would be necessary to drive this man out of society, because 
his authority would inevitably reduce all the others to slavery and imbecility. I do 
not think that society ought to maltreat men of genius as it has done hitherto; but 
neither do I think it should indulge them too far, still less accord them any 
privileges or exclusive rights whatsoever; and that for three reasons: first, because 
it would often mistake a charlatan for a man of genius; second, because, through 
such a system of privileges, it might transform into a charlatan even a real man of 
genius, demoralize him, and degrade him; and, finally, because it would establish 
a master over itself.199  
While rallying against the dangers of top-down organizational and intellectual schemes 
he points to the dangers and corrupting influences of hierarchy and privilege on our 
natures (however noble or genius they may be).  
According to Bakunin, hierarchy and privilege corrupt our “naturally social and 
communal” instinct. Contrary to Proudhon’s varied view of humankind (the idea we can 
be both unapologetically egoist as well as the most sociable of creatures), Marshall Shatz, 
in his introduction to Statism and Anarchy, describes Bakunin’s view on human nature as 
instinctually social and communal. He notes,  
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Bakunin believed that social solidarity, a deep-rooted social and communal 
instinct, was an innate feature of human nature.  If it failed to manifest itself 
consistently in contemporary society, that was only because it had been 
suppressed, or distorted, by the artificial structure of the state. To create a new 
and better society, therefore, did not require the reeducation of its inhabitants or 
the transformation of human nature, but only the release of the masses’ pent-up 
natural instincts and social energies by destroying the institutions thwarting 
them.200  
Nevertheless, to complement this seemingly axiomatic view of human beings as 
social creatures, Bakunin is also quite skeptical of the ontological underpinnings that 
ground such a theory. In this context, he calls into question the authority of what he calls 
“metaphysics,” and “scientism.” According to Bakunin,  
By “metaphysicians” we mean not just the followers of Hegel’s doctrines…but 
also positivists and in general all the present-day worshippers of the goddess 
science; all those who by one means or another (if only by a very diligent but 
necessarily always imperfect study of the past and present) have created for 
themselves an ideal social organization into which, like new Procrustes, they want 
to force the life of future generations whatever the cost; in short, all those who, 
instead of regarding thought or science as one of the necessary manifestations of 
natural and social life, take such a narrow view of that poor life that they see in it 
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only the practical manifestation of their own thought and their own always 
imperfect science. 
He continues, “Metaphysicians or positivists, all these knights of science and thought, in 
the name of which they consider themselves ordained to prescribe the laws of life, are 
reactionaries, conscious or unconscious.”201 In other words, the very philosophical 
foundations that ground the enterprise of discovering humankind’s social nature, the very 
underpinnings of any scientific categorization of human beings as social or anti-social, 
and the very ontological presuppositions that Bakunin makes are at odds with the spirit of 
his skepticism towards the Procrustean tendencies of the metaphysicians. While he notes 
that “thought and science” are two of the “necessary manifestations” of “natural and 
social life” he also warns against taking these manifestations as a reflection of a 
particular, subjective, point of view, or a reflection of a particular worldview or science 
itself (especially scientific reductionism or an omniscient Reason itself as a worldview).  
Yet, at times, Bakunin seems to echo Hegelianism and the notion that “the 
rational alone is real.” Paul McLaughlin references Bakunin on this issue. In commenting 
on Bakunin’s philosophy of nature he notes  
In a sense, then, nature is the field of the possible or, we might say, the causable – 
which is the logical; its limit is the uncausable or the impossible – the illogical. In 
other words, ‘All that is natural is logical, and all that is logical has already been 
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realized or is bound to be realized in the natural world, including the social 
world.’202 
 Despite McLaughlin’s Hegelian reading of Bakunin, Bakunin disdained an 
overreliance on Reason and the intellectualism it tends to breed.  Such an overreliance 
was inimical to the concrete changes needed to forge egalitarian and free relationships 
along non-hierarchal and participatory lines.  Bakunin equated intellectualism with 
reactionary politics precisely because it tended towards authoritarianism and the worst 
excesses of privilege. Likewise, the corresponding veneration of science, or scientism, 
evacuated all meaning from social existence.  Bakunin notes,  
Only general scientific education will become common property, particularly a 
familiarity with scientific method as a way of thinking, that is, of generalizing 
facts and drawing more or less correct conclusions from them. But there will 
always be very few encyclopedic minds, and, therefore, learned sociologists.  
Woe to mankind if thought ever became the source and sole guide of life, if 
science and learning began to govern society.  Life would dry up, and human 
society would be turned into a dumb and servile herd.  The government of life by 
science could have no other result than to turn all mankind into fools. 
He continued,   
We revolutionary anarchists are proponents of universal popular education, 
liberation, and the broad development of social life, and hence are enemies of the 																																								 																					
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state and of any form of statehood.  By contrast to all metaphysicians, positivists, 
and scholarly or unscholarly worshippers of the goddess science, we maintain that 
natural and social life always precedes thought (which is merely one of its 
functions) but is never its result.  Life develops out of its own inexhaustible 
depths by means of a succession of diverse facts, not a succession of abstract 
reflections; the latter, always produced by life but never producing it, like 
milestones merely indicate its direction and the different phases of its spontaneous 
and self-generated development.203  
As opposed to an overreliance on Reason and the intellectualism it usually breeds, 
Bakunin favored a widely accessible and integrated education that would become the 
“common property of all” (as opposed to the patrimony of a privileged few) and 
emphasize both “science and handicrafts” (as opposed to the “hollow abstractions of 
religion, metaphysics, and sociology”).204  
 This chiding of abstractions has a philosophical and a practical component. 
Philosophically, abstractions do not facilitate the kind of thinking that serves the 
aggregate accumulation of knowledge (as opposed to the scientific method which 
provides the tools by which individuals can accumulate knowledge within scientific 
communities and then share these with the general public). Practically, a focus on mental 
labor as opposed to physical labor subtracts from Bakunin’s revolutionary goals by 
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making potential revolutionaries either intolerant of or incompetent in the everyday tasks 
(both menial and skilled) necessary for the triumph of the revolution.  
The only way we make life is by creatively constructing it and not speculating on 
it. In other words,   
…what Bakunin rejects is a certain kind of philosophy, a kind he associates with 
figures whom, in part, he admires (e.g., Marx and Comte); that is, systematic and 
theologistic philosophy and, especially, philosophy which claims to have the 
future within its speculative sight.205  
This rejection of “speculation” and a focus on lived experience is grounded in what can 
be called Bakunin’s naturalism or a “naturalistic account of the structure of being and 
reality.”206 While Marx is also well known for his similar idea of philosophical 
materialism (understood both in terms of the idea that life determines consciousness and 
the concrete everyday experience of the working class), Bakunin still thought Marx 
elevated his theory to futile abstractions that would not serve the cause of revolution. 
Indeed, Bakunin’s “naturalism” does not correspond to Marx’s materialism. While 
Marx’s materialism is based, in part, on the general idea that our material conditions of 
life determine our consciousness (consciousness defined specifically as the ideological or 
philosophical effects of our material conditions), Bakunin considered our 
“consciousness” involved more than simply a deterministic relationship between our 
material conditions and our ideas, inclinations, and philosophical outlook. While Bakunin 																																								 																					
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embraced an empiricist Enlightenment-inspired naturalism he did not ascribe any kind of 
ideological or teleological component to his empiricism as did Marx. While Marx’s 
historical materialism is rooted in ideological and political theoretical concerns, 
Bakunin’s naturalism is epistemic.  
 Moreover, Marx famously thought human nature evolved as the modes of 
production evolved, though we had innate qualities like intelligence, creativity, and 
emotions, material conditions and social relations would, to a large degree, influence how 
our nature manifested itself. Bakunin, instead, thought that we have a communal nature 
that is manifested in our individual exercise of liberty whereby we act “naturally and 
consequently freely” by “not exploiting” our neighbors, thereby allowing each other to 
“live naturally and freely.” Essentially, “one individual’s freedom serves as a 
confirmation and extension of another.” Indeed, as Bakunin notes, “... collective liberty 
and prosperity exist only so far as they represent the sum of individual liberties and 
prosperities.”  
 Bakunin operated  
…within the naturalistic framework established by the empiricist current of the 
Enlightenment. Humans are conceived as embodying a permanently fixed nature 
with behavior basically determined by natural laws. This state of affairs is then 
identified with what is good. However, when coercion enters into the relations 
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among people, we enter the realm of the unnatural. We are alienated from our 
natural condition and we lose our freedom.207 
While in Marx our idea of what is “good” is itself morphed according to changes in the 
modes of production, Bakunin thought what is good is already present before any 
consideration or influence of coercive relations within certain modes of production. For 
Bakunin, what is natural is good. While Marx believed a transformation of the underlying 
modes of production (likely necessitating a “dictatorship of the proletariat” to bring it 
about) would result in our “consciousness” changing to reflect a newfound sense of 
justice, Bakunin considered our “natural” way of being, or our spontaneous impulses, to 
be inherently good and existing prior to and in spite of coercive modes of production that 
often distorted this underlying nature. No other laws but the “laws of our own nature” 
should limit us. In this way, Bakunin thought we were already free in so far as we could 
act according to our natures; Marx rejected this logic in favor of a more determinist 
account of our inclination towards freedom. In this way, Bakunin felt the “instinct of 
liberty” was lacking in Marx.208  
Bakunin often returned to his critique of the “speculations” he thought integral to 
Marxian theory but was equally aware of the benefits of a “rationalistic” and “scientific” 
approach both to the study of society and the command and control of the natural world. 
While Marx and Bakunin were not adherents to any kind of a priori metaphysics 
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(associated with figures like figures like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz) they both 
championed the utility of science and the notion of universal enlightenment.  
Bakunin thought we could certainly have tools (e.g., our faculty of reason, 
science, and technology) to manipulate our environment and dominate it for the sake of 
our liberation, thereby echoing the mechanistic ideals of Francis Bacon and Sir Isaac 
Newton.209 He also recognized that such tools, while indispensable to the rational 
organization of society, were incapable of concerning themselves with what is “real and 
living” and therefore contrary to the “real or practical organization of society.”210 That is, 
Bakunin distinguishes between the (what he thinks is a false) idea that only that which is 
measurable is real and therefore manipulable and the actual manipulation of things being 
concretely beneficial. One seems to be a purely philosophical controversy for Bakunin; 
the other seems to be a political or practical judgment.  
Moreover, echoing his Romantic predecessors and contemporaries, Bakunin saw 
anarchism much like art, and he sees scientific efforts to discover principles of justice as 
contrary to the revolutionary ideals that guided him.211 He notes, “Art, then, is as it were 
the return of abstraction to life; science on the contrary, is the perpetual immolation of 
life, fugitive, temporary, but real, on the altar of eternal abstractions.”212 According to 
Bakunin, anarchism reflects our bodily rhythms, communal instincts, biological cycles, 																																								 																					
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and natural inclinations. It reflects our nature and is in turn natural. While science seeks 
to manipulate, change, and renounce that nature. Bakunin insisted science sought to tame 
our creative urges and channel our natural inclinations in ostensibly productive ways. 
Such a “scientific” endeavor was, for Bakunin, anathema to anarchists.  
Bakunin saw improvisation and emotion as central to the revolutionary endeavor. 
The constant resistance of anarchists to standardization and abstraction (especially when 
concerning revolutionary strategy) is part and parcel of the anarchist ideal. It is a 
sentiment echoed often by anarchists, most notably Emma Goldman, who famously 
insisted she did not want a revolution where she could not dance.213  
Nevertheless, Bakunin’s thinking on science and Reason oftentimes seems to 
contradict his steadfast opposition to intellectual absolutism. Bakunin has a complicated 
philosophical relationship with science.  While he admonishes the authority of 
institutionalized science he recognizes the incredible technological advances only made 
possible by science. He also recognizes the liberty such advances facilitate. Many of 
Bakunin’s writings on science, Reason, and intellectualism are attempts to reconcile the 
authority of science with his unshakable belief in liberty. He often does so by invoking 
the notion of progress (a quintessential Enlightenment ideal).  He makes a distinction 
between revelation and investigation by noting that while the authority of the state and 
the church are based on either coercion or some unverifiable faith (often-times both), the 
authority of science lies in its ability to correct and continually perfect itself (reflecting in 																																								 																					
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this way the anarchist ideals of reinvention and openness). He makes the distinction 
between revelation and investigation. While the authority of the state and the church is 
usually given, the authority of science is based on its ability to objectively verify its 
findings and investigate its own shortcomings all the while unceasingly furthering the 
human quest for truth and understanding.  
For this reason, Bakunin notes, anarchists “recognize the absolute authority of 
science” but “reject the infallibility and universality of the savant.” He continues,  
In our church – if I may be permitted to use for a moment an expression which I 
so detest: Church and State are my two bête noires – in our church, as in the 
Protestant church, we have a chief, an invisible Christ, science; and, like the 
Protestants, more logical than even the Protestants, we will suffer neither pope, 
nor council, nor conclaves of infallible cardinals, nor bishops, nor even priests. 
Our Christ differs from the Protestant and Christian Christ in this – that the latter 
is a personal being, our impersonal; the Christian Christ, already completed in an 
eternal past, presents himself as a perfect being, while the completion and 
perfection of our Christ, science, are ever in the future: which is equivalent to 
saying that they will never be realized. Therefore, in recognizing absolute science 
as the only absolute authority, we in no way compromise our liberty.214  
Moreover, while statist and religious paradigms often call for sacrifice in the name of 
patriotism or salvation, Bakunin thinks science does no such thing. Instead of our lives 																																								 																					
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being imbued with meaning and purpose through our cultivation of national identity or 
religious piety with disastrous consequences for the expansion of our freedom, science 
helps lead us to our self-identified goals and thereby expands freedom by bringing us 
progressively closer to truth (truth being the natural consequence of freedom for Bakunin 
and many anarchists). Essentially, “In a word, science is the compass of life; but it is not 
life.”215  
Science cannot tame life nor can it grasp it in its entirety. The conceptual 
distinction to keep in mind here is Bakunin’s differentiation between our natural life 
(rooted in spontaneity, instinct, and art) and the kind of artificial conceptual or scientific 
analysis that many times tries to impose itself on natural life. As mentioned earlier, 
Bakunin’s “naturalism” reflects the ongoing disagreement with Marxists on a host of 
issues that unite anarchists against the perceived “absolutism” (both political and 
metaphysical) of Marxist philosophy. McLaughlin notes,  
Indeed, this rejection of ‘absolute’ historical materialism, or of historical 
materialism as such (the theory – understood either as all-explaining, or in 
Popper’s terms, unfalsifiable or irrefutable economic determinism… or as grand 
metaphysical construct – is absolutist by its very nature) unite anarchists from 
Bakunin and Kropotkin to Bookchin and Chomsky.216  
It is, again, this tendency towards intellectualism, abstraction, and “metaphysics” usurps 
the spontaneity so central to Bakunin’s anarchism.  																																								 																					
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Moreover, and perhaps most forcefully, Bakunin identifies intellectualism and the 
worship of science with a worship of the state.  He finds both supportive of hierarchy and 
arbitrary authority as well as equates the totalizing nature of one to be easily translated 
into and transferable to the other.  Bakunin notes,  
Idealists of every stripe, metaphysicians, positivists, defenders of the 
predominance of science over life, and doctrinaire revolutionaries – all of them 
with identical ardor through different arguments uphold the idea of the state and 
of state power. With perfect logic [sic] (in their own terms), they regard it as the 
sole salvation of society. I say with perfect logic [sic] because once they have 
adopted the position – utterly false, in our view – that thought precedes life, that 
abstract theory precedes social practice, and that sociology must therefore be the 
point of departure for social upheavals and reconstructions, they necessarily 
conclude that since thought, theory, and science, at least for the present, are the 
property of a very few individuals, those few must be the directors of social 
life.217 
According to Bakunin, so-called intellectuals tend to serve power precisely because they 
tend to think they should, themselves, occupy positions of power and because they are 
less likely to want to change a status quo that has elevated their social status. Moreover, 
Bakunin claims the more critical they may be in the world of ideas the less so is that 
critique translated into progressive social action. In a commentary on servility to power in 
mid-nineteenth century Prussia, Bakunin notes that  
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…it is clear why the doctors of philosophy of the school of Hegel, despite their 
fiery revolutionism in the world of abstract ideas, in actuality turned out to be not 
revolutionaries in 1848 and 1849 but for the most part reactionaries, and why the 
majority of them today have become avowed supporters of Bismarck.218 
Bakunin recognized the tendency of intellectual aristocratism to translate into political 
absolutism precisely because intellectuals either benefit from this absolutism or it pleases 
their elitist pretensions.  Moreover, Bakunin simply viewed the enterprise of elitist 
intellectual debate as wholly divorced from fostering social change.  He notes, “Even the 
most rational and profound science cannot divine the form social life will take in the 
future.  It can determine only the negative conditions, which follow logically from a 
rigorous critique of existing society.”219 In other words, we cannot map out exactly how a 
future society would look like, but only question and critique the existing one.  This 
seems to draw a distinction between state planners and political activists like Bakunin 
and further encourage us to view Bakunin as an anti-intellectual as well as an anti-
authoritarian thinker.   
Intellectual aristocratism is central to the tendency towards government by 
scientists. Bakunin considers it an evil inherent to reformists and “social engineers” of all 
political persuasions.  They all share an underlying faith in our ability to shape the desires 
of the people and channel these desires as well as their creative urges in politically 
expedient ways. Those who aspire to these feats of social engineering usually occupy 
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important posts in ever more powerful states and these constitute, according to Bakunin, 
government by scientists. He parses this observation by noting that such a government by 
scientists is contrary to liberty while science itself is key to it. As Bakunin emphatically 
put it,  
But until the masses have reached a certain level of education, will they not have 
to let themselves be governed by men of science? God forbid! It would be better 
for those masses to dispense with science altogether than to allow themselves to 
be governed by men of science. The first effect of the existence of such a 
government would be to render science inaccessible to the people. For such a 
government necessarily would be aristocratic, because existing scientific 
institutions are aristocratic by their essential nature.220  
He means to say scientific institutions exclude the general population despite the need of 
the general population to utilize science for their own liberation. Moreover, such a 
general education cannot be reached when the ends of education are the furthering of 
institutionalized science (we see this at universities that tailor research to funding dollars 
instead of to human needs). Rather, education independent of the institutional logic of 
centers of education is what was necessary for Bakunin.  
Moreover, Bakunin notes that the scientific, technocratic, educated, and otherwise 
“intellectual” class tends to further the interests of the bourgeoisie. He notes,  
																																								 																					
220 Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, 78. 
		
	 115 
In all European states it is only the bourgeoisie, an exploiting and dominating 
class – including the nobility, which today exists only in name – that receives a 
more or less serious education. Apart from that, a special minority is produced 
from the midst of the bourgeoisie, one which devotes itself exclusively to the 
study of the greater problems in philosophy, social science, and politics. It is this 
minority that, properly speaking, constitutes the newest aristocracy of the licensed 
and privileged ‘intellectuals.’ It is the quintessence and the scientific expression 
of the spirit and interests of the bourgeoisie.221  
Indeed, advances in science as well as art and culture seem to mostly benefit a small 
privileged class according to Bakunin. Like Marx, Bakunin claims these advances also 
serve as instruments of domination and exploitation undeniably reflecting the culture and 
interests of the dominant class. Bakunin also realizes the growth of poverty among the 
masses is accompanied by the growth of technical progress under capitalism. While this 
“progress is stupendous,” it is also true that “the more it grows, the more does it become 
the cause of intellectual and consequently material slavery, the cause of poverty and 
mental backwardness of the people; for it constantly deepens the gulf separating the 
intellectual level of the privileged classes from that of the great masses of the people.”222  
“How can workers break this vicious circle?” Bakunin asks. He answers,  
They must, of course, acquire knowledge and take possession of science – this 
mighty weapon without which, it is true, they can make revolutions, but lacking 																																								 																					
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which they will never be able to erect upon the ruins of bourgeois privileges the 
equality of rights, justice, and liberty which constitute the true basis of all their 
political and social aspirations.223 
The role of science as a tool for liberation is clear in Bakunin. Nevertheless, he also 
regrets that advances in the “administration of things,” themselves reflective of scientific 
advances, were designed to oppress workers.224 The difficulty is then to take control of  
“science” in much the same way the proletariat should seize the means of production in 
Marxism.  What is certain is that no “dictatorship” should follow from such a takeover 
according Bakunin.   
This brand of anti-authoritarian anti-intellectualism draws a clear distinction 
between the concentration of scientific knowledge in institutions that tend towards 
authoritarianism and science itself. Bakunin made clear that “science is first of all based 
upon the co-ordination of a mass of personal experiences – past and contemporary – 
always subjected to the rigorous test of reciprocal criticism. It is impossible to imagine 
any more democratic basis than this.”225 Science serves as a common language across 
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space and time and between people of different cultures.226 It is for this reason that, 
according to Bakunin, the scientific method is essentially democratic and egalitarian.  
This view of science reflects Bakunin’s hope for the unity of humankind. While 
we are infinitely varied in our interests, tastes, and dispositions, we all share an 
underlying humanity that reflects Bakunin’s view of science. In other words, Bakunin 
contrasts the democratic and egalitarian nature of science to the authoritarianism and 
privileged position of theology and metaphysics.  He considered science could provide an 
epistemological unity without the pretension to abstraction. The results of scientific 
research aggregated bits of knowledge without an aspiration to universal, abstract (and 
ultimately, empty and meaningless) knowledge. He notes, “The great unity of science is 
concrete. It is unity in infinite diversity, whereas the unity of theology and metaphysics is 
abstract; it is a unity in the void.”227 
To complicate matters a bit, while we are all unique (though essentially social 
creatures), and Bakunin thought we should embrace that diversity, he also thinks we 
share the underlying faculty of reason.  While this does not contradict his celebration of 
human diversity it does call into question his commitment to difference in the face of 
totalizing metaphysical abstractions. Indeed, Bakunin complicates the neat distinction 
between science and its institutionalization as well as between science and metaphysical 
abstractions when he equates human reason as a unifying and identical faculty we all 
share and, moreover, identifies that unifying faculty with science itself. He undermines 
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the individuality he praises by highlighting our identical rationality and its relation to 
science. Bakunin notes 
The world is a unity, notwithstanding the infinite variety of its component beings. 
Man’s reason, which takes this world as an object to be recognized and 
comprehended, is the same or identical, despite the infinite number of various 
human beings – past and present – by whom it is represented. Science, therefore, 
also must be unified, for it is but the recognition and comprehension of the world 
by human reason.”228 
He continues, “Metaphysics…acted according to the method of centralized states. 
Rational philosophy, on the contrary, is a purely democratic science.”229  
Despite claiming that we are naturally endowed with an identical faculty of reason 
he made no claim to our “natural” equality. The inequality bred of intellectualism is not a 
reflection of differences in our natural endowments but rather differences engendered by 
social injustice. Intellectualism is dangerous because it privileges certain members of 
society. When we create institutions and modes of society that create castes of 
“intellectuals” (e.g., a vanguard party or a privileged class of people that attend the most 
well funded and prestigious universities) we create inequality in every other sphere of 
society (including the economic and the political). That is why Bakunin was convinced 
that “the social environment, social position, and conditions of existence, are more 
powerful than the intelligence and will of the strongest and most energetic individual. It 																																								 																					
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is precisely for this reason that we demand not natural but social equality of individuals 
as the condition for justice and the foundation of morality.”230  
Bakunin’s general attitude toward intellectualism can be summarized in the 
following way. The distinction between the democratic and egalitarian nature of science 
and the authoritarian manifestations of its institutionalization and the contrast between 
science and the authoritarian pretensions of theology and metaphysics are at the heart of 
Bakunin’s anti-intellectualism. While Bakunin equates scientific institutions with 
aristocracy, he equates science itself with egalitarianism. While he rejects the overarching 
ideal of Reason, he embraces our most esteemed faculty, reason. While he understands 
the limits of the scientific endeavor he also sees that same endeavor as the key to guiding 
our search for liberty. Indeed, Bakunin recognized the reductionist impulse of scientism 
as a danger. The usually self-glorifying notion of scientific progress represented an 
uncritical faith in the benign nature of technological and scientific advancements. 
Bakunin warned that technical and scientific experts might use their knowledge to 
dominate ordinary citizens and while Bakunin was critical of this potential domination he 
did not reject the validity of scientific knowledge. He only recognized that the tendency 
to reduce life to formulaic expressions and subsume it to technocratic control would 
likely lead to tyranny.231 This was at once a stance against the authoritarian tendencies of 
intellectuals and institutionalized science as well as a wariness of totalizing metaphysical 
notions like Reason itself.  
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Indeed, there seem to be two competing tendencies in Bakunin’s thoughts on 
science and intellectualism.  On the one hand, his skepticism towards the concentration of 
scientific knowledge (in institutions as well as individuals) points to its pernicious effects 
in much the same way as concentrations of political or economic power would have 
pernicious effects.  On the other hand, there is an unsullied hope in the unity of 
knowledge and the existence of such unity being decipherable through our faculty of 
reason, yet still somehow interwoven with the infinite contingencies of the human 
experience.  
Between Reason and Scientism: Peter Kropotkin and Free Inquiry 
The general thrust of Kropotkin’s writings on anarchism includes not only a clear 
opposition to the state and capitalism but also highlights anarchism’s underlying 
scientific basis. Kropotkin was the quintessential representative of “scientific anarchism.” 
A scientist himself (he was a geographer), he based his anarchism on evidence of human 
cooperation as a survival strategy. Kropotkin’s anarchism was based not on abstract 
principles but rather on these naturally occurring cooperative elements and tendencies of 
human life that undergird the processes of free association central to the anarchist tenets 
of liberty and equality. Nevertheless, while celebrating science as central to progress and 
to discovering the proper ordering of society, Kropotkin also recognized the limits of 
science and, more importantly, both the sometimes authoritarian excesses of its 
practitioners as well as the authoritarian institutional logic of scientific associations and 
universities. He also took aim at the specialization and division of labor that was a 
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byproduct of scientific progress and hoped to further the idea of “integral education” that 
would combine both “intellectual” and “manual” labor.  
According to Roger N. Baldwin, Kropotkin described anarchism “in relation to 
the tendencies away from metaphysics and towards physics.”232 By this he meant that 
Kropotkin sought to shift the basis of anarchism from abstract ideals to notions rooted in 
empirical scientific evidence and understanding. According to Kropotkin, these naturally 
occurring elements and strategies of cooperation are only discoverable through the 
scientific method and empirical observation. 
Through his observations, Kropotkin came to the conclusion that 
…anarchism proves to be in accordance with the conclusions arrived at by the 
philosophy of evolution. By bringing to light the plasticity of organization, the 
philosophy of evolution has shown the admirable adaptability of organisms to 
their conditions of life, and the ensuing development of such faculties as render 
more complete both adaptations of the aggregates to their surroundings and those 
of each of the constituent parts of the aggregate to the needs of free 
cooperation.233  
Kropotkin forcefully contrasts this view with a faith in the ideal of Reason. While he 
celebrated the scientific method he remained skeptical of overarching philosophical 
systems and the ungrounded faith in Reason on which they often depend. Many 
philosophical systems, such as Hegelianism for example, embraced the rational spirit or 																																								 																					
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the quasi-cosmic order of the universe; others, like Cartesian rationalism, relied on a 
thorough rational skepticism of the outside world and a celebration of the deductive 
method which cemented the mind/body divide and contributed to much subsequent 
philosophical scholarship and the idea that there exists a firm wall of separation between 
our mental and physical faculties.  
Reacting to Hegelian idealism and the rationalism of scores of philosophical 
schools in his essay “Modern Science and Anarchism” Kropotkin notes  
When the metaphysicians try to convince the naturalist that the mental and moral 
life of man develops in accordance with certain ‘In-dwelling Laws of the Spirit,’ 
the latter shrugs his shoulders and continues his physiological study of the 
phenomena of life, of intelligence, and of emotions and passions, with a view to 
showing that they can all be resolved into chemical and physical phenomena.  He 
endeavors to discover the natural laws on which they are based. Similarly, when 
the anarchists are told, for instance, that every development consists of a thesis, an 
antithesis, and a synthesis; or that ‘ the object of law is the establishment of 
justice, which represents the realization of the highest idea;’ or, again, when they 
are asked what, in their opinion, is ‘the object of life?’ they, too, simply shrug 
their shoulders and wonder how, at the present state of development of natural 
science, old-fashioned people can still be found who continue to believe in 
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‘words’ like these and still express themselves in the language of primitive 
anthropomorphism…234 
Moreover, for Kropotkin, just as important as a rejection of these philosophical systems 
was an appreciation of both mental and manual labor. Kropotkin would echo Bakunin’s 
idea of integral education by describing anarchist communities where everyone would 
perform both “mental and manual labor.”235  
Kropotkin criticizes the division of labor and the intellectualism born of it. He 
laments the separation of the “brain worker” and the “manual worker” and the contempt 
among intellectuals and scientists of manual labor. Central to Kropotkin’s notion of 
“integral education” is a blurring of the line between mental and manual labor as well as 
a celebration of the well-rounded individual.  Kropotkin recognizes that knowing more 
and more about less and less is a feature of modern industry, science, and learning. While 
specialization may serve to advance science and industry it hinders the full development 
of individuals. Ostensibly, advances in science and industry should contribute to 
developing our human capacities in a free society, but under conditions of political and 
economic oppression they contribute to hindering human development.  
 Kropotkin sees the solution to this stagnation in combining scientific and, what he 
calls, handicraft education. He notes, “We maintain that in the interests of both science 																																								 																					
234 We should note that by “natural law” Kropotkin does not echo natural rights theorists like John Locke 
who argued our natural rights were reflective of our moral duty (that existed in the state of nature prior to 
the social contract). Rather, Kropotkin means to say that the social “laws” discovered by the scientific 
method regarding natural human behavior should be considered appropriate and he would regard anarchism 
to reflect these “natural laws.”  See Kropotkin, Anarchism, 151-152.  
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and industry, as well as of society as a whole, every human being, without distinction of 
birth, ought to receive such in education as would enable him, or her, to combine a 
thorough knowledge of science with a thorough knowledge of handicraft.”236 According 
to Kropotkin, employing our mental and bodily powers brings a sense of fullness and 
better prepares us for the work of the revolution and for revolutionary society.  
Nevertheless, this belief in the importance of an integral education does not 
belittle the importance of science to discovering the tendencies in human relations and 
the proper ordering of society.  Kropotkin is clear in his celebration of the scientific 
method.  Indeed, anarchistic thinkers have taken him to task for it. Paul Feyerabend, for 
example, accuses Kropotkin of unquestioningly supporting the epistemological authority 
of science. He writes that Kropotkin, and anarchists generally, “swallow without protest 
all the severe standards which scientists and logicians impose upon research and upon 
any kind of knowledge-creating and knowledge changing activity.”237  
Feyerabend is largely correct about Kropotkin’s celebration of science and logic.  
However, this does not mean that Kropotkin unquestioningly supports the idea that we 
should “swallow without protest” the standards of either. Kropotkin, like Bakunin, 
esteems individual and folk wisdom just as much as a strict scientific method and our 
faculty of reason. Moreover, Kropotkin contends the state and institutions like academia 
often marginalize unorthodox voices that might challenge the arbitrary epistemological 
																																								 																					
236 “Brain Work and Manual Work,” Peter Kropotkin, accessed February 7, 2016, 
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/kropotkin/brainmanualwork.html.  
 
237 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge (London: Verso, 
1975), 20.  
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authority Feyerabend worried about. It is precisely the institutional manifestations of 
science (especially science supported by the state for reasons of state) that often exhibit 
an authoritarian impulse and reflects the class background of its practitioners.  
 Kropotkin does not see science itself (nor the underlying Reason it is said to 
reflect and manifest) as authoritarian despite the many authoritarian instantiations of 
reason and science in the same way we would not consider our sense of vision as 
inherently faulty in light of its many real-world imperfections (astigmatisms and the like). 
If we consider Reason as analogous to vision we can see that it would seem nonsensical 
to seek liberation from our sense of vision simply because of the many possible 
imperfections in those who see. Moreover, we can even claim that our personal 
experience and cultural background will affect how we “see” but it would be nonsensical 
to seek liberation from our vision for this reason. Indeed, Kropotkin would argue our 
capacity for reason (and the science that is bred of this human faculty) should not be 
denigrated because of the detrimental effects of certain instantiations of reason (and the 
institutions that have celebrated science and logic and cultivated a certain kind of 
knowledge).  
 We could parse this analogy a bit more and understand that Kropotkin views a 
certain kind of “vision” as authoritarian in the same way he considers a certain kind of 
exercise of science (and the institutional power and authority that accompanies it) as a 
threat to freedom. Indeed, we should think of it in the same way we think of "looking" 
and "seeing." While looking certainly describes vision in some sense it does not always 
entail an appreciation of dimensions, distances, or even accurate representations (we can 
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think of how someone suffering from astigmatism of some kind does not really "see" 
what's in front of them but can certainly "look" at it). An appreciation of the 
"dimensions" of what is being "seen" is central to anarchist thought in the same way that 
a healthy skepticism of (or wearing corrective lenses to better "see") what is being 
"looked" at is generally a good thing if we suffer from astigmatism.  
A dogged insistence that we should only "look" with our God-given eyesight in 
its purest form without corrective lenses or a consideration of what we are looking at and 
in what context we do so would be silly and unnecessarily dogmatic or 
conceptually "authoritarian" for anarchists like Kropotkin. Anarchists, including 
Kropotkin, have always been keen to appreciate context and particularities of given 
situations in this way.  To continue the analogy, Kropotkin would insist that while there 
is only one way to "look" there are many ways to "see" and that anarchists can appreciate 
vision as well as anyone but they are also skeptical as to the idea of "looking" always 
entailing "seeing.”238  
 It is the danger of insisting on only a certain kind of “looking” that Kropotkin sees 
as dangerous. Kropotkin rejects the dogmatism of a celebration of Reason or science 
while embracing our faculty of reason and the scientific method.  Indeed, Kropotkin 
exemplified the spirit of rational inquiry while noting the dangers of a scientism that 
would reduce the study of humankind to totalizing onto-epistemological axioms. 
According to Brian Morris, Kropotkin, like Marx, “stood firmly in the tradition of the 
Enlightenment” in his “affirmation of reason.” He stressed the importance of  
																																								 																					
238 I am indebted to Dr. Bruce Hauptli for this analogy.  
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…free inquiry and secularism; an advocacy of scientific materialism and the 
repudiation of mythology, mysticism, and religious dogma as modes of 
understanding the world; a respect for craftsmanship and an enthusiasm for 
industry, coupled with a belief in human progress through the application of 
science and technology; an emphasis on individual liberty  and equality and the 
promotion of a cosmopolitan outlook; and finally, a repudiation not only of sacred 
texts but of the past, of the classical literature of antiquity, as a source of 
authority.  
However, Kropotkin’s worldview was not a simple scientism. According to Morris, 
Kropotkin thought the “identification of the Enlightenment with a blind faith in progress 
or with a naïve rationalism is facile in the extreme.”239 Nor did Kropotkin reduce human 
existence or nature to a scientistic reductionism.  
 Kropotkin took care to remind us that individuals have varied natures. He 
recognized that we were capable of great altruism and cooperation as well as other 
desires that led us to egoism and the domination of others.240 Importantly, this conception 
of human nature resisted the axiomatic reductionism of other classical anarchist thinkers.  
Nevertheless, for Kropotkin, it is precisely this variation that necessitates an anarchist 
society of free association. In his The Conquest of Bread, Kropotkin notes,  
And as all men do not and cannot resemble one another (the variety of tastes and 
needs is the chief guarantee of human progress) there will always be, and it is 																																								 																					
239 Brian Morris, Kropotkin: The Politics of Community (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2004), 130.  
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desirable that there should always be, men and women whose desire will go 
beyond those of ordinary individuals in some particular direction.241 
According to Morris,  
He [Kropotin] shared with Marx a great debt to both the logic and content of the 
eighteenth-century French Enlightenment, but… he rejected entirely its 
metaphysics of nature.  He thus repudiated the anthropocentrism and essentialism 
of Enlightenment thought…as well as its radical dualisms (humanity/nature, 
mind/body, individual/society) and its mechanistic world picture.242  
In large measure, Kropotkin endeavored not to invent society or human relations anew 
but rather to base his idea of social organization on what he saw as present and obvious in 
existing relations.  Kropotkin’s anarchist communism extrapolated from a perceived 
nature of human relations.  It was  
…less a vision of a future utopia but rather an attempt to sustain and develop the 
kind of institutions based on sociality and free cooperation that already formed an 
essential part of all human societies, even the most tyrannical. It was to preserve 
and expand the precious ‘kernel’ of social customs without which no human or 
even animal society, could exist.243 
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Kropotkin emphasized that individuals have varied natures and the most successful 
human societies and endeavors have been those based on cooperation. From his 
celebration of medieval guilds to the fact that wolves and lions hunt in packs and bees 
and ants cooperate to build their hives and colonies, examples of mutual aid are 
plentiful.244 
Kropotkin’s anarchism is based on a thoroughly scientific worldview that rejects 
the metaphysical dualisms reminiscent of the Enlightenment and embraces humankind’s 
varied nature and its identification with nature itself.  Morris quotes Kropotkin,  
Upon a mechanical explanation of all phenomena, embracing the whole of nature 
– that is, including in it the life of human societies and their economic, political 
and moral problems.  Its method of investigation is that of the exact Natural 
Sciences, and, if it pretends to be scientific, every conclusion it comes to must be 
verified by the method by which every scientific conclusion must be verified.  It 
aims to construct a synthetic philosophy comprehending in one generalization all 
the phenomena of nature – and therefore also the life of societies.245  
Indeed, “Kropotkin, following the radical implications of Darwin’s theory of evolution, 
therefore rejected any metaphysical dualism between humans (and their social life) and 
nature – for Kropotkin continually emphasized that humans are a part of nature.”246  
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As is made evident by the historical, sociological, and consequentialist reflection 
in Mutual Aid247 as well as his scientific outlook, Kropotkin sought not to marry himself 
to any one philosophical paradigm. Kropotkin’s philosophy, most notably his philosophy 
of nature, seemed to be a via media between the idealism of those who postulate a 
“radical separation of humanity and nature” or deny “the reality of an external world 
(exemplified by neo-Kantian philosophy, hermeneutics, and postmodernism), and a 
reductive form of materialism.” Kropotkin combined a humanism that emphasized 
“human agency and the recognition that human social life and culture constitute a 
relatively autonomous realm of being” and a naturalism that recognized humans as “an 
intrinsic part of nature.”248  
Revolution, for Kropotkin, entailed a transformation of society attuned to natural 
human relations absent the ossification of its institutional residues in the form of 
government.  “The notion of a ‘revolutionary government’ Kropotkin considered to be a 
contradiction in terms, for ‘revolution’ and ‘government’ were incompatible concepts.  
‘The one is always the negation of the other,’ he wrote, and apart from anarchy ‘there can 
be no revolution.’”249 Likewise, for Kropotkin, law itself (perhaps the most omnipresent 
instantiation of state power) was antithetical to the both the basis of a free society and its 
natural state. “We need to recognize that the ‘law’ is a relatively modern phenomenon 
and that humans have lived for many centuries without any kind of written law.  Since 
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earliest times humans have regulated their lives through habits, local customs, and 
cultural usages.”250 Indeed, “Nothing good, he wrote, ‘is made except by the free 
initiative of the people, and all power tends to kill it.’”251 
 In fact, for Kropotkin, it is precisely science that combats the totalizing onto-
epistemological maxims and axioms of the nineteenth century metaphysicians that sought 
to root out “habits, local customs, and cultural usages.” Kropotkin saw science as 
providing knowledge for solutions to specific problems while following a general method 
for attaining that knowledge.  While the scientific method was standard, the problems 
tackled and experimental results could be applied to an infinite variety of localized 
contexts. This possibility is central to Kropotkin’s anarchism and to the anarchist 
acknowledgement of our “need of knowledge, of brains and of the voluntary 
collaborations of a host of local and specialized forces which alone can attack the 
diversity of economic problems in their local aspects.”252  
Kropotkin notes,  
In anarchism there is no room for those pseudo-scientific laws with which the 
German metaphysicians of the first thirty years of the nineteenth century had to 
content themselves. Anarchism does not recognize any method other than the 
natural-scientific, and it applies this method to all the so-called humanitarian 
sciences. Availing itself of this method as well as of all researches which have 																																								 																					
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recently been called forth by it, anarchism endeavors to reconstruct all the 
sciences dealing with man and to revise every current data of right and justice on 
the bases which have served for the revision of all natural sciences. Its object is to 
form a scientific concept of the universe embracing the whole of nature and 
including man.253  
While this call may seem epistemologically and ontologically universalizing it is 
important to keep in mind what Kropotkin means by science. Science is a tool that, while 
embracing the study of nature (including human beings and society) as a whole, serves 
the interests of particularized solutions to specific problems as well.  In Kropotkin’s case, 
the overarching problem is a proper ordering of society that Kropotkin thinks should 
reflect both the history of human communities (themselves, historically, run along the 
lines of free association and mutual aid) and the behaviors of animals.  
Nevertheless, Kropotkin also clearly outlines what he thinks are the limits of 
science in so far as it informs anarchism.   
Anarchism like socialism in general, and like every other social movement, has 
not of course developed out of science or out of some philosophical school. The 
social sciences are still far removed from the time when they shall be as exact as 
are physics and chemistry…It would be unreasonable, therefore, to expect of the 
young social sciences, which are concerned with phenomena much more complex 
than winds and rain, that they should foretell social events with any approach to 
certainty. Besides, it must not be forgotten that men of science, too, are but 																																								 																					
253 Ibid, 192. 
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human, and that most of them either belong by descent to the possessing classes 
and are steeped in the prejudices of their class, or else are in the actual service of 
government. Not out of universities therefore does anarchism come.  
It remains important, according to Kropotkin, to recognize the limits of both science itself 
and those who practice science as well as to guard against the institutional logic (itself 
bred of authoritarian tendencies) of scientific associations and universities. He continues, 
“Like socialism in general, and like all other social movements, anarchism was born 
among the people; and it will continue to be full of life and creative power only as long as 
it remains a thing of the people.”254  
Reconciling Anti-Intellectualism, Reason, and Science 
By seeing the social world and the physical world as just one natural world, 
Bakunin and Kropotkin saw science as reflective of our natural ability to reason and as 
the key to discovering the “natural laws” that would lead us to anarchism. They 
considered the anarchist endeavor intimately tied to scientific progress all the while 
noting the dangers of elevating science and our most esteemed faculty to the level of their 
most cherished ideal: liberty.255 Instead, anarchists like Bakunin insisted, “Once more, 
Life, not science, creates life; the spontaneous action of the people themselves alone can 
create liberty.”256   
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Bakunin and Kropotkin recognized Enlightenment values as channeling both 
liberating and pernicious tendencies. While both thinkers celebrated the discovery of 
truth through science and the exercise of reason they were also quick to point out that 
excessive abstraction, institutionalization, and compartmentalization of rationality and 
science led to concentrations of power and authority that are unacceptable to anarchists. 
The predictable consequences of the worship of Reason and science, which take the 
shape of an intelligentsia subservient to power, the excessive separation of intellectual 
from manual labor, and the idolization of Reason and science, contribute to the 
intellectualism Bakunin and Kropotkin consistently combatted.  
In both Bakunin and Kropotkin we see a clear distinction between a disdain for 
the intelligentsia and an appreciation of reason and science. While scientism and a 
worshipping of Reason were products of the intelligentsia and the institutions that 
afforded and perpetuated their power, a clear appreciation for Enlightenment values 
unvarnished by the class oppression of state and capitalist systems imbued most anarchist 
thought. By keeping in mind this qualified support of the ideal of Reason we see a clear 
appreciation for science as a liberating force (so long as it is divorced from its 
authoritarian ties to the state and capitalism).  
By rejecting dogmatism in every realm (including the intellectual) both Bakunin 
and Kropotkin highlighted the anti-authoritarian elements of diversity, localism, and 
pluralism in matters of philosophy and science. They both share a steadfast opposition to 
univocal expressions of truth, Reason, and science as well as a healthy suspicion of the 
institutional manifestations of them all. They agree there are many ways to tackle 
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important social issues and matters of justice yet diagnosed a persistent intellectual 
monomania in the problematizing and resolving of these same issues.  
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Chapter 4  
Anti-Authoritarianism as Anti-Intellectualism:  
Stirner, Nietzsche, and the Anarchic Politics of Postfoundationalism 
“Caminante no hay camino se hace camino al andar.” – Antonio Machado257 
This chapter will examine Max Stirner’s and Friedrich Nietzsche’s challenges to 
traditional Western metaphysics and epistemology and their connection to anti-
authoritarian thought (especially the anarchist tradition and recent developments in 
postfoundational anarchist theory). My purpose is to stress the importance of both Stirner 
and Nietzsche in thinking about an anti-authoritarianism of the intellect (i.e., an anti-
authoritarianism aimed at the epistemic authority of Reason, the scientific method, and 
other authoritative accounts of knowledge, as well as against the ontological categories 
usually used to sustain them).  Conceiving of such an anti-authoritarianism of the intellect 
facilitates new ways of thinking about important political notions in the 
postfoundationalist context (e.g., domination) and relating them to traditionally non-
political notions (e.g., intellectualism).  
I will consider how the anti-authoritarianism of these thinkers questions the 
legitimacy of not only politics and political institutions but also apolitical hierarchies that 
nevertheless govern our thinking.  This anti-authoritarianism of the intellect rejects what 
William James called “intellectualism” or the grafting of conceptual frameworks onto our 
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Antonio Machado, accessed 6/29/2016, http://gwenglish.blogspot.com/2014/04/poem-of-day-antonio-
machados-caminante.html.  
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understanding of the world and the lauding of such grafting as exact, thorough, and 
scientific.258   
While the history of critical political thought is rife with anti-authoritarian 
discourse aimed at political, economic, and cultural domination, postfoundational 
anarchist discourse takes inspiration not only from radical anti-capitalist and anti-statist 
frameworks of analysis but also anti-metaphysical thinkers like Stirner and Nietzsche. 
Stirner and Nietzsche highlighted our dubious romance univocal understandings of 
Reason, essentialist views of human nature, and other kinds of onto-epistemological 
foundationalism. Their interrogation of foundationalism illustrated anarchist anti-
intellectualism.  
Intellectualism in the anarchist tradition is nuanced and defies easy categorization.  
While other radical traditions like Marxism openly espouse their scientific and 
rationalistic aspirations (e.g., a theory of scientific socialism and a dialectically 
materialist understanding of history) and other quintessentially modern political traditions 
like liberalism easily betray their foundational assumptions (e.g., atomized individuality, 
rational self interest), anarchism does not lend itself to a static philosophical reading. 
While these scientific aspirations and foundational assumptions frame Marxism’s and 
Liberalism’s endeavor to secure liberty and equality they also seem to unwittingly 
reinforce a certain kind of domination, hierarchy, or arbitrary authority.  
Historically, the calling of anarchism has been to oppose domination, hierarchy, 
and arbitrary authority wherever it may be present. These sorts of dominion have been 																																								 																					
258 William James, A Pluralistic Universe [iBook], lecture 6 “Bergson and His Critique of Intellectualism.” 
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readily challenged in the realms of state power, the concentration of wealth, the spiritual 
authority of the Church, and patriarchy while it has been little explored in the “struggle 
over signs, symbols, representations, and meaning in…everyday life.”259 
Postfoundational anarchism seeks to fill such a gap in anarchist anti-authoritarianism.260 
In order to do so these contemporary anarchists appropriate postfoundationalist 
discourses to better apply such anti-authoritarian critiques to the realms of ontology and 
epistemology. Such a broadening of how we think about domination, hierarchy, or 
authority in the postfoundationalist context is crucial to understanding these 
contemporary currents of anarchist theory and their precursors in anti-metaphysical 
nineteenth century thought.  
Here, I will address Stirner’s rejection of the ostensibly emancipatory value of 
language, essentialism, and rationality while noting his views on self-legislation and 
autonomy. I will also focus on Nietzsche’s challenge to the authority of Reason in his 
analysis of the creative forces of the Dionysian, his rejection of transcendental moral 
absolutes, and his perspectivism. I will interrogate both Stirner’s and Nietzsche’s role in 
conceptualizing the beginnings of a postfoundational anarchism as well as their role in 
																																								 																					
259 Jesse Cohn, “What’s Wrong With Postanarchism?, accessed 02/19/2015, 
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260 Despite the appropriate postfoundational critique of some canonical anarchist thinkers like Proudhon 
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A Factor in Evolution (Forgotten Books, 2008[1902]). Nevertheless nearly all anarchist thinkers can be 
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sustaining and continuing the anti-intellectualist strain of anarchist thought.   This will be, 
in part, an engagement with issues in the anti-intellectualism of these two thinkers and a 
reflection on their connection to the anarchist tradition (especially concerning the 
“anarchist turn” of late).261 While anti-intellectualism of this kind is not unique to Stirner 
and Nietzsche,262 they did serve as a clear bridge to contemporary anarchist anti-
metaphysical and, I argue, anti-intellectualist thought.   
Anti-Intellectualism  
 By embracing these political features of seemingly apolitical onto-epistemological 
frameworks of understanding we consider an understanding of anti-intellectualism as an 
anti-authoritarianism that is key to the evolution of postfoundationalist anarchist thought.  
My aim is to frame an understanding of contemporary postfoundationalist anarchist anti-
intellectualism as grounded in these two thinkers and I hope to make evident the 
connection between this kind of anti-authoritarianism and the anarchist tradition.  
As mentioned above, many consider the postfoundationalist tradition as the first 
sincere attempt to elude the hold of Reason on philosophy and what prominent social 
																																								 																					
261 See Jacob Blumenfeld, Chiara Bottici, Simon Crtitchley, ed. The Anarchist Turn (London: Pluto Press, 
2013). 
  
262 Nathan Jun highlights the fact that within the anarchist tradition, P.J. Proudhon’s, Mikhail Bakunin’s, 
and Peter Kropotkin’s work served as precursors to skepticism towards epistemic authority and ontological 
absolutism. According to Jun, the so-called classical anarchists engaged in a critique of not only the 
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engaged in a critique of the ontological and epistemological categories that sustain the former.  In other 
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philosophical, scientific, moral, cultural, and religious dimensions as well.”  That is to say, “anarchism is 
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theorists have considered the “rationalization” of society. Reflections on the “iron cage” 
of modernity, the nihilism fueled by all-consuming rationalistic culture, the 
“disenchantment” of the Western world and the rise of instrumental rationality all 
contributed to a steady critique of the dangers of modern industrial and technological 
society. The move towards mastering “all things by calculation”263 impelled social critics 
of all stripes to condemn the de-humanizing and dangerous tendencies of Fordist 
industrialism, politico-administrative instrumentalism, and the tragic expressions of 
rationality in twentieth century totalitarianism. This critique culminates in the Critical 
Theory of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno that lambasted the liberating veneer of 
the Enlightenment ethos – namely, the idea that harnessing the power of reason to master 
both nature and ourselves led inevitably to freedom from the intellectual shackles secured 
by myths of all kinds (religious, political, cultural, etc.).264  
However, these understandings of reason and rationality are distinct from those 
present in so-called classical anarchists like Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin 
(and the anarchist tradition generally). While the former seems to center on an endeavor 
to command and control – an effort to instrumentally exploit the faculty of reason for the 
sake of an imagined progress, order, and efficiency – the latter seems strictly a 
satisfaction of the perennial philosophical and psychological need for certainty and even 
enjoyment in endeavoring towards an ideal that promised liberty and equality.   
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This difference is crucial to understanding why the classical anarchist tradition 
(itself derivative of Enlightenment ideals) does not laud the “rationalization” of society– 
that is, the instrumental logic that pervades social relations and administration and is 
usually accompanied by a callous disregard for the originally emancipatory quality of 
Enlightenment ideals - and the disjunction between anarchist and postfoundational 
anarchist thought. While critics like Weber, Adorno, and Habermas lambasted the 
rationalization of society, postfoundational anarchist critics attempt to escape the 
conceptual clutches of both rationalization and the ostensibly limiting discourse of the 
Enlightenment tradition while staying true to the intellectual spirit of classical anarchist 
anti-authoritarianism.  
In other words, we should recognize a difference between this rationalization 
being dangerous because it moves away from Enlightenment ideals and those very same 
Enlightenment ideals being dangerous.  According to Weber,265 Horkheimer and 
Adorno,266 and Habermas,267 Enlightenment ideals are perverted by this rationalization 
while postfoundationalist critics recognize danger in these very ideals.  It is the 
conception of Reason (the capital R denoting reason understood both as a faculty and an 																																								 																					
265 In “Science as a Vocation” Max Weber famously describes the “disenchantment” that accompanies 
modern “intellectualism” and “rationalism.” He describes the overly zealous attachment to scientific 
explanation and recognizes its epistemic hubris as a symptom of such disenchantment. According to 
Weber, all science already presupposes some value judgment and to think otherwise is foolish. He notes 
that science already presumes certain things are “worth knowing” and intimates our presumably detached 
endeavor to “control everything by means of calculation” as misguided. See his Max Weber, ed. David 
Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone, The Vocation Lectures (Cambridge: Hackett, 2004) 
See also Weber, The Essential Weber.  
 
266 In Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno describe how the Enlightenment ideal of 
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267 See Jürgen Habermas, trans. J.J. Shapiro, Toward a Rational Society (Boston, Beacon, 1970) for an 
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ideal) that accords with the latter which sustains much of the classical anarchist tradition 
as well as informs the kind of intellectualism to which Stirner, Nietzsche, and their 
postfoundationalist interlocutors react.  
It is the latter conception that I argue is understood as a dominating force that 
serves as the critical object of anti-intellectualism and which sustains the critical ground 
of a politicized sense of onto-epistemological domination.  Postfoundational anarchists 
seek to fulfill the promise of anarchism by applying anarchist anti-authoritarianism to 
ontology and epistemology.  This is an attack on not only the “rationalization” already 
identified by Weber and others but also the support, albeit qualified, for Enlightenment 
ideals evidenced in the so-called classical anarchist tradition (or at least present in some 
of its figureheads: Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, et al.). While these 
figureheads all had complex and occasionally contradictory approaches to intellectualism, 
Bakunin and Kropotkin were most outspoken on the issue. Bakunin was a thorough anti-
intellectualist and critic of what he called “metaphysics” and “scientism”268 while 
Kropotkin accepted human nature as varied while committed to scientific free inquiry.269 
																																								 																					
268 Bakunin notes “By ‘metaphysicians’ we mean not just the followers of Hegel’s doctrines…but also 
positivists and in general all the present-day worshippers of the goddess science; all those who by one 
means or another (if only by a very diligent but necessarily always imperfect study of the past and present) 
have created for themselves an ideal social organization into which, like new Procrustes, they want to force 
the life of future generations whatever the cost; in short, all those who, instead of regarding thought or 
science as one of the necessary manifestations of natural and social life, take such a narrow view of that 
poor life that they see in it only the practical manifestation of their own thought and their own always 
imperfect science.” See, Mikhail Bakinin, Statism and Anarchy, ed. Marshall Shatz (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 133. 
269 While Kropotkin accepted our varied natures and did not accept an essentialist view of ontological 
categories, he did recognize the efficacy of the scientific method.  He concluded, “…every conclusion it 
[mechanistic explanation] comes to must be verified by the method by which every scientific conclusion 
must be verified.  It aims to construct a synthetic philosophy comprehending in one generalization all the 
phenomena of nature – and therefore also the life of societies.” See, Peter Kropotkin, The Conquest of 
Bread, ed. Marshall Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 95.  For Kropotkin’s rejection 
		
	 143 
Godwin, on the other hand was, occasionally, an unapologetic rationalist,270 while 
Proudhon was a qualified essentialist and rationalist.271 Despite the variety in thought on 
the issue of Enlightenment ideals they all, in one form or another, embraced the 
intellectual spirit it fostered and endorsed the purportedly liberating effects of its 
zeitgeist. Nietzsche and Stirner on the other hand vociferously opposed Enlightenment 
ideals themselves and their purportedly liberating effects. It is the latter opposition that I 
think more directly addresses the anti-intellectualistic aspirations of postfoundational 
anarchy.  
Anti-Intellectualism and Postfoundationalism 
As already discussed, postfoundationalist anarchism is premised on recognizing 
the inherent authoritarianism in giving primacy to Reason and auxiliary concepts like 
human nature, “essentialisms” of all kinds, and binaries in the classical anarchist tradition 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
of metaphysical essentialism and what postfoundationalists would classify as totalizing notions, see his 
Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution (Forgotten Books, 2008[1902]).  
 
270 According to Godwin, equality itself was based on the existence of some independent Truth and an 
idealized Reason. Godwin notes, “There is no satisfactory criterion marking out any man, or set of men, to 
preside over the rest…all men are partakers of the common faculty, reason; and may be supposed to have 
some communication with the common instructor, truth.” See, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its 
Influence on Modern Morals and Happiness (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976 
[1798]) 231.  Indeed, Political Justice addresses the idea of private judgment and Reason at length.  
Though he acknowledges the absurdity of a “one size fits all” view of legality and other authoritative 
vehicles of social control he does recognize the authority of natural law based on the dictates of Reason.  
 
271 While Proudhon is well known for noting the inherent complexity of life and our inability to perfectly 
graft any idealization onto it, he also had a quite reverent attitude towards Reason and towards the 
liberating effects of what later thinkers would call the “rationalization” of society. Proudhon notes, “Every 
question of domestic politics must be decided by departmental statistics; every question of foreign politics 
in an affair of international statistics. The science of government rightly belongs to one of the sections of 
the Academy of Sciences, whose permanent secretary is necessarily prime minister; and since every citizen 
may address a memoir to the Academy, every citizen is a legislator.  But as the opinion of no one is of any 
value until its truth has been proven, no one can put his will in the place of reason-no one is king.” See 
Proudhon, What is Property? Donald R. Kelly, Bonnie G. Smith, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 209. 
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that may restrict meaning, understanding, and anarchist practice. The postfoundationalist 
anarchist recognition of authoritarianism in ontology and epistemology, especially the 
primacy given to Reason as an emancipatory tool and ideal in the anarchist tradition, 
echoes nineteenth century critiques of modernity.  From Romanticism’s attack on order 
and rationalism to American Transcendentalism’s admonishment of intellectualism and 
empiricism, there has been no lack of criticism of the rationalistic, instrumentalist, and 
nihilistic tendencies of modernity.  However, recent critiques of the Enlightenment and 
its discontents stress the incompatibility between freedom and the stifling effects of 
rationalistic discourse.  
More recently, we have seen the debate over the authority of essentialist and 
universal accounts of ontological and epistemological categories that accompany such 
rationalism intensify in many philosophical traditions.  American pragmatism and Latin 
American philosophy of liberation have both sought to counter supposedly Euro-centric 
tendencies272 in epistemology and ontology while others admit to the arbitrary nature of 
scientific principles and the mutually supportive naturalism that sustains it.273 This self-
referential nature exposes the lack of any undergirding philosophical foundation and 
reflects the concerns of postfoundationalist thought of the Continental tradition which has 
consistently challenged the essentialism and universalism of persistent philosophical 
dualisms (e.g., mind/body, true/false, good/evil) and rejected the underlying humanist 
																																								 																					
272 “Eurocentric” refers to those points of view that laud univocal accounts of human nature, objectivity, 
and European exceptionalism in matters concerning philosophy and theories of knowledge.  
 
273 See W.V.O Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969), 69-90.   
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philosophical presuppositions (e.g., essentialist view of human nature, belief in progress) 
which underlie, in their view, its veneer of pluralism, a supposedly liberating humanism, 
and a seemingly baseless meliorism.  
Post-analytic philosophy has likewise stressed the unviability of traditional 
philosophical themes centered on these univocal concerns in ontology and epistemology 
and stressed the role of meaning, language, ethical direction and the practical pursuits of 
philosophical reflection274 while some recent philosophers of science have questioned the 
validity of claims to scientific knowledge given the supposedly authoritarian or fallacious 
tendencies of scientific discourse.275  Most contemporary musings on these challenges to 
rationalism first highlighted in the nineteenth century echo the common concerns of 
postfoundational thinking and harken back to the anti-foundationalist, anti-authoritarian 
and anti-intellectual thought of Stirner and Nietzsche.   
Despite the long tradition of counter-Enlightenment thought, teasing out what is 
authoritarian or limiting about the privileging of Reason, or the primacy of ancillary 
notions like a well-defined human nature, can be difficult.  The reasons for this difficulty 
are twofold.  On the one hand, many prominent anti-authoritarian thinkers are accused of 
employing the ideal and privileging the faculty that is said to be authoritarian, namely, 																																								 																					
274 See John Rajchman and Cornel West, ed. Post-Analytic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1985).  
 
275 The idea that rationality does not always fit the history or evolution of “science” is a prominent theme 
among some philosophers of science.  Others seek to historicize science and the scientific method and 
thereby question its claims to timeless veracity. For a general understanding of the debate surrounding 
these issues see Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press [1962] 1996), Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave, ed., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge 
(London: Verso, 1978), Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987).  
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Reason.276 On the other hand, detecting the authoritarianism inherent in exercises of what 
one noted classical anarchist called private judgment could seem nonsensical, 
counterproductive and ineffable.277 After all, how else are we to combat the arbitrary 
authority of certain social and political institutions if not through our own reasoned and 
unimpeded judgment?  
Nevertheless, we can diagnose unease with the authority of Reason by 
questioning the “intellectualism” inherent in modern thinking. We could acknowledge 
our tendency to claim our conclusions  
…are the only logical ones, that they are necessities of universal reason, they 
being all the while, at bottom, accidents more or less of personal vision which had 
far better be avowed a such; for one man’s vision may be much more valuable 
than another’s, and our visions are usually not only our most interesting but our 
most respectable contributions to the world in which we play our part.278 
Here, American pragmatist William James echoed Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” 
yet recognized the necessity of a “stable scheme of concepts, stably related to each other” 
which “lay hold of our experiences” and “co-ordinate them withal.” However,  
																																								 																					
276 The most commonly cited argument in this vein is Jürgen Habermas’ idea of performative contradiction, 
best outlined in Jürgen Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and 
S.W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).  
 
277 William Godwin famously lauded the importance of private judgment in affairs both public and private. 
See William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Modern Morals and 
Happiness (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, [1798] 1976).  
 
278  William James, A Pluralistic Universe [iBook], lecture 6 “Bergson and His Critique of Intellectualism.”  
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…all these abstract concepts are but as flowers gathered, they are only 
moments dipped out from the stream of mine, snap-shots taken, as by a 
kinetoscopic camera, at a life that in its original coming is continuous. 
Useful as they are as samples of the garden, or to re-enter the stream with, 
or to insert in our revolving lantern, they have no value but these practical 
values. You cannot explain by them what makes any single phenomenon 
be or go – you merely dot out the path of appearances which it traverses. 
For you cannot make continuous being out of discontinuities. The stages 
into which you analyze a change are states, the change itself goes on 
between them. It lies along their intervals, inhabits what your definition 
fails to gather up, and thus eludes conceptual explanation altogether.”279  
The ambition to map out the world (conceiving of it wholly and deciphering conceptual 
distinctions within it) is what James means by intellectualism.  Indeed, this kind of 
“Thought deals thus solely with surfaces. It can name the thickness of reality, but it 
cannot fathom it, and its insufficiency here is essential and permanent, not temporary.”280  
 The authority of Reason and auxiliary notions is intimately related to our ambition 
to conceive of our world in its totality. Such folly, according to thinkers like Stirner, 
Nietzsche, and James, is responsible for our hubristic pursuit of celebrated ideals like 
liberty and equality. While such ideals may spark efforts at social progress and political 
emancipation (themselves equally idealized pursuits) and, often, secure concrete 																																								 																					
279 Ibid.  
 
280 Ibid.  
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advances in combatting the domination of some over others, they often impede our 
efforts at thinking freely.  Such efforts seem to rely on a limiting understanding of 
freedom that privileges intellectualist frameworks.  
Martin Heidegger interprets this concern as a concern over thinking itself.  While 
anarchism traditionally aims at dismantling sites of hierarchy and arbitrary authority 
without replacing them with new structures of domination, Heidegger also notes thinking 
itself does not aim at structuring new frameworks of understanding nor does it serve 
practical aims. By posing the question “what is called thinking?” Heidegger exposes what 
thinking is not. He notes, “1) Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences. 2) 
Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom. 3) Thinking solves no cosmic 
riddles. 4) Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act.”281   
 Leslie Paul Thiele reckons, what then is left for thinking?282 The answer to the 
question lies in not answering at all and instead challenging our most fundamental 
assumptions. We should, in the vein of Stirner and Nietzsche, seek to challenge the 
symptoms of the intellectualism James identified.   
Key to challenging the authority of Reason as an ideal and a faculty is to 
understand a glorifying of Reason as a symptom of this intellectualism. I will not be 
conflating Reason and intellectualism but rather seeing a lauding of Reason (as both a 
means to emancipation and the result of emancipation in the anarchist sense) as 																																								 																					
281 Martin Heiddeger, trans. J. Glenn Gray, What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper Collings, 2004), 
159.  
 
282 Leslie Paul Thiele, Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 95. 
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undeniably “intellectual” in the Jamesian sense and worthy of anarchist anti-authoritarian 
critique in the postfoundationalist vein.  
 As mentioned above, despite countless attempts to challenge the hegemony of 
“intellectualism,” there are two critiques that inspire the postanarchist tradition in explicit 
and obvious ways.  Interlocutors of Nietzsche and Stirner have emphasized their 
contribution to postfoundationalist, anti-authoritarian and pluralistic ways of knowing 
and being that highlight both the supposed incoherence and the futility of an overreliance 
on Reason and auxiliary notions.283 While Nietzsche challenged the reliance on the 
Apollonian (i.e., the orderly, rational, and disciplined aspects of human thought and 
action), rejected transcendental moral absolutes, and emphasized interpretation and 
perspective in all questions of knowing, Stirner highlighted the arbitrariness of “fixed 
ideas,” the limits of language in expressing ideas and inspiring action, and the stifling 
nature of conceptual frameworks of understanding. I argue that both Stirner and 
Nietzsche serve as linchpins and transitional figures in unpacking both what is anti-
intellectual about anarchism and what is anarchistic about anti-intellectualism and how 
related understandings of anti-authoritarianism inform a politicized sense of onto-
epistemological domination.   
																																								 																					
283 While many anarchists have garnered inspiration from both Stirner and Nietzsche, Emma Goldman and 
Saul Newman stand out as their most influential interlocutors in the tradition.  While Emma Goldman 
lectured extensively on Nietzsche’s thought and its value to anarchic anti-authoritarianism, Newman has 
argued Stirner to be the critical linchpin to non-essentialist anarchic critiques of liberal capitalist society. 
While Goldman’s Nietzsche lectures were lost thanks to police raids on Mother Earth’s headquarters she 
did write about Nietzsche’s influence on her in Living my Life (New York: Dover, 1970).  For a detailed 
consideration of Nietzsche’s influence on the anarchist tradition see Moore, John and Spencer Sunshine 
eds. I Am Not A Man, I Am Dynamite! Friedrich Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition (New York: 
Autonomedia, 2004). For a detailed study of Stirner’s relation to the anarchist tradition see Saul Newman 
(ed.) Max Stirner (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).   
 
		
	 150 
Max Stirner, Anti-Authoritarianism and Anti-Intellectualism 
Max Stirner is best known as one of Karl Marx’s “idealist” intellectual nemeses in 
The German Ideology.284 He is also considered a prominent critic of the left-Hegelianism 
of his time and an inspiration for the individualist or egoist anarchist tradition.285 In the 
introduction to the Cambridge edition of Stirner’s The Ego and its Own, David Leopold 
notes that “Since individual autonomy is incompatible with, and more important than, a 
general duty to obey the law, Stirner rejects absolutely the legitimacy of political 
obligation.”286 This view has of course secured Stirner as an important figure in the 
history of anarchist thought.  However, Stirner’s contribution to the anarchist tradition 
goes beyond a simple rejection of any raison d’état. Stirner interrogates the foundational 
onto-epistemological assumptions on which even the minimalist state seeks to pin its 
legitimacy.  Moreover, Stirner goes beyond the state to interrogate the legitimating or 
foundational assumptions that govern any raison d’être.  
For Stirner, overcoming these foundational assumptions begins with challenging 
understandings of selfhood, individuality, and autonomy. While the Enlightenment 
tradition gave us a robust account of social and political obligation tied to strong 
conceptions of human nature and its relation to the state, Stirner seeks to undo the 																																								 																					
284 Karl Marx dedicates several sections of The German Ideology (USA: Prometheus Books, 1998) to 
attacking Stirner’s supposedly empty and idealistic notions of the ego and his politically sterile ideology 
more generally.  
 
285 Egoist anarchism had its adherents in European individualist strains of anarchism but was most 
prominent on the American scene.  Benjamin Tucker exemplifies this movement in the U.S.  For a general 
history of egoist anarchism (and anarchism generally), see Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A 
History of Anarchism (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010).   
 
286 Max Stirner, The Ego and its Own, ed. David Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
xxvi. 
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Enlightenment-inspired anthropocentric fabric of social contract theory while preserving 
the boundless pluralism only recognized through a thorough embrace of absolute 
individuality and autonomy.  By rejecting the full spectrum of what he sees as religious 
thinking, as a way to embrace what contemporary postfoundationalist thinkers would call 
a de-totalized philosophical outlook, he embarks on a thorough critique of the history of 
philosophy.  
He began this endeavor by appraising  
…each of the dissident movements of the time – liberal humanism, philosophical 
realism, and the philosophy of pure criticism – and had found each of them 
infected by an ultimate compromise…at the last moment they had admitted to the 
presence of some transcendent object in the scheme of things – not indeed a ‘God’ 
in the sense of a personal deity, but a ‘Humanity’ or a ‘Society’ or a ‘Morality’, 
all of which were as fictitious, and as autocratic in their claims upon the 
individual concrete human being, as any personal God had ever been; and thus the 
project of atheism still had to be carried out to its conclusion.”287  
This theme of “total atheism” – that is, the complete rejection of any absolute authority, 
meaning or purpose, runs through Stirner’s work.  R.W.K. Paterson notes,  
What the total atheist denies (and by this stage he has become identical with the 
nihilist) is that our experience has any ultimate moral or metaphysical meaning. 
The factual regularities discovered by the scientist are ultimately inexplicable, if 																																								 																					
287 R.W.K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist Max Stirner (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 61. 
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metaphysical explanation requires reference to a Summum Bonum purposively 
directing the world of brute facts; in the absence of such a directive principle, the 
scientific order is seen to be a metaphysical chaos. If the idea of ‘God’ is the idea 
of a unifying principle which transforms our centrifugal experiences into a 
coherent and significant whole, then the atheist’s denial of God is a denial of the 
possibility of any such ideal unity.288  
“Ideal unities” are akin to “essences” and can just as easily exist in the realms of the 
social, political, personal, or intellectual. “Belief in ‘God’, declares Stirner, is always the 
belief in a ‘highest essence’, whether this is supposed to be realized in the theistic God, in 
the spirit of Humanity, in the ideal of Love, or in the ideals of social unity and justice.”289  
Indeed,  
It makes no difference whatsoever to him [Stirner] whether the One God or the 
Triune God, the Lutheran God or the Etre Suprême, or even no God at all, but 
only ‘Mankind’, is held to represent the highest essence; for in his eyes these 
servants of a highest essence are all religious men, the ranting atheist no less than 
the most devout Christian.’ Nor does it make any difference to him, Stirner would 
add, whether the democratic State or the socialist society, personal relationships 
or abstract justice, Love, Freedom, or Duty, is held to represent the highest 
essence; for if these ideals are put forward as ‘sacred’ ideals transcending, in their 
infinite perfection, the finite and fallible individuals whose ‘worship’ they claim, 																																								 																					
288 Ibid, 214. 
 
289 Ibid, 215. 
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then they are religious ideals, and the fanatical democrat and socialist, the 
fanatical lover, libertarian, and moralist, are all equally religious men.290 
Stirner emphatically rejects any “totalizing” or overarching conceptions concerning just 
about everything. He “sharply reminds critics” that 
…the only human reality is the reality of the specific, concrete individual, in all 
his immediacy, and that the individual is gross body as well as pure thought, a 
‘whole fellow,’ with intellectual interests undoubtedly, but also with sensuous, 
emotional, financial and many other interests, all of them equally valid for 
pursuit, and all of them interests, unintelligible without their reference to a living, 
acting self who is conscious of them as interests for him.291  
Difficulty arises because Stirner would like to overcome all these “fixed ideas,” 
and particularly those concerning our conceptions of ourselves.  In order to do this he 
must reject the guiding ideas that both underlie our understandings of ourselves as well as 
the conceptual frame that structures the power, privilege, and authority he seeks to 
undermine.  These notions are often understood in opposition to each other.  We can find 
it difficult to have an idea of freedom without some conception of a lack thereof. In a 
clear precursor to Derridean deconstruction, Stirner struggles with the question of 
overcoming a stifling existence structured by oppositions.292 
																																								 																					
290 Ibid.  
291 Ibid, 195-6. 
 
292 Derridean “deconstruction” most famously identifies the problems associated with these “binaries.” See 
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatari Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
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Indeed, as Leopold notes in commenting on Stirner’s magnum opus,  
…Stirner ‘will hear nothing of this cutting in two’ (p.32) and insists that 
alienation can only be overcome by rejecting the human essence of the ‘liberals’ 
as the enemy of selfhood rather than its true content and aspiration – as the 
striking epigraph to the Second Part has it, ‘Man’, as well as God, must die. In its 
place Stirner seeks to rehabilitate the prosaic and mortal self, the ‘in-man 
[Unmensch]’ for whom the notion of a ‘calling’ is alien, the ‘man who does not 
correspond to the concept man’ (p. 159). For Stirner, because there are no 
universal or prescriptive elements in human nature, the concept cannot ground 
any claim about how we ought to live…Rather, we need to learn, as Stirner’s 
Nietzschean injunction has it, to give up our ‘foolish mania to be something else’ 
(p. 149) and become what we are.293  
 Stirner is clear in his distaste for the arbitrary limitations of language and 
essentialisms of all kinds. His aversion to classical liberalism emanates from the same 
place as his critique of systemic thinking generally. On the one hand he rejects 
liberalism’s foundational philosophical anthropology and on the other deconstructs its 
edifying “truths.” Stirner notes that,  
Liberalism simply brought other concepts on the carpet; human instead of divine, 
political instead of ecclesiastical, ‘scientific’ instead of doctrinal, or, more 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
University Press, 1997).  See also Derrida, Positions, trans Alan Bass. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982).  
293 Stirner, xx-xxi. 
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generally, real concepts and eternal laws instead of ‘crude dogmas’ and 
precepts.294  
These human, political, scientific “real concepts” and “eternal laws” aim at a certain kind 
of domination for Stirner.  Stirner warned that “[Liberalism’s] aim is a ‘rational order’, a 
‘moral behaviour’, a ‘limited freedom’, not anarchy, lawlessness, selfhood. But if reason 
rule [sic], then the person succumbs.”295  
 Stirner is referring to how we succumb to a certain intellectual domination that 
dresses itself in the liberating veneer of liberalism and humanism.  Stirner refers to the 
shackling effect of the flowery discourse of “man” and “truth.”  According to Stirner, the 
Enlightenment inspired liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries privileges 
essentialist ideas of humanity and truth which serve to further univocal claims about 
ostensibly universal values like progress and justice.  He warns, “He who is infatuated 
with man leaves persons out of account so far as that infatuation extends, and floats in an 
ideal, sacred interest. Man, you see, is not a person, but an ideal, a spook.”296  
 These “spooks” serve as the ghastly foundation to what Stirner sees as an 
inherently oppressive intellectual world.  To structure the heights of informed opinion on 
such a precarious and artificial base represents for Stirner a colossal danger to our 
freedom.  The divide we pretentiously further between the sphere of the intellect and 
everything else (the material world, including our bodies) sinks us ever deeper into our 
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dominion and further exacerbates the ludicrous ideals on which we construct our material 
and social worlds.  
 Stirner’s insight, though anticipating Marx’s famed critique of liberal ideology, 
goes beyond Marx’s injunction against ideology’s justificatory function in the 
exploitation and alienation inherent in capitalism.  While Marx replaces liberal ideas of 
human nature and natural rights with ideas of “species being” and historical materialism, 
Stirner rejects these ideational foundations of social life altogether. Stirner and others in 
the postfoundationalist tradition see these ideational foundations themselves as 
oppressive rather than emancipatory. While Marx ironically accused Stirner of being just 
another idealist in the Hegelian vein,297 Stirner could not have been clearer in his distaste 
for the primacy of ideas.  
The reasoning behind his view is neatly framed in The Ego and its Own. Stirner 
notes,  
Men are sometimes divided into two classes: cultured and uncultured. The 
former, so far as they were worthy of their name, occupied themselves with 
thoughts, with mind, and (because in the time since Christ, of which the very 
principle is thought, they were the ruling ones) demanded a servile respect for 
thoughts recognized by them. State, emperor, church, God, morality, order, are 
such thoughts or spirits, that exist only for the mind. A merely living being, an 
animal, cares as little for them as a child. But the uncultured are really nothing but 
																																								 																					
297 See Marx, The German Ideology.  
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children, and he who attends only to the necessities of his life is indifferent to 
those spirits; but, because he is also weak before them, he succumbs to their 
power, and is ruled by – thoughts. This is the meaning of hierarchy…Hierarchy is 
dominion of thoughts, dominion of mind!298  
By internalizing these ideational foundations we not only serve the interests that seek to 
dominate us but also equally dominate ourselves.    
 This idea is similar to what Ludwig Feuerbach understood as the nature of 
modern thought that simply projected the qualities of God onto our atheistic humanism 
and thus shackled us to an anthropocentric foundationalism. According to Feuerbach, 
theology has been thoroughly “rationalized.” The idea of God in modern philosophy 
reflects the preoccupation with reason and not with any spiritual attributes of the 
creator.299 The necessity of God is itself a manifestation of God’s rationality and 
intelligence.300 Indeed, “It is, thus, an innate characteristic of God’s own essence that he 
is a object of no being other than man…But, if God is only an object of man, what is 
revealed to us in his essence? Nothing but the essence of man.”301 
 Likewise, arguing against the intellectualism inherent in this anthropocentrism 
Feuerbach emphasized the role of emotions in thinking.  He held that an ideal like Reason 
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is lauded only because it is privileged in the lives of those theorizing about it.302 In other 
words, “The philosophers who led lives in which reason was itself dominant over feelings 
and actions simply projected the structure of their own lives onto the world.”303  
 Moreover, like Stirner and Nietzsche, Feuerbach highlighted the importance of 
the sensuous.  He noted, “Truth, reality, and sensation are identical. Only a sensuous 
being is a true and real being.”304 He continued, “The unity of thought and being has 
meaning and truth only when man is comprehended as the ground and subject of this 
unity.”305 According to Feuerbach, the sensuous should ground (in more ways than one) 
our endeavor to be thinking beings.  In an eloquent critique of the kind of intellectualism 
James later interrogated, Feuerbach recommended we,  
Desire not to be a philosopher, as distinct from a man; be nothing else than a 
thinking man. Do not think as a thinker, that is, with a faculty torn from the 
totality of the real human being and isolated for itself; think as a living and real 
being, as one exposed to the vivifying and refreshing waves of the world’s 
oceans. Think in existence, in the world as a member of it, not in a vacuum of 
abstraction as a solitary monad, as an absolute monarch, as an indifferent, 
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superworldly God; then you can be sure that your ideas are unities of being and 
thought.306 
However, Feuerbach remains within a nominalist framework – that is, within a mode of 
thought that denies the existence of abstract objects but nevertheless recognizes their 
pragmatic or cognitive value and “existence” as terms.  Such a framework adequately 
helps Feuerbach convey his appreciation for sensuous and natural existence and thereby 
does not fully embrace the utter rejection of all idealized concepts, as does Stirner.  
Common to all these thinkers who echo Stirner’s sentiments is an effort to deflate 
the grandiose pretensions of intellectualistic discourse.  While John Locke and other 
Enlightenment thinkers sought to demystify the pretended sophistication and grandeur of 
government and the Church, Stirner sought to naturalize our understanding of philosophy 
as just another misguided mode of thought.  According to Stirner, philosophy itself 
served as a tool by which we inadvertently dominate ourselves.   
Such a claim to self-domination would strike some as nonsensical. How can we 
dominate ourselves? The key to understanding this is to unpack Stirner’s notion of 
autonomy. Stirner does not conceive autonomy in Kantian terms, as rational human will. 
That is, while Kantian morality entails a foundational law (the Categorical Imperative) 
derived from our most prized faculty307, and where immorality is irrational, Stirner thinks 
self-legislation is still comprised of two misguided concepts, namely the Self and 
legislation.  																																								 																					
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For Stirner, we should no more be governed by the will of another than by our 
own rational self-legislation. This is especially the case when that self-legislation is 
premised on idealized renderings of man and his potential imported from the sphere of 
religion and God. Stirner notes, “The ghost has put on a body, God has become man, but 
now man is himself the gruesome spook which he seeks to get behind, to exorcize, to 
fathom, to bring to reality and to speech; man is – spirit.”308  
This apparent self-legislation is an effect of the intellectual domination we endure 
and a consequence of the humanism we embrace. Our rational will requires as much faith 
and submission to religiosity as any belief in God. Indeed,  
What Stirner sought to demonstrate is the ultimate identity of total atheism and 
total egoism. If atheism is a theological denial, it is also an ethical and social 
denial. If it is man’s escape from the clutches of an alien Deity, it is also the 
individual’s escape from the alien authority of the State, society, and his fellow 
men.309  
The tragedy for Stirner is we succumb to this “self-legislation” willingly and 
utterly convinced of our freedom in doing so.  Not unlike Marx’s “false consciousness,” 
Stirner seeks to highlight this tragic element of intellectualism while rejecting any 
alternative or underlying emancipatory formula that Marx and other radical thinkers 
would propose. In the process of constructing conceptual frameworks that ground our 
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very ideas of freedom, we are depriving ourselves of an opportunity to even fathom or 
experience freedom in any concrete sense.   
 Perhaps most importantly, the primary sin of humanism in this sense is the 
positing of a “self” that strives for freedom to begin with.  Stirner avoids using such 
language of “selfhood,” opting instead for the “I.” Indeed, “The I is the foundation, but 
because the I is what remains outside any abstraction and that which is constantly eludes 
conceptualization, it is, at the same time, an anti-foundation.”310 The “I” is a sort of 
“creative nothingness” that should elude surrender to any abstraction or illusion, 
“including the illusion of an ideal, unified self.”311  
The trajectory of Stirner’s interventions seeks to steer us away from the ethereal 
and towards the importance of “life.” Stirner notes, “…the life turned away from things, 
the spiritual life, no longer draws any nourishment from nature, but ‘lives only in 
thoughts’, and therefore is no longer ‘life’, but – thinking.”312 He is certain of the 
impoverishing quality of the vita contemplativa. Instead, he highlights the liberating 
effects of the immediacy of a life intimate with and indistinguishable from nature.  In 
pointing to this “pre-intellectual” paradigm of being, Stirner harkens back to our 
childhoods.  
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 Stirner notes,  
For little children, just as for animals, nothing sacred exists, because, in order to 
make room for this conception, one must already have progressed so far in 
understanding that he can make distinctions like “good and bad”, “warranted and 
unwarranted”; only at such a level of reflection or intelligence – the proper 
standpoint of religion – can unnatural (that is, brought into existence by thinking) 
reverence, “sacred dread”, step into the place of natural fear. To this sacred dread 
belongs holding something outside oneself for mightier, greater, better warranted, 
better; the attitude in which one acknowledges the might of something alien, not 
merely feels it, then, but expressly acknowledges it, admits it, yields, surrenders, 
lets himself be tied (devotion, humility, servility, submission).313  
We see these sentiments mirrored in James’ appraisal of intellectualism when he notes,  
…to the philosophic tradition which treats logos or discursive thought generally 
as the sole avenue to truth, that to fall back on raw unverbalized life as more of a 
revealer, and to think of concepts as the merely practical things…comes very 
hard. It is putting off our proud maturity of mind and becoming again as foolish 
little children in the eyes of reason.314 
It is this self-imposed “surrender” that resigns us to a “life” of intellectualism and 
imprisons us in a framework of the ideal.  According to Stirner this traps us in an 
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existence justified by argumentation, rational reflection, and a deluded sense of 
existential certainty; it is the opposite of freedom in any real sense.  Stirner, like 
Nietzsche after him, sought to unravel the domination inherent in our intellects and free 
us from the limitations imposed by morality, religion, truth, and other such “fixed ideas.”  
Friedrich Nietzsche, Anti-Authoritarianism and Anti-Intellectualism 
Nietzsche is best known as a relativist, nihilist, and aphoristic thinker who 
prioritized life itself rather than the narrow academic philosophical concerns of his time. 
He challenged Christianity and traditional morality and concerned himself with our 
concrete this-worldly existence rather than the ethereal and otherworldly. By dismissing 
the philosophical tendency to celebrate the utility, functions, or promise of knowledge to 
rival our existence Nietzsche embodied the anti-intellectualism central to any consistent 
anti-authoritarianism.315  
Nietzsche best embodies this move towards anti-intellectualism and echoes 
Stirner in noting, “life is not an argument.”316 Indeed, Nietzsche battled against the 
engrained appeals to logic in the history of philosophy.  He does so not in an effort to 
dismiss logic’s utility or force but rather admonishes those who pretend that an appeal to 
logic and the enabling faculty of reason are pathways to a discernment of reality.  For 
Nietzsche, matters of logic apply only to fictitious entities we have created. This makes it 
easier to render the world “formutable [sic] and calculable” to us. In this sense, logic, like 																																								 																					
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reason, is instrumental and geared towards utility. For Nietzsche, “logic” is a symptom of 
an idealized and artificial notion of reason itself.317   
This idealized faculty does not exist independently of the schema it conjures, or 
more importantly, those who conjure it.  Nietzsche does not attribute an independent 
existence to reason, only a relative or relational one. That is to say, Nietzsche holds that 
reason is not an ideal existing independently of those who fabricate it. Reason is itself a 
product of our primal urges, needs, passions, and desires and is adapted, applied, and 
morphed according to context. Nietzsche notes there is a “misunderstanding of passion 
and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a relationship 
between different passions and desires; and as if every passion did not have in it its 
quantum of reason.”318 According to noted Nietzsche scholar R.J. Hollingdale, “Such a 
view of the nature of thought conflicts with any idea involving its objective validity: it 
abolishes the ‘faculty’ of thought altogether, and thus calls in question the objective 
validity of the ‘science of reasoning’, logic.”319  
For Nietzsche, fixation with logic and the faculty of reason is reflective of a 
narrow understanding of the limits of our cognition. In The Will to Power Nietzsche 
criticizes Aristotle’s law of contradiction by divorcing logic from truth.  He notes, “We 
are unable to affirm or deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective empirical law, it 
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is not the expression of any ‘necessity’ but only of an inability.”320 Interestingly enough, 
this insight anticipates recent findings in quantum physics and the social scientific import 
of such discoveries. While advances in quantum science have enabled us to, indeed, 
“affirm and deny one and the same thing” (as is the case with discovering the location(s) 
of electrons), such indeterminacy is said to have some impact on our comprehension of 
the social world.321   
Such a fixation is also reflective of an underlying psychological weakness. We 
seek to tame reality to fit our own comforting illusions because “familiarizing something 
unfamiliar is comforting, reassuring, satisfying, and produces a feeling of power as 
well.”322 So, Reason is not a reflection of our strength as thinking beings or cunning 
animals but rather betrays our ultimate weakness as a species.  We employ Reason to 
make our lives easier not because we are strong enough to decipher reality and adapt it to 
our needs but rather because we are too cowardly to recognize our need to decipher 
reality is already a symptom of our psychological weakness.  
In this line of thought, Nietzsche also anticipates constructivist renderings of 
reality by arguing for a metaphysical world of our making.323 Indeed, thinking itself is 
possible only if we “assume being: logic handles only formulas for what remains the 																																								 																					
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same” but this assumption “is part of our perspective.” Because “the world is in a state of 
becoming” and “knowledge and becoming exclude one another,” “‘knowledge’ must be 
something other than knowledge: ‘there must first be a will to make knowable, a kind of 
becoming must itself create the deception of beings.”324 That is to say, in order for to 
have knowledge a fathomable and effable notion of knowledge itself must exist.  This 
notion itself, in turn, informs the content of knowledge.   
In other words, the production of knowledge involves constructing a framework 
for understanding and having that framework inform the content of what is known.  In 
this way, employing cognitive tools already informed by our idea of knowledge produces 
knowledge itself. Our framework for understanding is already our idea of knowledge.  In 
creating the “illusion of beings” we will the production of knowledge and a desire for it.  
Here, knowledge is an effort to order our constructed forms of understanding to suit 
understanding of other constructed “things.” In this sense, “knowledge” is not “to know” 
but to “schematize.”325 Such systematization should always be scrutinized. Nietzsche 
notes, “I distrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of 
integrity.”326  
Correspondence to some concrete reality or coherence between concepts or, as 
Stirner would call them, “fixed ideas” does not undergird Nietzsche’s theory of truth. 
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Knowledge entails little about truth and truth little about knowledge.  In writing on the 
“origin of knowledge,” Nietzsche notes,  
Through immense periods of time, the intellect produced nothing but errors; some 
of them turned out to be useful and species-preserving; those who hit upon or 
inherited them fought their fight for themselves and their progeny with greater 
luck. Such erroneous articles of faith, which were passed on by inheritance further 
and further, and finally almost became part of the basic endowment of the species, 
are for example: that there are enduring things; that there are identical things; that 
there are things, kinds of material, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; 
that our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in and for itself. Only 
very late did the deniers and doubters of such propositions emerge; only very late 
did truth emerge as the weakest form of knowledge. 
Nietzsche continues, “Thus the strength of knowledge lies not in its degree of truth, but 
in its age, its embeddedness, its character as a condition of life.”327 The life serving 
functions of knowledge have elevated its pursuit to rival existence itself.  Here is where 
Nietzsche finds both fault with the idea of knowledge and its utility. Knowledge became 
crucial to survival; it complemented our cleverness in its ability to aid our thriving. It also 
reflected our weakness as psychologically stunted creatures that needed the reassurance 
of permanence over flux. In any case, knowledge is artificially imposed on and distinct 
from the life it helps preserve and the urges, desires, and passions it seeks to map, delimit 
and order.   																																								 																					
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Logic has even less of a relation to either truth or knowledge.  Nietzsche 
questions,  
What is the origin of logic in man’s head? Surely it arose out of the illogical, the 
realm of which must originally have been immense. But innumerable beings drew 
inferences in a way different from that in which we do now perish; nonetheless, 
they might have been closer to the truth!328  
“Truth” in these scenarios is incidental.  We do not arrive at it in any systematic way nor 
even know much about when and how we approximate it.  There is both a certain 
impenetrability of reality and limits to our cognitive ability to fathom such penetration.  
The best that can be hoped for is the practical benefit of knowledge acquisition and an 
understanding that knowledge itself is artificial.  
Nietzsche’s point is to stress the occasional utility of notions like truth and the 
employment of logic without attributing metaphysical veracity to their claims.  After all, 
Nietzsche notes,  
We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live – by positing 
bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; 
without these articles of faith no one could endure living! But that does not prove 
them. Life is not an argument; the conditions of life might include error.329  
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Nietzsche questioned the idea that we could ever reach an objective truth.  He saw 
objective truth as a symptom of the evolution of philosophy.  He saw it as a contingency 
of certain modes of thinking and instead embraced perspectivism as an appropriate mode 
of “knowing” and dismissed the “knowledge” of knowledge as nonsensical. He 
considered philosophers guilty of “concept idolatry”330 and in Twilight of the Idols refers 
to Kant as a “concept cripple.”331  
Nietzsche reacted to what he saw as the reverence for “rational truth” and the 
“virtue and happiness” associated with it in the Platonic tradition. The ultimate result of 
this, according to Bruce Detwiler, is “our modern passion for objective truth, with its 
underlying assumption that scientific knowledge is not only valuable but more valuable 
than anything else.”332 This view is misguided according to Nietzsche. In section 374 of 
The Gay Science Nietzsche notes that “we cannot look around our own corner,” and “we 
cannot reject the possibility that [the world] may include infinite perspectives.”  Indeed, 
“the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these,” 
we cannot know “how far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed 
whether existence has any character other than this.”333  
We can therefore not fathom the extent of our knowledge of “facts.” We are 
inextricably tied to our perspective knowing. Our understanding is always incomplete and 																																								 																					
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partial. Moreover, Nietzsche claims we endeavor only to further certain perspectives 
against competing internal drives and external adversaries. “Facts” of the matter actually 
matter little. Nietzsche argues, “Facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.” 
Indeed, “It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against.  
Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to 
compel all other drives to accept as a norm.”334 
Hence, we have Nietzsche’s preference for “Nature” over “Life.” By Nature, 
Nietzsche means our ephemeral passions and instincts grounded in unmediated existence. 
By Life Nietzsche means the derivative faculties of clever animals like us that shape, 
organize, reify, and master Nature for our own invented ends. Indeed, “Whereas Nature is 
boundless, indifferent and amoral, Life remains bounded by a horizon of anthropocentric 
preferences and values.”335  
 Nietzsche’s view of Nature is value-free.  As Daniel W. Conway notes, Nietzsche 
“…endows the Nature to which he ‘returns’ with no positive content or 
character…Nature is simply whatever remains when all super-natural principles of 
interpretation have been subtracted from our understanding of the world.”336 The absence 
of supernatural principles of interpretation or constructed frameworks of understanding 
attracts Nietzsche to the demystified and this-worldly concreteness of natural existence 
(as opposed to idealized Life).  																																								 																					
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We can see a parallel between Nietzsche’s contempt for God (and its secular 
stand-in Reason) and his disdain for Life and its ethical and metaphysical foundations. 
Both attempt to fill a void caused by our psychological weakness.  For example 
Nietzsche considers our attempts at social justice as nothing more than an expression of a 
secular and moral stand-in for the almighty. Indeed, explains Detwiler,  
Because most of us cling to moral assumptions and their political corollaries, 
which depend for their validity upon a God we have largely repudiated, Nietzsche 
characterizes modernity as an age of ‘incomplete nihilism.’ In spite of the death of 
God a secular gospel of brotherly love and egalitarianism still flourishes…337 
There seems to still be a need for some kind of transcendent grounding because most 
“people resist total nihilism not simply because they are obtuse but because they are 
psychologically incapable of coming to terms with it.”338  
The competing drives that animate our nihilistic existence exercise authority over 
each other by force and not by any reasoned consideration of utility, expediency, or 
verity. Though Nietzsche seems to embrace the naturalness of these competing drives he 
couches this embrace in a thorough rejection of the edifying frameworks of 
understanding that seek to justify or judge their authority or existence.   
In declaring that God is dead, Nietzsche refers to “the new realization that there is 
no objective order, meaning, or ethical significance inherent in existence. Rather, man 
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himself has always been creator of his own meanings, usually without realizing it.”339 
While accepting such a circumstance, Nietzsche affords this reality an ironic absence of 
certainty or authoritative account, instead relying on infinite “perspectives.”  
We should consider Nietzsche as a thinker who destabilized the epistemological 
and ontological landscape in ways that opened opportunities for upstarts, rebellions, and 
outright revolutionary thought that interrogates its own presuppositions and hidden 
sources of arbitrary authority and privilege.  Nietzsche, Stirner, and their interlocutors 
have helped highlight what is authoritarian about Reason (both as an ideal and as a 
privileged faculty) and paved the way towards postfoundationalist anti-authoritarianism 
of the intellect.   
Anti-Authoritarianism, Anti-Intellectualism and “Non-Political” Domination 
While there is little disagreement in thinking of Stirner and Nietzsche as 
ontological and epistemological anti-authoritarians, there is resistance to thinking of them 
as politically anti-authoritarian. This is with good reason. Their radicalism is often 
interpreted as politically apathetic, an apology for the bourgeoisie or as an unabashed 
elitism. While Marx lambasted Stirner for his idealism and for playing into the hands of 
the bourgeoisie, Nietzsche has long been considered a reactionary and an inspiration for 
Fascism.340 Likewise, many more “interpretations seem possible: between the racial 
enthusiasms of national socialism, the still encountered dedication of those trying to live 
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a la Demian, a ‘Nietzschean’ life, the bright individualism of most Anglo-American 
interpretations, and the dark cosmic mysteries offered by Continental philosophers.”341 
Appropriated by Nazi propagandists as an inspiration for the fiercely agonistic great 
power politics of the first half of the 20th century and also interpreted as offering a 
foundation for the cutthroat individualism of unfettered capitalism, both Stirner and 
Nietzsche seem susceptible to the idea of our domination over each other. 
However, I argue their thought can be channeled either politically or apolitically. 
Or, as I note, their ideas can be exercised in political ways to challenge orthodoxies in 
ostensibly non-political spheres and, moreover, serve as critical intellectual linchpins to 
the postfoundationalist and anarchist traditions. Stirner and Nietzsche represent seminal 
figures in the history of anti-intellectualism and frame the issues which later anarchist 
and postanarchist scholars and activists tackled.   
For Nietzsche, many of our conceptualizations (e.g., about human nature, 
rationality, free will) seek to justify a certain “form of life” and legitimize that over which 
“this form of life has sway.” Indeed, as Tracy Strong notes, conceptualizations are “thus a 
manner of preserving a certain pattern of domination and of enforcing a legitimacy for a 
certain set of horizons, without it ever appearing necessary to seek justification for that 
enforcement.”342  
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 Such a characterization of Nietzsche echoes classical anarchist concerns about the 
self-referential justificatory quality of the state.  The argument is as follows: The state is 
legitimate because it exists.  The sovereign authority already imposed on those who think 
otherwise than the state already ipso facto delegitimizes thinking otherwise than the state. 
Granted, there are countless justificatory frameworks that legitimize governments (and 
rebellion against it) but the horizon of legibility (to invoke James Scott) remains the state 
form.343 In other words, even when resisting government the sovereignty of the state 
remains and is unquestioned. Moreover, such resistance is usually couched in an appeal 
to constitutionalism, liberty or equality vis-à-vis the state, rights discourse sanctified by 
the state, or even the mythological origins of the state. Any resistance alien to this state-
centric framework that does not already recognize the legitimacy of the state (though 
could perhaps not recognize a specific government presiding over the state) is already, 
usually, considered out of bounds. Moreover, the state itself is never asked to legitimate 
its existence (though governments may be said to be justified by the consent of the 
governed). The state simply is and any resistance to its oppression or domination is 
usually framed legally, morally, or politically within a state-centric horizon of legibility.   
In this sense, the horizon of political thought is necessarily limited to the 
framework of sovereign state power. These conceptual schemes are always in reaction to 
the state-centric framework of reference.  No state will disappear for lack of “legitimacy” 
unless a competing justificatory narrative (or force) replaces that legitimacy. States do 
not simply step aside or dissolve in recognition of their own illegitimacy. Only changes 
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in the “forms of life” themselves will invite new justificatory schemes. Anarchists note 
that challenges to state authority tend to be considered ipso facto illegitimate unless 
grounded in some other theory of popular or individual sovereignty vis-à-vis the state, in 
the same way that Nietzsche diagnoses how it seems unnecessary to justify the legitimacy 
of arbitrary horizons of the intellect. 
 Tracy Strong refers to this auto-legitimization when speaking on one such 
limiting conceptualization, free will.  He quotes Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil,  
The doctrine of free will is a cunning method of preserving the credibility of the 
ego-cogito. In fact, Nietzsche writes, ‘ “Freedom of the Will” – that is the 
expression of a complex state of delight of the person exercising volition…. What 
happens here is what happens in every well constructed and happy 
commonwealth: namely, the governing class identifies itself with the success of 
the commonwealth.’344  
In other words, the “ego-cogito” – like the state – privileges its own existence via certain 
unquestioned beliefs. In the former this belief is free will, in the latter it is the 
preservation and success of the commonwealth.   
Likewise, Nietzsche notes that master and slave morality operate in similar ways.  
Slave morality is then inherently reactive and limiting in its moral and intellectual 
horizons. It is a reaction to master morality (which entails the affirmation of the self and 
the consequences of such affirmation as good and noble). While master morality entails 
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the affirmation of the self, slave morality reactively defines “good” as the opposite. 
Likewise, slave morality defines evil as the opposite of the good in master morality. The 
“slave morality” prevalent in modern thinking depends on an intellectual horizon set by 
others. It hinges on “master morality” and so lacks the creative character Nietzsche 
admired.  Nietzsche sought first to identify this “soil,” or the unquestioned ground set by 
others, on which such values sprouted, and then to overcome their limiting horizons and 
highlight the “creative character of thinking.”  
It was Nietzsche’s aim to supersede what was considered the most rigorous 
thought – philosophy.  Of course, this rigor was grasping at straws according to 
Nietzsche. It was a pretended rigor that had no chance of attuning itself to its ostensible 
aims (e.g., truth, reality). It was an ostensible rigor that had no basis in any underlying 
reality but rather was a reflection of our own psychological weakness and need for 
certainty.  According to Nietzsche, the project of “knowledge” seeking in philosophy is 
Sisyphean.  What was needed was not seeking but thinking. Jane Bennett and William 
Connolly note,  
Nietzsche…thought about the layered and creative character of thinking in a way 
that pulls it past the mechanical determinism of reductionists, the 
transcendentalism of two-world metaphysicians, and the teleological model 
advanced by those who cannot fold nature into culture without investing it with a 
final purpose. Thinking for Nietzsche involves a complex process of discord and 
coordination between multiple theaters of activity. As he puts it, ‘the chamber of 
consciousness is small,’ too small to perform the complex task of thinking by 
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itself. ‘Conscious thinking, especially that of the philosopher, is the least vigorous 
and therefore also the relatively mildest and calmest form of thinking; and thus 
precisely philosophers are most apt to be led astray about the nature of 
knowledge.345  
Nietzsche held that philosophers are led astray because they artificially impose a 
constructed relating of reality onto both our ideas of that reality and our intellectual 
impetus for action within it.  Jane Bennett and William Connolly aptly describe how this 
process unfolds.  
These linguistic equalizations enter into habits, organic functions, institutional 
regimes and the experimental designs of science. Moreover, they become 
corporeally encoded in patterns of perception and cultural vocabularies. But they 
are never completely stabilized. The similarities-rendered-equal and the 
differences-rendered-similar periodically manifest themselves as rebel forces 
within habits, organic functions, etc. These differential energies and energetic 
disturbances both enable creativity in thinking and help to propel interventions for 
reform of the ‘laws.’ The point is that somatic/cultural relays play a major role in 
the stabilization and destabilization of laws. So there is a side of us capable of 
coming to terms, though only fugitively, with dimensions of the world that 
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escape, exceed, resist and destabilize the best equalizations of nature we have 
been able to devise and enforce.346 
We seem to unwittingly react to this privileged accounting of reality and pivot our 
intellectual musings on its constructed framework. The anti-intellectualism I see in 
Stirner’s and Nietzsche’s thought seeks to expose such reaction and attempts to unhinge 
our thought from its bounds. While Stirner and Nietzsche both fit into intellectual 
categories (despite their earnest efforts to the contrary) that lend themselves to either 
political and apolitical readings, I argue that their anti-authoritarianism of the intellect 
serves as a bridge to the anti-intellectualist strain of postfoundationalist anarchist thought. 
This postfoundationalist strain identifies the domination inherent in and compels us to 
combat authoritative accounts of intellectuality, thought, and philosophy for non-political 
ends. Their ends are for the sake of thinking freely. 
Anti-Intellectualism, Post-Foundationalism and the Anarchist Project 
Stirner and Nietzsche combat these forms of intellectual domination by pointing 
to the totalizing effects of humanist and liberal discourse despite their anti-authoritarian 
ethos. While Stirner and Nietzsche have no recourse but to express their thought with 
language, ideas, concepts, etc. they consciously qualify and openly reject the sagacity of 
their own thinking by admitting to its limitations and encouraging self-reflection and 
independence of thought in their readers.347   
																																								 																					
346 Ibid, 150. 
 
347 Perhaps the best example of this is in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra when Zarathustra hopes to 
embolden his followers to no longer follow him. Central to the idea of the superman (or overman) is the 
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Their reevaluations of the history of philosophy lend themselves to anarchist 
readings where anarchism purports to dismantle sites of arbitrary authority, power and 
privilege.  Stirner and Nietzsche identify sites of arbitrary authority, power and privilege 
in epistemology and ontology while their anarchist interlocutors intend to dismantle the 
political, economic, and cultural sites of domination structured by them. These sites of 
intellectual domination stifle both free thought and genuinely creative endeavors 
according to these two anti-foundationalist thinkers.  Both thinkers are philosophers of 
creation and on this point they also converge with the anarchist tradition.  
Both thinkers offer an account of creative destruction (Nietzsche of metaphysics 
and values, Stirner of all “fixed ideas”) that complements the Romantic impulse that 
animates the postfoundationalist tradition. This tendency also reflects the “passion for 
destruction” which animated Mikhail Bakunin and also informs the “creative passion” of 
thinking freely.348 In the anarchist context, Saul Newman has referred to this general 
outlook as turning anarchism on itself. Newman thought of this process of dismantling 
sites of authority in the ontological and epistemological spheres as turning the political, 
economic, and cultural values of so-called classical anarchism against the ontological and 
epistemological pillars of anarchist thought.  
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
idea of trailblazing and setting your own course.  Nietzsche writes, “I now go away alone, my disciples! 
You too go away and be alone! So I will have it. Truly, I advise you: go away from me and guard 
yourselves against Zarathustra! And better still: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he has deceived you. The man 
of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies but also to hate his friends. One repays a teacher 
badly if one remains only a pupil… Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have 
all denied me will I return to you.” See Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For Everyone 
and No One (London: Penguin, 2003), 103.      
 
348 Mikhail Bakunin writes, “The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too!” See “The Reaction in 
Germany,” accessed 12/26/2014, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1842/reaction-
germany.htm. 
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Stirner and Nietzsche were both concerned with domination though not in the 
ways those on the political left usually envision such struggles.  While the political left, 
most notably anarchists, recognize the dangers of concentrated political, economic, and 
cultural power, interlocutors of Stirner and Nietzsche in the postfoundationalist anarchist 
tradition highlighted the dangers of totalizing conceptual schemes and arbitrary 
intellectual consensus on key onto-epistemological issues. Stirner worried about the 
dominion of everyday thought and how it insidiously imposed arbitrary limitations on our 
thinking, expression, and action while Nietzsche worried about the trend towards 
sheepishness and allowing ourselves to be dominated by psychological weakness in the 
face of the grandiose intellectual ambitions of philosophy.   
 While Stirner, Nietzsche, and their interlocutors are also echoed in the Anglo-
American philosophical tradition with regards to the limits of philosophical thinking, they 
seek to go a step further than highlight the practical worth of philosophy or its relation to 
natural science.349 Moreover, they also seek to highlight the relevance of what are usually 
understood as political problems (e.g., domination, authority) to issues in metaphysics 
and epistemology.  
Nietzsche, like Stirner, was wary of the democratic and socialist experiments of 
his day as hopelessly usurping individual freedom and our spontaneous urge to create 
																																								 																					
349 For example, we often see echoed in Nietzsche the practical value of both science and concepts like 
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(and destroy according to Bakunin).  Anarchists too are wary of such experiments and for 
the same reasons.  The logic of opposition to such schemes is the same.  It is an 
opposition to grandiose conceptual mappings (even if consensual) of both social and 
intellectual life that respects the individuality of each and disavows us of our Promethean 
aspirations and Procrustean tendencies.  
Anarchists seek, much like these two thinkers, what can be understood as an 
“aristocracy of all, where the liberty and autonomy of each is fully and equally 
respected.”350 They seek this “aristocracy” in the context of a Heraclitean reality that 
accepts the “essence of life is its continuously changing character; but our concepts are 
all discontinuous and fixed, and the only mode of making them coincide with life is by 
arbitrarily supposing positions of arrest therein.” Indeed it is  
With such arrests our concepts may be made congruent. But these concepts are 
not parts of reality, not real positions taken by it, but supposition rather, notes 
taken by ourselves, and you can no more dip up the substance of reality with them 
than you can dip up water with a net, however finely meshed.351  
Stirner, Nietzsche and their interlocutors guard against the authoritarian dangers of such 
“congruence” as well as the arbitrary and limiting force of these suppositions. 
 Reason and its supporting ontological notions like essentialism, human nature, 
and foundationalism of all kinds are usually celebrated for their emancipatory value but 
are derided by Stirner and Nietzsche as psychological weakness, totalizing domination, 																																								 																					
350 Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 33.  
 
351 William James, A Pluralistic Universe [iBook], lecture 6 “Bergson and His Critique of Intellectualism.” 
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and an arbitrarily limiting intellectualism. Instead, Stirner and Nietzsche served as a 
bridge to contemporary anarchist anti-metaphysical and, I argue, anti-intellectualist 
thought by embracing the sensuous and emotive qualities of life as integral to thinking 
and rejecting argumentation as the measure of truth or any other authoritative rendering 
of reality. By recognizing that the intellectualism inherent in our celebration of Reason 
exercises a peculiar logic only applicable to fictitious modes of being wholly divorced 
from these sensuous and emotive qualities, Stirner and Nietzsche intended to debunk the 
Enlightenment-inspired adulation of Reason and undermine the predictable 
intellectualism that accompanies it.  
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Conclusion 
Towards Public Irony 
Anarchism is more than a protest against government.  It is quintessentially anti-
authoritarian. It challenges authority and interrogates relations of domination inherent in 
the inequalities and relations of domination in every realm of life. It follows that 
anarchism also questions epistemological and ontological authority. Those with anarchist 
inclinations tend to question any claim to knowledge, intellectual authority, or 
metaphysical finality. Nevertheless, some contemporary anarchist scholarship has 
stressed the notion that their classical anarchist predecessors largely ignored the dangers 
of the authority of Reason, science, other “foundational” concepts, and the intellectualism 
they engender.  
To the contrary, I have argued a direct challenge to the authority of Reason, 
science, “foundationalisms” of all sorts, and the intellectualism they usually engender 
was already present in the so-called classical anarchists. In doing so, I not only revisited 
the sometimes-caricatured readings of the these anarchists and considered 
postfoundational traits they already possessed, but also critically consider the novel and 
heterogeneous ways anarchists and others have tackled the notion and experience of 
freedom.352 I discovered anarchists appeal to our private judgment in the face of 
established academic institutional power, they question the notion of a Reason-driven 
progress that was integral to the Enlightenment tradition, and they regularly challenge the 
																																								 																					
352 For a detailed consideration of the relationship between anarchism, modernity and postmodernity see 
Nathan Jun, Anarchism and Political Modernity (London: Continuum, 2012).   
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conceptual hegemony of supposed bulwarks of our intellect (e.g., Reason, the scientific 
method, univocal understandings of human nature).  
In chapter one I briefly theorized employing Wittgenstein to imagine what 
anarchist anti-intellectualism might look like.  By using what I consider as action-
oriented understandings of meaning in Wittgenstein’s notions of “knowing how to go on” 
and “rule following” I explore how to broaden our notion of freedom in anarchist 
philosophizing. In the rest of this work I interrogate freedom itself and its many 
“heterotopic logics”353 as they relate to anarchist anti-intellectualism while surveying 
some “paradigmatic” anarchist thinkers.  
 I continued the “turning” of anarchism “on itself” (as Saul Newman would say) in 
a reflection on the “disintegration, of transition, of waning faith in the modern ideas of 
Reason and Progress, and the Enlightenment project in general.”354 In reassessing the 
ostensible “canon” of anarchist thought I interrogated the assumptions of the 
postanarchist literature and connected anarchist anti-intellectualism to the anarchist 
approach to liberation more generally.  Anarchists sought not only social and political 
freedom in their rejection of the legitimacy of the state, the hierarchy of the capitalist 
firm, and the ecclesiastical authority of the church, but also to think freely.  Central to 
such an endeavor is a continual challenge to not only centers of political, economic, and 
religious authority but also a challenge to academic institutions, the celebration of Reason 
and science, and the foundational concepts that usually undergird them.  																																								 																					
353 Svetlana Boym, Another Freedom: The Alternative History of an Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010), 17.  
 
354 Gregory Bruce Smith, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996), 8. 
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A critique of the overconfidence in the persuasive power of reason is nothing 
new. Many have railed against what James C. Scott called “Seeing Like a State” and 
embraced his appeal to metis or the local and tacit knowledge born of and passed along 
by experience in order to combat the increasingly “rationalized” knowledge prioritized by 
the archenemies of anarchists, state systems.355 However, Anarchism is rarely considered 
in concert with thinkers like Wittgenstein who challenge the underlying presuppositions 
of meaning that sustain such critiques. The reason has much to do with the false 
perception that anarchists, by and large, are faithful children of the Enlightenment.  Even 
more rarely are they considered with thinkers like Rorty or Feyerabend who explicitly 
rejected anarchism as a viable political system. This work also navigated anarchist 
philosophy with an eye towards the kind of incessant critique central to the anarchist 
aspiration to be “without adjectives.” 
An incessant critique of the foundational notions of the Enlightenment, 
Modernity, and even Anarchism itself seems central to theorizing within an anarchist 
framework. However, the drive to perpetually question seems impossible to arrest and 
therefore impossible to transcend within the parameters established by modernity that 
seems to encourage such questioning.356 The struggle to transcend such a line of critique 
goes beyond what Rorty called “private irony,” or the incessant employment of new 
vocabularies to better describe and improve our self-image or understanding, because it 
																																								 																					
355 See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
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356 See Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European High 
Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1991). 
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requires us to relate such irony to our relations with others and the political community to 
which we belong.357  
 The process by which we make public our ironism through an anarchist 
framework begins with understanding the contradictions of the process itself and how the 
anarchist tradition has navigated it in the past. In the so-called classical anarchists we see 
an indefatigable faith in the idea that Reason propels progress and that Reason should be 
unimpeded in its exercise. Somewhat contradictorily, we also see that Reason (and 
intellectual authority more generally) is sometimes viewed with suspicion and critically 
appraised as the root of other modes of hierarchy and domination. In the anarchist 
tradition, the ideal of Reason, the scientific method, and the auxiliary notions usually 
used to sustain them are only celebrated because they are seen to contribute to freedom 
within certain contexts and at certain times.  However, the classical anarchists also think 
these same ideas pose a potential hazard to freedom when unquestioningly embraced. For 
anarchists, an uncritical acceptance of these ideals threatens to turn the ostensible search 
for truth or freedom into just another idol or hierarchical enterprise.   
This critique is not uniquely anarchist. The endeavor can be couched in the wider 
reverberations of the Enlightenment. Moreover, there were innumerable debates among 
schools of skeptics, subjectivists, deists, and later, romanticists and postfoundationalists 
concerning our most esteemed faculty of reason and the potential authoritarianism bred of 																																								 																					
357 Richard Rorty describes an ironist as one who has continuing doubts about the final vocabulary they 
employ, that recognizes their present vocabulary as inept to the task of overcoming these doubts, and that 
accepts their vocabulary (or any vocabulary) is no closer to an outside power or external reality than any 
other and are all contingent on the person employing said vocabulary. Willingness to reassess and “be 
impressed” by other vocabularies and admit those vocabularies are not connected to anything beyond 
ourselves. See “Private Irony and Liberal Hope” in Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 73-95.  
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its idealization. In order not stymie to our quest for freedom, anarchists offer twin 
concerns.  They are wary of the arbitrary authority inherent in government, 
concentrations of wealth, and the church (and religion generally) as well as the 
questionable authority of Reason and other modes of intellectual authority. These 
concerns should not sacrifice freedom in one realm for freedom in another.  Means and 
ends should be aligned. Similar to their critique of Marx’s “dictatorship of the 
proletariat,” many anarchists highlight the importance of resisting the lure of absolute 
authority in the realm of the intellect for the sake of some imagined liberation in other 
domains. In other words, we should not sacrifice ourselves to the imagined authority of 
mental abstractions for the sake of some progress in social and political matters. The so-
called classical anarchist thinkers (especially Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and 
Kropotkin) can all be interpreted as having this sometimes-contradictory relationship 
with the ideal of Reason and intellectualism.  This seemingly incongruous positioning 
leads to interesting contrasts and overlaps with postfoundationalist thought (and its 
phenomenological and existential predecessors). It also highlights the line between 
thought and action that anarchists are often negotiating.  
Progress is not Synonymous with Freedom 
In Godwin and Proudhon, there is a sense that progress, and therefore freedom, is 
only possible through the exercise of our reason. Moreover, the ideal of Reason, which is 
implicated in every scheme for societal improvement in these two thinkers, is often 
celebrated as an authority independent of its exercise as a faculty. However, this 
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celebration of our most prized faculty and the idealized constructs that are a consequence 
of this celebration were not absolute.  
Godwin and Proudhon, like Bakunin and Kropotkin after them, struggled between 
notions of immanence and transcendence. While they celebrated seemingly transcendent 
ideals (e.g., liberty, equality, and truth) they also navigated the ephemerality of life and 
reflected this ephemerality in their anarchism (thus rejecting the stifling intellectualism 
that is often a consequence of the unquestioned obedience to transcendent ideals).358 
They recognized the values that should underwrite anarchist ideals but admitted these 
values only existed as part of a contingent and transient reality.  
Godwin’s general attitude towards the celebration of Reason and the 
intellectualism that often follows evolved over time. His faith in the emancipatory 
potential of Reason in Political Justice gave way to an appreciation of the limits of 
Reason in his literary works. His novels demonstrate the dangers of “progressive 
modernity” and largely reject the evident ratiocination of Political Justice (arguably, his 
most famous work).359 Progressively, first in Caleb Williams and then in St. Leon and 
Fleetwood, Godwin offered an exaltation of fellow feeling and our natural sympathies as 
																																								 																					
358 Nathan Jun writes about the struggle between immanence and transcendence in anarchist thought in his 
Anarchism and Political Modernity, 126-7. 
 
359 David Collings, “The Romance of the Impossible: William Godwin in the Empty Place of Reason” 
English Literary History, 70:3 (2003), 849. 
 
		
	 189 
well as a rejection of overarching schemes for societal improvement and our reliance of 
reason for the achievement of justice.360  
Likewise, Proudhon shared the excitement of the philosophes for the ideals of 
progress, Reason, science, and truth. He goes so far as to say that no person’s will 
subjugates the dictates of reason.361 Indeed, Proudhon saw reason as a vehicle for and a 
prerequisite of liberation. Moreover, Proudhon was quite consistent in taking political 
economy as the Archimedean point of all inquiry. In this way, he shared Marx’s 
axiomatic materialist ontology. However, Proudhon also came to oppose an unadulterated 
reverence of Reason and the unquestioned faith in the accompanying scientific 
methodology that Enlightenment thinkers (and Marx) often praised.  
Interestingly, despite many points of agreement Proudhon and Marx vociferously 
disagreed over the notion of authority in the revolutionary process.  It is in this area 
where Proudhon’s views on intellectualism (and the celebration of Reason that sustains 
it) became most pronounced. In one of Proudhon’s famous letters to Marx he exhorted 
the revolutionary to not become the leader of the “new intolerance” of the “religion of 
reason” and instead advocated we tackle a priori dogmatisms and other philosophical 
assumptions with “eloquence and irony.”362 For Proudhon, this eloquence and irony 
should inspire our interpretation of the constant interplay between abstract Reason and 																																								 																					
360 See William Godwin’s, Caleb Williams (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000); St. Leon: A Tale 
of the Sixteenth Century (New York: Arno Press, 1972); and Fleetwood, or The New Man of Feeling 
(Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2001).  
 
361 Pierre Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? ed. Donald R. Kelly and Bonnie G. Smith (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) 209. 
 
362 Proudhon’s letter to Marx is dated 17 May, 1846 and is available at Anarchy Archives, accessed May 
12th, 2016, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/proudhon/letters/proudhontomarx.html. 
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everyday experience. This interplay highlights Proudhon’s consideration of experience as 
a process of becoming and contingency. In this way, he found life to resist fixed and 
absolute schematization.  
While Godwin and Proudhon privileged Reason they also acknowledged its 
limitations and even its dangers. They grappled with the defining features of modernity, 
challenging the framework that grounded the Enlightenment enterprise all the while 
celebrating its emancipatory potential. While many of their so-called classical anarchist 
counterparts were readily skeptical of overarching appeals to Reason and science, 
Godwin and Proudhon only gradually came to challenge the intellectualism inherent in an 
uncritical celebration of Reason and authoritative accounts of auxiliary notions like 
human nature and science.  
Science and the Scientific Method Enable Freedom – or Do They? 
Bakunin and Kropotkin were openly skeptical of Reason and the intellectualism 
associated with it throughout their work. While Bakunin and Kropotkin celebrated the 
scientific method they also diagnosed an intellectual monomania that relied exclusively 
on Reason and science to bring about revolution. According to them, these obsessions led 
to the formation of hierarchically institutionalized forms of scientific discovery, the 
dogmatism of a univocal “rationalism,” and an alienation from everyday living bred from 
a firm division of “intellectual” and manual labor.  
It is clear Bakunin did not consider himself a systematic thinker. He once 
emphatically pronounced that he “cleaved to no system” and he was therefore a “true 
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seeker.”363 He respected the authority of experts but always reserved his “incontestable 
right of criticism and censure” because he recognized “no infallible authority” for such a 
recognition would be fatal to his “reason,” “liberty,” and the success of his undertakings 
and would make him into a “stupid slave, an instrument of the will and interests of 
others.”364 Moreover, he forcefully rejected the auto-legitimating character of scientific 
“progress” and the pretense of the intellectuals associated with it.  
Likewise, while Kropotkin is the representative of “scientific anarchism,” he 
thought anarchism itself was anathema to any institutionalized, scientific, or 
philosophical rendering of social relations. While Kropotkin did rely on the scientific 
observation of animal behavior in nature to inform his theory of mutual aid, he clearly 
delineated the limits of such intellectual endeavors as divorced from our lived experience. 
Kropotkin’s anarchism was based on naturally occurring cooperative tendencies in 
human life and relied on scientific accounts of the same all the while recognizing the 
need to guard against the institutional logic (bred of authoritarian tendencies) of scientific 
associations and universities.  
 In Bakunin and Kropotkin, a disdain for the intelligentsia and a critical treatment 
of the ideal of Reason existed alongside an appreciation of our most esteemed faculty and 
science. While they were aware of their dangers they were outraged at the abuses of an 
idealized Reason and excessive fidelity to science.  Those abuses, and the dangerous 
authoritarian consequences that followed, were products of the intellectuals that morphed 
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an appreciation of intellectual matters into a devotion to intellectualism. In themselves, 
the ideal of Reason, science, and various complementary notions were quite beneficial 
(and in line with the Enlightenment values both Bakunin and Kropotkin prized) to the 
progress of humanity and future anarchist revolutions.  However, their consistent misuse 
and exploitation by the intelligentsia and the institutions associated with them led to a 
dangerous idolization of Reason and science as well as a usurpation of the Enlightenment 
ideals that undergirded much anarchist thought.  
It was perhaps Stirner and Nietzsche who best understood the dangers Godwin, 
Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin highlighted in their treatment of Reason, science, and 
intellectualism.  Stirner rejected the ostensibly emancipatory value of language, 
essentialism, and rationality while Nietzsche challenged the same through his analysis of 
the creative forces of the Dionysian, his rejection of moral absolutes, and his 
perspectivism. In this way, Stirner and Nietzsche sustained and magnified the anti-
intellectualist strain of anarchist thought and served as critical bridges to contemporary 
anarchist postfoundationalism.  
It can be argued that Stirner and Nietzsche went a step further than simply 
highlighting our excessive devotion to Reason, science, intellectualism, and even truth. 
Indeed, they did not think “rationalization” was dangerous because it moved away from 
the Enlightenment ideals cherished by many so called classical anarchists or because they 
celebrated the ideals to the point of idolatry. Rather, they pointed to those very same 
Enlightenment ideals being dangerous. There were many thinkers that certainly thought 
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Enlightenment ideals were being perverted but Stirner, Nietzsche, and their 
postfoundationalist interlocutors recognized dangers in these very ideals.  
They highlighted the incoherence and futility of an overreliance on Reason and 
auxiliary notions like univocal understandings of human nature or the idea of progress. 
Nietzsche challenged our celebration of the Apollonian (i.e., the orderly, rational, and 
disciplined aspects of human thought and action) and rejected transcendental moral 
absolutes, while Stirner highlighted the arbitrariness of “fixed ideas,” the limits of 
language in expressing ideas and guiding action, and the suffocating conceptual 
frameworks of understanding that limit genuine freedom.  
While the Enlightenment tradition gave us a robust account of social and political 
obligation tied to strong conceptions of human nature and its relation to the state, Stirner 
undoes the Enlightenment inspired anthropocentrism of social contract theory while 
preserving the boundless pluralism only recognized through an embrace of absolute and 
unbridled individuality and autonomy. According to Stirner, intellectualism in this sense 
imprisons us in an existence justified by argumentation, rational reflection, and a dubious 
existential certainty. Stirner, like Nietzsche after him, sought to unravel the domination 
inherent in our intellects and free us from the limitations imposed by morality, religion, 
truth, and other “fixed ideas.”  
Nietzsche perhaps best sums up the thrust of the Stirnerian critique by noting, 
“life is not an argument.”365 He rails against the appeals to logic in the history of 																																								 																					
365 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science with A Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, 
trans. Josephine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 117. 
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philosophy. While logic and our faculty of reason certainly have a practical use, they 
have little to do with any philosophical pretension to a discernment of reality for 
Nietzsche. An appeal to Reason and the intellectualism that is its symptom responds to an 
artificial and idealized version of the reality or truth it claims to be discovering.  
A common thread in Stirner and Nietzsche’s critique as well as in the anti-
intellectualism interrogated throughout Godwin’s, Proudhon’s, Bakunin’s, and 
Kropotkin’s work is a gravitation towards a sense of freedom that challenged orthodoxies 
in ostensibly non-political spheres (e.g., epistemology and ontology). All these thinkers, 
in one way or another, offer accounts of “creative destruction.” They reflect the “passion 
for destruction” of, in their view, obsolete and stifling modes of thinking and a “creative 
passion” for thinking freely.366 
Freedom is a Contested Concept 
Thinking freely is the ultimate means and end for anarchist anti-intellectualism.  It 
is also the means by which we are to construct free society along participatory lines. 
Without an ability to think freely we hinder our creative potential and our ability to 
interrogate our grounding philosophical assumptions. However, freedom in this sense is 
considered more broadly than simply an enlightened decision-making. Freedom is a 
contested concept. Modern notions of freedom are varied and embrace different guiding 
attitudes and philosophical orientations.  As Mortimer Adler puts it in his study of the 
subject: 																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
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Burke countered the intemperance of the French Revolution by his own organic 
conception of liberty. Hegel, in attacking the great English Reform Bill of 1831, 
measured it against his own historical and evolutionary theory. Both the 
proponents and the enemies of the New Deal fought under banners of 
freedom…whereas the Anglo-American liberty, won chiefly through victories of 
dissenting religious sects, was mainly attentive to the rights of minorities, the 
French conception, owing much to Rousseau’s theory of the General Will, and to 
the drastic course of revolution, put the emphasis on the sovereignty of the people 
and majority rights.367 
Like Adler’s work, most studies on the subject focus on civil or political liberty. A 
glaring omission in many studies on the idea of freedom is a thorough consideration of 
the anarchist tradition. Despite anarchism being the quintessential anti-authoritarian 
philosophy the idea of freedom in anarchist philosophy is seldom considered.  
I have tried to dissect the idea of freedom and its relation to intellectualism in 
certain “canonical” anarchist thinkers. That is, I have tried firstly to understand the 
anarchist attitude towards bulwarks of our intellect (e.g., the ideal of Reason, the 
scientific method, and other foundational philosophical constructs like human nature and 
truth). I have also attempted to frame the anarchist attitude towards intellectualism within 
a wider consideration of intellectual freedom.  
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Anarchism is sometimes described as the “politics of anti-politics.”368 This notion 
of politics transcends the usual understanding of politics framed vis-a-vis the state. It 
seeks to apply our thinking of political categories (e.g., legitimacy, freedom, domination, 
authority) to every sphere of life. Indeed, for anarchists “politics” is a bit of a misnomer 
in that its concerns could very well apply to issues of hierarchy and authority that fall 
outside the scope of government. Likewise, “freedom” is usually envisioned within a 
framework of some sort of governance.  Appreciating the anarchist conception of anti-
intellectualism requires us to think of anti-authoritarianism, freedom, and politics itself as 
existing in every realm of life. This conception of freedom, authority, and politics goes 
beyond Berlin’s famed distinction between negative and positive liberty as well as 
beyond the republican notion of freedom as non-domination or freedom from structural 
and relational modes of domination. This freedom entails our ability to interrogate the 
very ontological foundation of freedom itself. This requires a healthy suspicion of the 
philosophical underpinnings of ostensible authoritative bulwarks of our intellect. Whether 
it is the governance of the state or our own rational self-legislation, anarchists envision 
freedom as a constant challenge to the authority and legitimacy of governance and share a 
suspicion of concentrations of power wherever they may be found.369  
Anarchism shares this suspicion with everyone from Romanticists and 
Nietzscheans to poststructuralists and post-analytic philosophers. Indeed, there has been 																																								 																					
368 See Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).  
369 In a consideration of the republican notion of freedom as non-domination, Philip Pettit considers 
powerful “doorkeepers” as obstacles to freedom.  By pointing out that any kind of subjection (not just 
“frustration” or “interference”) constitutes domination, Petit echoes the anarchist sentiment that even 
though nothing frustrates or interferes with our “rational self-legislation” we are nevertheless subject to the 
dictates of Reason (which is often-times exploited in ideological and institutional terms by priests, 
scientists, and intellectuals of all kinds). See Philip	Pettit, “The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: 
The Case of Isaiah Berlin,” Ethics, Vol. 73, Issue 1 (Jan 2012): 111-126.	
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plenty of intellectual flirtation between anarchists, Nietzsche and Nietzscheans, and other 
postfoundationalist thinkers indicative of an emphatic anti-intellectualism and “return” to 
lived experience.  Heidegger soon followed Nietzsche in his explicit appeal (beginning 
with his work in Being and Time) to the “priority of the practical, pretheoretical, social 
disclosure of the world.”370 According to Gregory Smith, for Heidegger, “Authenticity 
implies a form of concernfully absorbed action, shaped by a pregiven ethos that 
eventuates in something like Aristotelian phronesis.”371 Indeed, what Smith calls the 
epicureanizing of thought is central to how to think of freedom beyond the theoretical or 
philosophical and as intimately tied to sensual lived experience.372 
Just as easily as the so-called classical anarchists would invoke Reason to justify 
anarchist action, so too would they invoke emotion and improvisation as the path towards 
liberation. Reflexively appealing to our emotions or improvisation in this way is a clear 
rejection of determinism. Indeed, the idea of self-determination can sometimes mean that 
our freely chosen acts should not be caused by preexisting conditions (including any kind 
of rational determinism).373 Likewise, our thinking, in so far as it is freely undertaken, 
should not be saddled with tradition, limiting conceptions of, as Heidegger put it, our 
thinking being (i.e., ridding ourselves of “spooks” as Stirner would put it), nor should it 
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hinge on one overriding univocal ideal of Reason. As Svetlana Boym asserts, “The 
examination of freedom requires a creative logic of its own.”374  
Thinking Freely 
By pushing the boundaries of existing anarchist scholarship by thinking about 
open-ended alternatives to conceiving of freedom in the realm of the intellect I attempt to 
describe what it means to think freely.  This entails an understanding of anti-
intellectualism that embraces anarchist anti-authoritarian values and applies them to our 
ontological and epistemological presuppositions as well as to the foundations of anarchist 
thought (which themselves are constantly negotiated by anarchists of all stripes).  
Svetlana Boym best echoes anarchist sentiments on the matter when she notes  
Possibly the only way to discover or rescue alternative frameworks of freedom for 
the twenty-first century is through thinking freedom neither as the means for an 
end nor as an end that justifies the means but simultaneously as means and ends, 
or as something that defies the means – and – ends rationale altogether.375 
In order to fuse means and ends we need to rid ourselves of intellectual banisters. Boym 
continues,  
In the extreme circumstances of twentieth-century history, the banister of social 
common places and familiar clichés can turn into a scandala, an obstacle that 
leads to a moral scandal and foundation for the ‘banality of evil.’ One has to think 																																								 																					
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through these radical breaks in the twentieth-century tradition that alter the way 
we measure things; otherwise one person’s banisters can turn into another’s 
barbed wire.376 
Arendt was quite clear on the topic as well. Our need for bannisters or the cold 
comfort of Reason “is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. 
And truth and meaning are not the same.”377 And, she notes, “The quest for meaning is 
‘meaningless’ to common sense and common-sense reasoning because it is the sixth 
sense’s function to fit us into the world of appearances and make us at home in the world 
given by our five senses; there we are and no questions asked.”378 She continues,  
And not only is the quest for meaning absent from and good for nothing in the 
ordinary course of human affairs, while at the same time its results remain 
uncertain and unverifiable; thinking is also somehow self-destructive…From 
which it follows that the business of thinking is like Penelope’s web; it undoes 
every morning what it has finished the night before. For the need to think can 
never be stilled by allegedly definite insights of ‘wise men’; it can be satisfied 
only through thinking, and the thoughts I had yesterday will satisfy this need 
today only to the extent that I want and am able to think them anew.379 
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In the Arendtian sense, it is impossible to derive meaning from thinking. Especially when 
that thought is grounded in an enterprise whose very foundation is fleeting.  
 For Paul Feyerabend, attempting to ground this fleeting foundation in the apparent 
stability of an “outside world” or concrete reality through empirical scientific evidence is 
equally absurd. According to Feyerabend, a “democratic criticism of science…belongs to 
the nature of knowledge.”380 No matter how “productive” science might be, its results 
have nothing to do with its validity or desirability and should be challenged by anyone.381  
In much the same vein as Rorty’s idea of the arbitrariness of “final vocabularies,” 
Feyerabend also claims “A tradition assumes desirable or undesirable properties only 
when compared with some tradition…”382 The freedom to challenge Reason (and the 
tradition that celebrates it) intelligibly and creatively is an integral part of thinking freely.  
 Feyerabend squarely describes the stifling effects of an unchallenged Reason in 
political terms.  He notes,  
The teaching of standards and their defence never consists merely in putting them 
before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible. The 
standards are supposed to have maximal causal efficacy as well. This makes it 
very difficult indeed to distinguish between the logical force and the material 
effect of an argument. Just as a well-trained pet will obey his master no matter 
how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and no matter how urgent the 																																								 																					
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need to adopt new patterns of behavior, so in the very same way a well-trained 
rationalist will obey the mental image of his master, he will conform to the 
standards of argumentation he has learned, he will adhere to these standards no 
matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and he will be quite 
incapable of realizing that what he regards as the ‘voice of reason’ is but a causal 
after-effect of the training he has received. He will be quite unable to discover that 
the appeal to reason to which he succumbs so readily is nothing but a political 
manoeuver.383  
According to Feyerabend, to overcome this “political maneuver,” itself steeped in the 
unequal and many times authoritarian institutions of learning, there is a necessity to 
eliminate the alien otherworldliness being imposed by the “standards” of reason, science, 
and ideals of all sorts. He notes,  
We must expect, for example, that the idea of liberty could be made clear only by 
means of the very same actions, which were supposed to create liberty. Creation 
of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are 
very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated 
without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by such a 
programme, for it contains the conditions for the realization of all possible 
programmes. It is guided rather by a vague urge, by a ‘passion’ (Kierkegaard). 
The passion gives rise to specific behavior which in turn creates the circumstances 
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and the ideas necessary for analyzing and explaining the process, for making it 
‘rational.’384  
In other words, Feyerabend echoes the anarchist aspiration of eliminating any kind of 
means and ends rationality.  
This is in line with Wittgenstein’s idea that our concepts depend on our own lived 
experiences. As Hanna Pitkin puts it in her study of Wittgenstein “…the nature of our 
concepts itself depends on our lives as animate creatures in the world.”385 The increasing 
disconnects between means and ends, between lived experience and ideational goals, 
leads to the tragedies critics of the Enlightenment have assailed. Pitkin eloquently 
describes how high-minded emancipatory Enlightenment ideals could degenerate into the 
“iron cage” decried by critical theorists of many stripes for precisely this reason. She 
notes,  
The hidden, the repressed, the distorted, the content of ‘false consciousness,’ also 
varies with person, culture, and time. Indeed, what is a liberating philosophical 
insight for one generation can become the encrusted and misleading conventional 
wisdom of the next. Successful philosophy allows the inquiring mind to discover 
what it needs to know about itself or the world; great philosophy performs this 
service for us all.386  
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Pitkin’s insistence on the Wittgensteinian point that we co-create “great philosophy” in so 
far as it serves us all (not just the “inquisitive” few) is central to the postfoundational 
effort to include any who might care to consider notions like “truth,” “reason,” “justice,” 
or similar instances of “final vocabularies” as largely beside the point. 
 Willingness to reassess and “be impressed” by other vocabularies and admit those 
vocabularies are not connected to anything beyond ourselves breaks open possibilities 
that any metaphysical grounding of thought would exclude.387 The challenge of 
translating the emancipatory potential of this “ironism” to the political is something the 
anarchist tradition is uniquely poised to do.  By already considering politics beyond 
government and the state, anarchists are attuned to how ironism could help sketch the 
possibilities of thinking freely in a way philosophers like Rorty failed to appreciate.  
 According to Rorty, his defense of ironism 
 …turns on making a firm distinction between the private and the public. Whereas 
Habermas sees the line of ironist thinking which runs from Hegel through 
Foucault and Derrida as destructive of social hope, I see this line of thought as 
largely irrelevant to public life and to political questions. Ironist theorists like 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault seem to me invaluable in our attempt to 
form a private self-image, but pretty much useless when it comes to politics. 
Habermas assumes that the task of philosophy is to supply some social glue which 
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will replace religious belief, and to see Enlightenment talk of ‘universality’ and 
‘rationality’ as the best candidate for this glue.388 
While Rorty considers ironism useless when it comes to politics, the anarchist conception 
of anti-intellectualism seeks to apply this same reconsideration of “final vocabularies” to 
a shared skepticism of the social institutions that relay knowledge all the while rejecting 
the “Enlightenment talk” of “universality” and “rationality” as any kind of redeeming 
“social glue.” However, how can we make public that which, according to Rorty, is 
exclusively private? How can we reflect the ironism meant to “form a private self-image” 
in our politics and relations with others? The answer lies largely in the contingency and 
improvisation inherent in anarchism as a political movement and form of association with 
others.  
While Rorty holds that “The metaphysician, in short, thinks that there is a 
connection between redescription and power, and that the right redescription can make us 
free,” the ironist “offers no similar assurance.”389 The anarchist similarly offers no 
resolution in the form of a correct redescription and hopes to transfer such a dismissal of 
the force of redescription to the public realm. Anarchists’ political attitudes are already 
imbued by their own ironism and action oriented understandings of meaning. Anarchists 
already believe that any kind of metaphysical grounding or accurate redescription of 
reality will not yield freedom. Only direct action aligning our anti-authoritarian means 
with our emancipatory ends will yield anything similar. Their refusal to ossify any 
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political order or ideal precisely under the banner of freedom is what makes anarchism an 
ideal channel to navigate its own lively anti-intellectualism towards a public ironism and 
a continued resistance to arbitrary authority in any sphere.  
This navigation should not simply be derivative of postfoundational attitudes 
towards “grand narratives” and “totalizing notions” that Habermas and Rorty 
appropriately consider politically sterile. Rather, in a Wittgensteinian vein, we should 
endeavor to think like anarchists. When we care to consider how to think like an anarchist 
we are not only contemplating a general suspicion towards concentrations of political, 
economic, and ecclesiastical power, or simply reflecting on how best to constitute a 
society with voluntary institutions based on the principle of free association so integral to 
anarchist philosophy. Instead, we are also aspiring to think without “banisters,” and make 
public our ironism, essentially improvising without the comfort of a political blueprint.  
That is, we are thinking freely.  
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